NEW ARAB AMBASSADORS TO IRAQ: SETTING PARAMETERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003218

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: NEW ARAB AMBASSADORS TO IRAQ: SETTING PARAMETERS
FOR OUR ASSISTANCE

REF: KUWAIT 1007

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Action Request: This message provides Embassy
Baghdad's assessment of logistical and other support we are
able to offer newly arriving ambassadors from neighboring
Arab countries. We seek the Department's concurrence with
this approach and request that Embassies Abu Dhabi, Amman,
Manama, Kuwait, Riyadh and Cairo be instructed to share the
contents of paras 5-8 and 10 with host governments so that
those governments have an accurate understanding of the kinds
of assistance we are able to offer.

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Here They Come
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2. (C) The expected post-Eid arrival of Ambassadors from the
UAE, Jordan, Bahrain and Kuwait will mark an important
milestone in Iraq,s continuing reintegration into the
region. Following this summer,s string of Arab high-level
visits, their arrival will underline greater regional
confidence in Iraq,s future. As such, there is a strong
U.S. policy interest in facilitating these developments.
Indeed, our message over the past months has been that the
U.S. would support Arab embassies seeking to reopen in
Baghdad. The time has come to define the parameters of that
support. We do not want to be seen as indifferent to the
real security concerns, or the day-to-day challenges of
living in Baghdad, that these arriving diplomats will face.
At the same time, our experience over the past months and our
ongoing resource constraints show that our assistance cannot
be open ended. We need to be clear on what we can and cannot
do to assist them. Moreover, our initial responses will set
precedents for the future.


3. (C) The Arab countries that have decided to return
ambassadors to Baghdad continue to perceive GOI capabilities,
especially with regard to security, as inadequate and have
requested specific U.S. assistance.

-- Jordanian diplomats who arrived two weeks ago informally
requested approval to fly to/from Amman via U.S. Milair for
reasons of convenience and security. They have also
expressed frustration with the lack of support they are
getting from the GOI.

-- Kuwaiti Ambassador-designate Ali al-Mou,min expects
Coalition Forces to handle his security when he arrives (at
least for an initial period),that he will be permitted to
fly to/from/within Iraq on U.S. Milair, and that he will have
access to U.S. Embassy dining and recreation facilities (ref
A).

-- On September 30, Embassy Manama alerted us of an impending
October 7 visit of Ambassador-designate Maliki and a Bahraini
request for security coverage between Baghdad International
Airport (BIAP) and the International Zone (IZ).

-- On September 28, the UAE requested U.S. security coverage
for a 10-12 day visit of newly named Ambassador Abdullah
al-Shihhi, expected to begin on October 3.


4. (C) We assume other Arab diplomatic delegations will seek
similar types of support as they move to restore full
diplomatic relations with Iraq. Providing the type of
assistance outlined above would have significant resource
implications. It would also deflect responsibility for
addressing these issues away from the GOI, where it rightly
should lie. We need to communicate clearly the parameters of
our support both to the GOI and to each of the countries
concerned. Below is Embassy Baghdad's enumeration of these
parameters in specific terms.

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Proposed Levels of Embassy Support
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5. (SBU) Security: In general, Embassy/RSO should not provide
transportation/security between BIAP and the IZ, except under
extraordinary circumstances. All transportation/security
to/from BIAP and within the IZ should be worked directly
between the third country government and the GOI. RSO can
share threat information, as appropriate, and offer advice on
a range of security issues as well as facilitate contact with
private security companies. For more details on specific
assistance RSO can provide to these arriving delegations, see
para 10 below.


6. (SBU) MilAir: As a general rule, we should not make
MilAir flights available to third country diplomats. Baghdad

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is serviced by regularly scheduled commercial flights to/from
Amman, as well as civilian charter flights to/from other
regional destinations. These should be the main modes of
transportation in and out of the country. If third country
governments are concerned about the security of these
flights, they can dispatch their own MilAir to transport
their officials. MNF-I can facilitate flight clearances and
other logistical requirements at BIAP. We can consider
allowing third country diplomats to fly on U.S. MilAir on a
case-by-case basis if the circumstances absolutely demand it.


7. (SBU) New Embassy Sites: The Embassy is working closely
with the MFA to turn over IZ properties currently in U.S.
possession to the GOI, including prospective new embassy
sites in the diplomatic zone. Third country governments need
to work directly with the MFA to identify and prepare the
specific sites for their new embassies. This is already
happening and should continue. All inquiries on the process
should be referred to the MFA,s Ambassador Srood Najib, the
GOI official designated to handle this issue. If requested,
the Embassy can offer suggestions on trusted and qualified
contractors; these contractors could be hired to renovate and
prepare their Embassy sites.


8. (SBU) Access to the New Embassy Compound (NEC)/Use of
Embassy Facilities: While it would be a nice gesture to
offer access to the NEC gym, pool and DFAC to third country
diplomats (given the dearth of dining and recreational
options in the IZ),the number of people who will be using
those facilities is already twice what the facilities are
designed for. Additionally, we do not currently extend those
benefits (except Liberty Pool) to any other diplomatic
missions. Access to the NEC for these diplomats should be at
the same level as diplomats from other countries.

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Conclusion: GOI Must Dedicate More Resources
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9. (SBU) We have a strong interest in ensuring these new Arab
embassies get stood up quickly and turn their attention to
the reason they are here: strengthening their countries'
bilateral relations with Iraq. We can assist, but this
should be in specific, clearly delineated areas. The GOI
must take on the lion's share of this work. We will use
upcoming meetings with Foreign Minister Zebari and other key
GOI leaders to press home this point. Given the multitude of
specific needs these missions will have, the MFA should set
up a special, appropriately staffed unit within the Protocol
Department to assist these missions as needed, particularly
during this crucial start-up period.

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Specific Security Assistance Extended to Other Embassies
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10. (SBU) Below is a list of the specific types of security
assistance RSO offers to other embassies in Baghdad. We can
offer the same to the new Arab embassies as they establish
themselves.

-- Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO),as we do for
other allies.

-- Conduct security assessments/surveys to help them improve
their security posture.

-- Share non-classified threat information on a normal basis,
and classified threat information on a case-by-case basis if
it involves them.

-- Meet with them, as we do with other allies, and liaise
with their security elements to provide background on
security conditions in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq.

-- Assist them in establishing security agreements with the
GOI to improve security support from the GOI.

-- Provide, on a resource available basis, along with DoD,
incident response and contingency management support.

-- Potentially include them in training offerings that we
have. For example, Hostage Awareness, WMD Awareness, etc.

-- Share our Public Announcements, Travel Advisories,
Consular Information Sheets and Warden Notices with them.

-- Support their requests for MNF-I and other badges/ID media
to facilitate their travel in/out of the IZ and Baghdad.

-- Provide them with guidance on best security practices for
facilities protection in Baghdad and Iraq.

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-- Support their efforts to join various information sharing
forums such as the Diplomatic Protective Liaison Working
Group (DPLWG).

-- Support their interest in the PSD working group; support
them, or their private security provider (Control Risk
Groups) in the private security contractor forum.

-- Facilitate their interface with DoD regarding ECM products
and the unclassified version of Blue Force Tracker (BFT).


11. (SBU) Virtually all of the above -- which involve sharing
information, experience and contacts -- are relatively
inexpensive or require limited time to provide, yet could be
very beneficial to a small mission.
CROCKER