DPM ISSAWI TO DEPUTY SECRETARY: "IRAQI DEMOCRACY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003291

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON IZ
SUBJECT: DPM ISSAWI TO DEPUTY SECRETARY: "IRAQI DEMOCRACY
IS AT RISK"

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) On October 6, Deputy Secretary of State John
Negroponte met with Deputy Prime Minister for Essential
Services Rafae Issawi in the DPM's Residence. Ambassador
Marc Wall, Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, and
Sunni Tawafaq parliamentarians Salman al-Jumaili and Dhafer
al-Ani also attended the meeting.


2. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Issawi warned the Deputy
Secretary of a "dangerous" consolidation of power by Prime
Minister Maliki and his Shi'a backers. He said the GOI was
failing to incorporate Sons of Iraq into the security forces
or civilian life, a trend that could turn them against the
government. The Deputy Secretary encouraged more Sunni
participation in the 2009 elections than had been the case in
2005, and stressed the need for reconstruction progress to
keep up with security gains. End Summary.

DPM: IRAQ CONTROLLED BY "ONE MAN, ONE PARTY"
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3. (C) DPM Issawi - a Sunni Arab - started the conversation
by warning the Deputy Secretary of a "dangerous"
consolidation of power taking place in Iraq. All key matters
- security, oil, trade, finance - are controlled by "one man,
one party," he explained, singling out Prime Minister Maliki
and ISCI (Note: PM is a member of Da'wa party. End Note).
Declaring "democracy is at risk," Issawi said politicians
throughout the provinces, especially the KRG, are under the
false impression they are part of the decision-making
process. He blamed overconfidence among the Shi'a Arab
political elite and a policy of sectarian marginalization as
the root causes of this problem. As an example, Issawi
recalled when during a trip to Mosul, the Iraqi Army (IA)
commander recommended recruiting from the local population.
Issawi recounted, however, that the PM was dismissive when he
raised the issue. "The Prime Minister said there are already
6,000 soldiers from Mosul - this was enough," he explained.
Meanwhile, Issawi said, 15 out of 17 of the Ministry of
Defense's most senior officials are Shi'a Arabs. He also
highlighted a new draft law in the Council of Representatives
that would shift approving authority for army generals from
the President to the Prime Minister.

DPM ON SONS OF IRAQ
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4. (C) Issawi complained the GOI was failing to incorporate
Sons of Iraq (SOI) into the security forces or civilian jobs,
and said this could eventually turn them against the Iraqi
government. He said the problem was most disconcerting in
Diyalah and Baghdad. Blaming a "decision made in Iran,"
Issawi said one month ago the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
began arresting key SOI leaders and foot soldiers, forcing
many to flee Iraq. He alleged advisers to the PM continue to
assert that SOI are affiliated with Al-Qaeda and
anti-government Sunni insurgents. When the Deputy Secretary
asked Issawi how to best handle the SOIs, Issawi replied the
GOI needed to form a "multi-sectarian" committee to first
identify qualified SOI for absorption into Iraqi Police (IP).
Issawi stated the GOI then needed to facilitate "permanent"
civilian employment for those not qualified to enter the
security forces. "The current policy is very bad," he said,
"And it will leave scars in their hearts and turn them
against the government." When the Deputy Secretary pointed
out greater success with absorbing SOI in Anbar province,
Issawi - himself from Anbar - conceded it was easier to deal
with the SOI issue in "homogeneous" provinces (Comment:
Issawi has previously suggested that the GOI should absorb
all 100,000 SOI into either the IA or IP, in order to balance
Shi'a and Kurd numbers in both. End Comment.)

RECONSTRUCTION
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5. (C) The Deputy Secretary stressed the importance of
reconstruction, sharing his observations that gains in
security have generally not been matched by progress in the
delivery of essential services. The Deputy Secretary
recounted his visit to Ramadi, where markets were bustling,
but roads and buildings remained in extremely poor condition.
He underscored the importance of a more aggressive GOI push
for reconstruction, and the need to do so now while Iraq was
enjoying windfall oil revenue. Issawi said Iraq's legacy of
central planning and the post-2003 brain drain was
responsible for lack of reconstruction project execution. He
furthermore blamed line ministers, stating many were
incapable, stymied by bureaucracies, or harboring sectarian

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motives, adding that an "Iranian style" of governance by
procrastination permeated the GOI. He also said the private
sector was not sufficiently developing outside the KRG.

PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS
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6. (C) Tawafuq parliamentarian Dhafer al-Ani complained the
Shi'a-dominated government was pushing religious leaders as
candidates for the upcoming provincial elections, and the
Deputy Secretary encouraged more Sunni participation in
elections. In response to the parliamentarians' concerns
over Iranian influence and further sectarian marginalization,
the Deputy Secretary reminded the group that many Sunni,
especially in the west, boycotted the last round of
elections. He said the level of Sunni participation in the
future of Iraq would be strongly related to their voter
turnout. Ani acknowledged this, promising, "This time, we
will be part of the election...all over Iraq, not just in
Sunni majority areas."

COMMENT
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7. (C) Issawi was clearly intent on keeping the conversation
focused on his complaints of Shia consolidation of power,
rather than discussing essential services - his mandate.
Even when the Deputy Secretary steered the conversation
towards a frank exchange of ideas on reconstruction, Issawi
would return to the subject of sectarianism, Iranian
influence, and SOIs. Issawi's complaints reflect other
conversations we have had with him. They also demonstrate,
however, his firm belief that a failure by the GOI to address
these issues will result in security lapses that can
insurmountably obstruct his efforts to improve essential
services throughout Iraq. End Comment.


8. (U) DepSec staff has cleared this cable.
CROCKER