SWEDISH ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAQ INCREASING; SWEDISH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003296

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV EINV ETRD IZ SE
SUBJECT: SWEDISH ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAQ INCREASING; SWEDISH
TRADE MINISTER TO VISIT

REF: (A) BAGHDAD 2174 (B) STOCKHOLM 482 (C) BAGHDAD
1852

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Sweden has made a large commitment to Iraq
and intends to do more, particularly as it looks ahead to its
July 2009 European Union (EU) Presidency. In an October 8
meeting, visiting Swedish Ambassador Niclas Trouve and
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Deputy Director
General Robert Rydberg told Ambassador Crocker and General
Odierno that Swedish Trade Minister Bjorling planned to visit
Iraq in about a month and Foreign Minister Bildt may come
some time after. Trouve sought the Ambassador's and
Commanding General's (CG) assessments of Iraq's current
political and security situation, and underlined Sweden's
commitment to contribute to Iraq's future. On the standing
up of a permanent Swedish Embassy by spring 2009, Trouve said
all is still on schedule but expressed concern about the
imminent removal of immunities for private security
contractors. He delivered a letter from the Swedish MFA
officially requesting and enumerating specific security
assistance from the U.S., floated the idea that the U.S.
should pay for alterations to the perimeter walls of the
Swedish Embassy site as a solution to the issue of Wartsila
generator convoys, and said that Sweden is still waiting for
an answer to its July request for information on a Swedish
detainee at Camp Cropper. Trouve noted that he will travel
to Washington and New York in December. End Summary.

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Swedish Engagement Influential and Appreciated
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2. (C) Deputy Director General Rydberg began by underlining
Sweden's significant investment in Iraq. It hosted the May
International Compact with Iraq (ICI) review conference and
has begun construction on its new embassy in Baghdad, the
biggest Swedish embassy project since the fall of the Berlin
Wall. Ambassador Crocker stressed that Sweden's engagement,
and particularly that of Foreign Minister Bildt, has been
enormously important in catalyzing wider European
involvement. The May ICI meeting sent a powerful signal
throughout Europe. Ambassador Crocker said that Foreign
Minister Zebari has told him visits by the German, Italian
and Slovakian Foreign Ministers are in process. Rydberg
noted that Swedish Trade Minister Bjorling is planning to
visit Iraq next month. Swedish Foreign Minister Bildt will
come sometime after. Ambassador Crocker encouraged Sweden to
use the visit of Trade Minister Bjorling to press home the
message that Iraq must take steps to improve its business
climate. Currently Iraq is rated 152nd in the world as a
place to do business by the World Bank's 2009 "Doing
Business" Report. He recommended Bjorling engage Deputy
Prime Minister Barham Saleh on this, given his key role both
in Baghdad and in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on
business matters.


3. (C) Turning more broadly to the critical role Sweden can
play in strengthening Iraq's international relations,
Ambassador Crocker said that Sweden - as a neutral country
that represents the values of the West - is in a tremendously
influential position. We are at an historic moment: since
the 1958 revolution, Iraq has been a major source of regional
and global instability. Now, for the first time in 50 years,
it has a government that is oriented toward the West. The
West must take advantage of this moment as there are
countervailing forces that have other designs. Sweden's
voice has influence in the EU and at UN Headquarters.
Ambassador Crocker also stressed the need for the
international financial institutions (IFIs) to step forward,
a message he told Ambassador Trouve he has delivered in
Washington. The International Monetary Fund needs to staff
an office here and the World Bank needs to expand its
presence in order to build the lasting relationships that
will be critical over the longer term.

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Security and the SOFA
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4. (C) Ambassador Trouve then solicited the Ambassador's
and CG's assessment of the current political and security
situation as well as prospects for successful conclusion of a
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). His particular interest
was on how they would impact Swedish Embassy operations.
Trouve asked specifically about timetables for a U.S.
withdrawal and confirmation that immunities for private
security contractors would no longer exist after the end of
the year. On the ongoing SOFA negotiations, Ambassador
Crocker said we are close, but a few hard issues remain. The

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U.S., he said, is cognizant of the potent effect the British
colonial legacy still has on the Iraqi psyche and the need
for any agreement to sanctify Iraq's full sovereignty. At
the same time, he stated, we have some core concerns that
need to be met. In the end, we must have a legal basis for
our forces to remain.


