SETTING THE SCENE FOR PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS IN TUZ

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003124

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINS PTER PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SETTING THE SCENE FOR PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS IN TUZ
(SALAH AD DIN PROVINCE)

REF: BAGHDAD 2503

Classified By: PRT TEAM LEADER RICK BELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is a PRT Salah ad Din reporting cable.

Summary
--------------


2. (C) While the situation remains reasonably calm in the Tuz
district of Salah ad Din province, background tension exists
among the different ethnic groups present there. Even though
Tuz is not formally a "disputed area," it is adjacent to
Kirkuk, was separated from Kirkuk province in 1976, and has a
similar ethnic mix. These facts render Tuz vulnerable to the
effects of any instability in Kirkuk or any change in
Kirkuk's administrative status. Poor delivery of services
damages the credibility of the local and national government
in the eyes of Tuz residents; this credibility gap creates
space in which political groups can push destabilizing
sectarian and ethnic agendas. The PRT expects the Kurds to
have the most success in elections relative to their numbers,
because their main parties run as one list. End Summary.

CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN TUZ
--------------


3. (SBU) Within Salah ad Din (SaD) province, Tuz is the
district with the heaviest ethnic mix, including significant
numbers of Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Sunni Turcomen, and Shia
Turcomen. It has two sub-districts, Amerli and Suleiman Beg.
Tuz was part of Kirkuk province until SaD was formed in 1976
as a mostly Sunni Arab province in Saddam Hussein's home
area. Saddam's Arabization campaigns forcibly expelled many
Kurds from Tuz as well as from Kirkuk. Tuz lies on the
primary highway between Baghdad and Kirkuk. The Hamrin
mountains form a natural barrier between Tuz and the rest of
SaD, and the district's ethnic makeup only strengthens its
ties to Kirkuk.


4. (C) While the situation remains reasonably calm, there is
background tension among the different ethnic groups in Tuz.
Non-Kurds resent and to some degree fear Kurdish ambitions
and influence, while Shia Turcomen in Amerli sub-district
have tense relations with Sunni Arabs. Tensions in
neighboring Kirkuk and Khanaqin (in Diyala province) have not
yet spilled over significantly to Tuz, but contribute to a
general unease, exacerbated by a low-level insurgency
combined with criminal activity, including kidnapping and
murder. For example, September 1 saw two separate IED and
VBIED attacks in Tuz city, against an IP investigating
officer and an assistant judge. Since July 28 there have not
been any explicit examples of ethnically-motivated violence;
some commentators have suggested that an IED attack on
September 12 may have deliberately targeted the PUK in Tuz,
but the circumstances remain murky. It is no coincidence
that the Suleiman Beg sub-district, with its relatively
disenchanted Sunni Arab population, is the center of the
insurgency in Tuz. The somewhat uncertain security situation
contributes to a climate of fear and instability that
ethno-sectarian extremists could exploit.

KURDISH AMBITIONS
--------------


5. (C) While the PRT lacks detailed knowledge of the Kurdish
areas of Tuz district, it is convinced the KRG is encouraging
the return of Kurds who had been pushed out of Tuz during
Saddam's Arabization campaigns. There are rumors of direct
cash payments to repatriating Kurds and of ongoing activities
by the Asayish (Kurdish intelligence service). The KRG
provides at least some public services to majority-Kurdish
areas, including a program involving teachers, and some Kurds
work in the KRG while leaving their families behind in Tuz.
All these activities lead to high anxiety about Kurdish
ambitions among the non-Kurdish population, in particular the
Turcomen.

ETHNOSECTARIAN TENSIONS
--------------


6. (C) Kurds and Sunni Arabs: In the PRT's experience, Sunni
Arabs in Tuz generally say Tuz should remain part of Salah ad
Din (and Kirkuk must be "an Iraqi city," i.e. not part of
Kurdistan),while Kurds believe Tuz should become aligned
with a Kurdish Kirkuk. Previous PRT reporting has indicated
high levels of concern by Sunni Arabs in the rest of SaD over
the possibility of Kurdish annexation of Tuz in the event
that Kirkuk joins the KRG (ref A). There are tensions
between local Kurds and a Sunni Arab IP QRF battalion that
was recently deployed to Tuz by provincial authorities.
(Note: There are legitimate reasons for the presence of the

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Arab battalion: the district had been asking for an
increased IP presence for some time. End Note.) Tensions
also exist between Turcoman officers and the Kurdish
rank-and-file in the Tuz IP force.


7. (C) Shia Amerli and Sunni Arabs: The Shia Turcoman town
of Amerli has tense relations with the Sunni Arab villages in
its sub-district. These tensions stem in large part from a
July 2007 terrorist attack that killed 125 residents of
Amerli and remains an enduring trauma in the town's
collective psyche. This has led to accusations by Sunni Arab
villagers that the Shia-dominated sub-district council
ignores their needs. Sunni Arab visitors to Amerli town do
face some harassment. Some Sunni Arabs also complain that
Amerli Shiites are able to get resources from the GoI
directly, while the Sunnis face relative neglect.


8. (C) Diversity among the Turcomen: Many Turcomen in Tuz
are Shia and align themselves with national Shia parties
(ISCI, Dawa, and some Sadrists),which dilutes the political
strength of the Turcoman community.


