AYATOLLAH TELLS NEGROPONTE: U.S. MUST STAY UNTIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003288

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: AYATOLLAH TELLS NEGROPONTE: U.S. MUST STAY UNTIL
THE JOB IS DONE

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Baghdad's leading Shi'a cleric Ayatollah Hussein Al
Sadr told Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte October 6
that the United States and Iraq are "working toward a greater
good" to establish a "strong, free, and prosperous" Iraq, but
he urged the U.S. to "ensure we reach this goal," and warned
against a premature exit from Iraq by U.S. forces. In an
otherwise wide-ranging conversation on the situation in Iraq,
Al Sadr returned to this point again and again, saying that
the goal of strengthening Iraq "seemed to require more
serious effort." Throughout the discussion, Al Sadr also
sounded the alarm on excessive Iranian influence in Iraq. To
punctuate his remarks, Al Sadr's aides warned that a return
to instability in Iraq similar to Afghanistan's is not
unimaginable. END SUMMARY.

DANGEROUS IF U.S. LEAVES
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2. (C) Deputy Secretary Negroponte met Ayatollah Hussein Al
Sadr at his home for a genial discussion that included dinner
in the Ayatollah's garden and reminiscences of previous
conversations. Pol M/C Ford, poloff (notetaker),and an
embassy interpreter accompanied. Al Sadr repeatedly
emphasized that the U.S. and Iraq had "achieved a lot" in
joint efforts to develop a strong, free, and prosperous Iraq,
but "had not yet achieved everything." Despite a "sound
plan" and much "blood sacrificed" by both Iraqis and
Americans, Al Sadr warned that the job is as yet incomplete.
He believes that the Iraqi government is still weak and needs
U.S. support. According to Al Sadr, it would be dangerous
for the U.S. to leave Iraq soon.

IRAN IS NOT OUR GUARDIAN
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3. (C) Claiming that he is "an Iraqi before a Shi'a," Al
Sadr decried the "clear and flagrant" interference by other
countries in Iraq's affairs. He singled out Syria, Saudi
Arabia, and Iran in particular. Warming to the theme of
undue Iranian influence, he asserted that "Persian
footprints" are all over Iraq. Al Sadr maintains that
Iranian intelligence has offices in the provincial
governorates and even in the national Council of
Representatives. He declared that "Iran is not our guardian"
and wondered aloud how the U.S. could stay silent in the face
of Iran's penetration into Iraq.

BADR MILITIAS
--------------

4. (C) The Ayatollah also directed some venom at the Shia
Islamist group Badr, noting that the Shi'a militia Jaysh
al-Mahdi had been stopped, but now the Badr Corps militia was
asserting domination over the Interior Ministry (he provided
no specifics). The Ayatollah said he was watching the
competition between the Shia Islamist parties Dawa and
ISCI/Badr for tribal loyalties in southern Iraq. He worried
that this competition could lead to armed clashes or even the
creation of new tribal militias in southern Iraq when
security there is relatively good now.

NEW POLITICIANS
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5. (C) Al Sadr admonished the U.S. for installing expatriate
Iraqi politicians as "princes" in Iraq, in whom Al Sadr and
his followers had wanted to believe, but who ultimately did
not deliver results. He believes Iraq's current politicians
are weak and the country needs new ones. Speaking
specifically of Prime Minister Maliki, Al Sadr believes him a
"good man," but his overall performance "is not good." The
Ayatollah advised "we should not continue with Maliki much
longer."

WARNINGS
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7. (C) At several points, Al Sadr and his aides called for
increased U.S. involvement to support emerging political
entities, and to counter popular discontent with the current
Iraqi government. Al Sadr aides warned that "Iraq is ready"
to return to a resurgence of violence similar to that taking
place in Afghanistan now, led by "either Sunni or Shi'a."
They wondered aloud "what would happen on December 31" if the
U.S. and Iraq did not reach agreement on the SOFA, to which
Deputy Negroponte replied "we will not stay if we are not
wanted."


BAGHDAD 00003288 002 OF 002


COMMENT
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8. (C) Al Sadr and his aides stuck closely to their talking
points: on at least six occasions throughout the evening, he
reiterated the don't-leave-the-job-undone theme. They were
not assuaged by the Deputy Secretary's observations that Iraq
was growing stronger. D noted their concerns but held that
the U.S. must limit its involvement in internal Iraqi
politics while not absolving itself of responsibility to
continue to support Iraq's stability and growth. As a
leading Shi'a cleric, dark horse successor to Ayatollah
Sistani, and uncle to Muqtada Al Sadr, Al Sadr's comments
highlight that despite some dissatisfaction with aspects of
U.S. involvement in Iraq, influential Iraqis tell us that a
continued U.S. presence is crucial for enduring Iraqi
independence. END COMMENT.


9. (U) DepSec staff has cleared this cable.
CROCKER