5. (C) General Odierno provided an overall security
assessment, noting that, with the exception of Ninewa
province, steady improvements continue countrywide. While
these gains are still fragile, the recent spate of
high-profile bombings in Baghdad notwithstanding, the overall
number of attacks has not risen in past weeks. AQI has been
pushed to the north and its ability to conduct operations
elsewhere has been greatly diminished. Similarly, operations
this year against Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) Special Groups has led
them to adjust tactics, focusing more on small, well-trained
teams that target primarily mid-level GOI officials. General
Odierno said that Iran is supporting these teams and is also
using "soft power" tools to influence Iraq's political
situation. In response to a question by Ambassador Trouve on
Sons of Iraq (SOI) integration, General Odierno assessed it
as going well thus far. Prime Minister Maliki's directives
to the Iraqi military indicate he wants it to succeed. That
said, the U.S. is monitoring the situation closely.

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Iraq's Multidimensional Politics
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6. (C) On the political front, Ambassador Crocker and
General Odierno updated Trouve and Rydberg on dynamics within
the Sunni and Shia communities, Arab-Kurdish tensions, and
the impact of PM Maliki's growing assertiveness. On the
Sunnis, Ambassador Crocker said that the Sahwa movements do
constitute a political force. How that will play out is not
yet certain. A number of groups with the Sahwa name have
registered as political parties in order to take part in the
upcoming provincial elections. While this is a positive
sign, the Ambassador noted, it is also potentially
problematic as their experience in political organizing is
nonexistent. We are looking at how best to keep their
expectations realistic. What we don't want, he stressed, is
for these groups to go into the provincial council elections
poorly organized and overconfident, then not succeed and
spend the next several years again in the political
wilderness. Hopefully we will see local alliances emerge
between Sahwas and the established Sunni political parties.
If handled properly, the upcoming elections should redress
the imbalances that resulted from the 2005 Sunni boycott.


7. (C) Turning to the Shia, Ambassador Crocker noted recent
efforts by Prime Minister Maliki to reach out to the
Sadrists. It is still an open question whether he is doing
this in his capacity as Prime Minister of Iraq or as the Dawa
Party leader with an eye to elections. Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI) is also reaching out to the Sadrists
and the Sadrists themselves have become increasingly vocal in
their criticism of Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs. As
an example, Ambassador Crocker pointed to this past week's
incident when Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mashadani's plane was
denied entry into Iranian airspace enroute to Tehran for
official meetings. Sadrist parliamentary member (and chair
of the parliament's Legal Committee) Baha al-Arraji publicly
denounced this Iranian action as "an insult to a pillar of
Iraq's democracy." (Note: Mashadani eventually did go to
Tehran. End Note.) Many Sadrists recognize that the JAM did
not work out as planned and are now prepared to transform
their energies into political and social efforts.


8. (C) On recent Kurdish-Arab tensions on Kirkuk, Khanaqin,
and Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs),Ambassador Trouve
asked what role the U.S. is playing to resolve these issues.
On Khanaqin, General Odierno responded that our commanders in
the field have emphasized to both sides that the last thing
they need is for this to result in armed conflict -- we must
make sure that a tactical mistake does not lead to strategic
consequences. In reality, General Odierno observed, the real
problem has been the inflammatory comments of Barzani and
Maliki, but it appears now that the situation has now been
defused and cooler heads have prevailed.


9. (C) Ambassador Crocker noted that this issue offers
great insight into the multidimensional aspect of Iraqi
politics. First, although not in KRG territory, the
Peshmerga moved into Khanaqin several years ago to provide
security when the central government was incapable of doing
so. At that time, the primarily Kurdish population of
Khanaqin welcomed their presence. Now, however, the broader
context has changed. The position of the central government
is much stronger and Maliki wants to redress the situation.

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Second, the improved security situation has resulted in both
Sunnis and Shia increasingly identifying themselves as Arabs
over their sectarian affiliation. This strengthened sense of
"Arabness" has produced a newly emerging Sunni-Shia alliance
against the Kurds, as was shown in the July parliamentary
vote on a provincial elections law (which was then vetoed by
the Presidency Council). Third, and to some degree a
countervailing force to the Sunni/Shia versus Kurd dynamic,
there is the tension between Maliki's efforts to strengthen
central government authority and resistance to that from
Kurds, and some Sunnis and Shia in the provinces. Ambassador
Crocker underlined that all these currents are the result of
a demonstrably improved security situation.

