SAHWA LEADER ABU AZZAM AN AMBITIOUS POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003263

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER IZ
SUBJECT: SAHWA LEADER ABU AZZAM AN AMBITIOUS POLITICAL
WANNABE

REF: BAGHDAD 2831

Classified By: PMIN Robert S. Ford. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Sahwa leader Thamir Al Tamimi, aka Abu Azzam, said
that the Sahwa issues are not yet over for the government of
Iraq (GOI),despite his own claims in the press that the
process is going smoothly. This is not the only time Abu
Azzam has issued contradictory statements weeks. He has also
said that Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki is both good and bad
for the Sunni Arabs. He predicted that the Iraqiyya-Hewar
coalition announced in the first week of October would endure
and he has also said it would not survive the first crisis.
He has called the IIP weak, divided, and untrustworthy, but
he also labeled it a nationalist party that possibly would
make an acceptable coalition partner. He said that the SOFA
is good and would help Iraq avoid a civil war, but he also
predicted publicly that even without the SOFA Iraqis could
come together. These inconsistencies are part and parcel of
regular interactions with Abu Azzam. We conclude from our
private discussions with him, and the contrasts with what he
says in public, that Abu Azzam is an opportunistic and
relatively hardline Sahwa leader with big political ambitions
who says different things to different audiences.

Is the Sahwa Finished: Not Yet
--------------


2. (C) Sahwa leader Abu Azzam told poloffs on October 6 that
it is still too early to predict whether the Sahwa transition
to GoI supervision can be considered a success. This
transition depends on the government's delivery of its
promise to pay Sahwa members salaries, beginning on November

1. He claimed that only five percent of Baghdad Sahwa
members have transitioned to the GoI. The problem is that
powerful political parties with militias (i.e. ISCI) are
forcing the GOI to slow the transition process. The
militias, according to Abu Azzam, also have infiltrated Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) and are targeting Sahwa leaders in an
effort to deter Sahwa members from joining the ISF. He hopes
that, based on the agreement with the GOI, qualified Sahwa
members would be able to join ISF - regardless of the 20
percent quota - while those who are not qualified for entry
into ISF should be offered civilian jobs.


3. (C) Abu Azzam said that the slow integration process and
uncertainty surrounding Sahwa members' future are causing
them to lose their enthusiasm and ignoring their security
duties. He added that currently, if a Sahwa member saw
someone planting an IED (Improvised Explosive Devise) he
would turn the blind eye. He told poloffs that Sahwa members
prefer to be incorporated with the Iraqi Police (IP) instead
of the (Iraqi Army). Most army soldiers get posted to
unfamiliar provinces, and Sahwa members prefer to join the
police in order to remain in their own neighborhoods, among
their own people and tribe.

A Sahwa Leader Shopping for Political Support:
--------------


4. (C) Abu Azzam told poloffs that he had spoken with Salih
Mutlaq (Tawafuq) and Ayad Allawi (Iraqiyaa) to form an
alliance to run in the upcoming provincial elections.
However, he doubts that Ayad Allawi was serious about the
alliance with Abu Azzam. He said that Mutlaq and Allawi are
in agreement to run as a tandem in the upcoming election,
Allawi aiming to be the next Prime Minister, and Salih Mutlaq
to be the President. Abu Azzam doubts that this coalition
would survive without a strong Sunni backing. He added that
Allawi lacks popularity among Iraqis and Salih Mutlaq lacks
Sunni support. Regardless, Abu Azzam did not eliminate the
possibility of working with them when and if the opportunity
arises. Abu Azzam also told us that he is talking to other
hardline Sunni political figures, such as Khalaf al-Ulyan and
Adnan ad-Dulaymi.


5. (C) Abu Azzam said he was not in favor of forming an
alliance with the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). He indicated
that IIP's murky relationship with ISCI and the Kurds makes
them an unfavorable ally and one not to be trusted. He said
that IIP was losing its popularity, influence, and
credibility among Sunni Arabs due to their approval of the
constitution in 2005. (Comment: However, he also in media
interviews praised the IIP as a "nationalist" party opposed
to Iranian intervention. Perhaps for this reason, he
admitted to us reaching out to the IIP several times,
although IIP rebuffed him. End Comment.)


6. (C) Abu Azzam also told us on October 6 that he had
spoken with the Prime Minister's advisor, Sami Al-Askeri in
late September and told Al-Askeri that cooperation with the
IIP in the upcoming provincial elections could not be ruled

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out. Abu Azzam said that he is convinced Maliki is trying to
divide Sunni political opposition, especially the IIP. Abu
Azzam added that by forming a strong Sunni alliance among
various Sunni groups, he would be stronger politically and
more popular than the IIP.

SOFA: It Would Be Good Against Iran
--------------


7. (C) According to Abu Azzam, parliament will veto a
security agreement between the U.S. and Iraq. He also
asserted that if the U.S. forces decided to withdraw from
Iraq, a civil war would be forthcoming. By contrast, in his
October 2 interview with Al-Arabiya Arabic TV-channel, he
said if the U.S Forces withdrew from Iraq now or in 2011,
eventually Iraqis would be able to work together in resolving
their problems. The real work now, he said, is to get Sunni
Arabs more engaged in the political arena in order to fight
Iranian influence which remains the real and dangerous threat
to Iraq and the region.


8. (C) COMMENT: In private meetings with poloffs, Abu Azzam
vehemently expressed his dislike of the Shia-led Government
and called Al-Maliki a corrupt Iranian puppet. Yet, in his
media interviews he is much less critical of Maliki,
occasionally even laudatory. His positions with regards to
the leading Sunni political parties are likewise dichotomous
- public support and private criticism. When asked about the
divergent positions, Abu Azzam told poloffs that in his media
interviews he would like to give a false impression that
Iraqis are united and Maliki is competent. It is clear that
he is trying to manipulate the media in an attempt to raise
his profile among Iraqi voters, perhaps seeking more support
for his new political party "Iraqi Dignity Front" and
promoting his own political agenda. Even though he described
himself as a friend of the West in general, and the U.S. in
particular, we have doubts about his political agenda. Above
all, he is an opportunistic political hopeful who so far
doesn't look too scrupulous to us. To give him credit, Abu
Azzam's message about Iran remains the same whether he was
addressing the media or us. END COMMENT.

CROCKER