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Turkey/PKK
--------------


10. (C) The discussion touched briefly on the recent
Kurdistan Workers, Party (PKK) attack on Turkish soldiers
very close to Turkey-Iraq border. Ambassador Crocker told
Ambassador Trouve that it is critical for Iraqi Kurds to
understand how explosive this issue is with the Turkish
population. He noted that both Talabani and Barzani
immediately condemned the attack. General Odierno added that
this is a complex issue that does not have a military
solution. The GOT, he noted, understands this but is under
tremendous public pressure to do something. In reality, the
steps the GOI will need to take are both multifaceted in
nature and will take perhaps five to seven years, which does
not mesh up well with the Turks desire to see the PKK
eliminated now.

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Swedish Embassy Update, Future of Private Security
Contractors, and Wartsila Generator Convoys
--------------


11. (C) Ambassador Trouve then turned to concrete issues
related to progress on Sweden's embassy project. The plan to
open the embassy in April 2009 is on track, he said. The
architects in charge have told him all is going well. The
security perimeter is in place and a security force is
present. The Swedes continue to use the security services of
the UK-based Control Risks Group (including Gurkha stationary
guards at the embassy building site). Ambassador Trouve said
he proposed to Foreign Minister Zebari that security
personnel on Swedish Embassy grounds, and those protecting
him when he travels, should be covered under the Vienna
Convention. He expressed concern, however, about what would
happen should a Swedish security officer shoot someone. He
also noted that providing diplomatic passports for these
individuals would be problematic, given that most are not
Swedish. Ambassador Crocker noted that the U.S. Embassy has
already initiated a dialogue with the Iraqi Ministry of
Interior about training special Iraqi protection units that
eventually will provide protection for U.S. diplomatic
personnel. Ambassador Crocker emphasized that as we move
forward, security responsibilities have to be "Iraqi-ized."


12. (C) Ambassador Trouve then raised the ongoing issue
(refs B and C) of the convoys of huge Wartsila generators
that must pass by the Swedish Embassy site and have
necessitated temporary movement of exterior T-walls. (Note:
The moving of the T-walls takes place entirely on the public
road that passes directly in front of the Swedish Embassy and
which the GOI has never acknowledged to be part of the
Swedish compound. The Swedes are using this public road as
their construction laydown area and are doing so
unilaterally, according to the Iraqi MFA. End Note.) Trouve
confirmed that the last two convoys went smoothly but also
said "we're not happy about this." The situation has created
the impression that the Swedes are allowing military convoys
to pass through their premises. Additionally, the moving of
T-walls reduces the setback from the street and makes the
embassy site more vulnerable to VBIEDs. Trouve asked how
many more Wartsila convoys were expected and General Odierno
responded that two more are scheduled. Ambassador Crocker
noted that whether there will be future convoys beyond this
is a GOI decision and urged the Swedes to engage the Ministry
of Electricity regarding its future intentions. Ambassador
Trouve then informally conveyed that the architects of the
project say that an alteration in the positioning of the
T-walls can be accommodated into their design. However, it
would cost $75,000 to $100,000. Trouve floated the idea that
"maybe this is something we can discuss." Ambassador Crocker
again recommended that Trouve raise this with the GOI.

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Formal Request for Security Assistance
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13. (C) Following up on conversations earlier this year
with both Ambassador Crocker and DCM Butenis (refs A and C),
Ambassador Trouve presented a formal letter from the Swedish
MFA requesting U.S. Embassy assistance for Swedish embassy
personnel in the event of emergency situations. The letter
requests assistance in four specific areas: Quick Reaction
Force (QRF); emergency communications and
intelligence/information exchange; MEDEVAC and access to the
Combat Support Hospital (CSH); and hostage assistance.
Trouve said that once the U.S. formally responds to this
request it will designate a point of contact with whom we
should liaise.

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Swedish Camp Cropper Detainee; Information Again Requested
--------------


14. (C) In a brief aside, Ambassador Trouve noted that the
U.S. had not yet responded to an official letter Sweden had
delivered in July regarding the situation of a Swedish
detainee at Camp Cropper. "We need an answer," he said.

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Trouve to Washington and New York in December
--------------


15. (C) As the meeting concluded, Ambassador Trouve said he
will be traveling to Washington and New York in December.
Ambassador Crocker asked that he provide us his specific
dates when he knows them, as there would be a number of USG
officials who would be very interested in meeting with him.
CROCKER