9. (C) No Spillover from Kirkuk/Diyala: Tuz's relative
stability manifested itself in the district's subdued
reaction to the July 28 suicide bombing in Kirkuk. At a
meeting of political party leaders convened by the local CF
commander on August 7, all the speakers emphasized the
importance of ethnic harmony and restraint. Even the most
strident speech (from a KDP representative) made its
arguments in the context of the Iraqi constitution, and
called for a Kurdish government in Kirkuk that would still
respect all ethnic groups (ref A). Local CF and the resident
PRT representative have seen no overt evidence of ethnic
tensions that might become serious flashpoints, aside from
one unconfirmed report of a demonstration by the Iraqi
Turcoman Front (ITF) in Tuz on July 29.

KIRKUK IS KEY
--------------


10. (C) Kirkuk remains the key variable in the future
stability of Tuz. The PRT sees little likelihood that
tensions would boil up in Tuz without external stimulus. As
long as Kirkuk remains stable, it is likely Tuz will also
remain stable; if Kirkuk were to explode, Tuz would be
affected to some degree.

POOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE
--------------


11. (C) Tuz district residents consistently complain of poor
delivery of basic services from both the local and provincial
levels of government. The district's geographic isolation
and its distinctive character relative to the rest of the
province contribute to at least some degree of provincial
neglect. The situation will not improve when Tuz loses the
disproportionately large share of Provincial Council seats it
currently holds, which resulted from Sunni Arab boycotts of
the 2005 provincial elections. The local PRT representative
detects far more passion in most of his interlocutors'
remarks on bread-and-butter topics such as electricity than
on abstract political issues such as the fate of Kirkuk.
Nevertheless, the population's disenchantment with the
government creates space in which political groups can push
destabilizing sectarian and ethnic agendas. Both the Iraqi
Turcoman Front (ITF) and the main Kurdish parties have
attempted to provide basic services and fill the legitimacy
vacuum in Tuz.

TUZ AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS
--------------


12. (SBU) The Tuz Chairmen of the Socialist Democratic
Kurdistani Party (Abbas Mansur Karim) and the Islamic Group
of Kurdistan (Hajji Shawan),told the PRT September 20 that
their parties support the integration of Tuz into the KRG.
Abbas objected to the use of the term "annexation,"
explaining that since Tuz was taken from Kirkuk in 1976, it
is only natural that it should return to its original home
(which they hope will join the KRG). The PRT attempted
unsuccessfully to contact the Al Ikhwa Turkumani Party;
according to several prominent Provincial Council members,
this party is unknown in SaD and inconsequential.


13. (C) Dividing the district into its component pieces
provides the best insight into which party or bloc will
receive the most support in Tuz. In Tuz city proper, the
parties have the most strength. Among the Kurds in the city,
the PUK is strongest. Since Kurdish parties are running as
one list in the election, the PRT expects them to garner the
most votes province-wide. Among Shia Turcomen, ITF has a
presence, but ISCI (generally referred to in Tuz as the Badr

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Organization) is stronger in the city. There is also a small
Dawa presence. There are Sadrists with a connection to a
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) cell in the district. Among the Sunni
Arabs, the IIP is strongest within the city. Outside of Tuz
city, the political dynamics are different. The KDP seems to
have at least some strength in small Kurdish villages in the
countryside. Among the Turcomen in outlying villages and
towns, the ITF has significantly more strength than it does
in Tuz city. In the Sunni Turcoman village of Yangija, the
Shia Turcoman village of Bostamli, and the Shia Turcoman town
of Amerli, the ITF has the upper hand, although the Shia
parties have followings among the Shia Turcomen in the
countryside. Furthermore, at least two Turcoman villages are
actively hostile to the ITF, including the Sunni Turcoman
village of Abbud.


14. (C) Among the Sunni Arabs outside of Tuz city, the
influence of political parties becomes much reduced. In the
southern part of the district around the village of Maftul in
Amerli sub-district, Sheikh Sami has the most influence due
to his role as an SOI contractor. In Suleiman Beg, the
sub-district Director and various sheikhs, especially Faysal
Razi Husayn, have the most influence, and none of them is
affiliated with a party. Even in Amerli, with its
substantial ITF and ISCI presence, Sheikh Faruq Mustafa Qasim
remains highly influential, based in large part on his tribal
credentials.

TUZ POPULATION NUMBERS
--------------


15. (SBU) According to Public Distribution System (PDS)
figures and input from local PRT contacts, the population of
Tuz district is 157,000, with an ethnic breakdown of 39
percent Turcomen (more Shia than Sunni but both present),36
percent Arab, 25 percent Kurd; it is possible that the
Kurdish percentage could be understated, due to northern
Kurdish villages being supported by the KRG, and perhaps
being off the books of the PDS system. The Tuz sub-district
has 96,000 people, of which the city accounts for 70 to
75,000; ethnic breakdown for the city is 40 percent Turcoman,
40 percent Kurdish, and 20 percent Arab. The population of
Suleiman Beg town is 12,700 out of a sub-district population
of 24,400, with ethnic breakdown for the town at 92 percent
Sunni Arabs and 8 percent "Turcoman-speaking Arabs." The
population of Amerli town is 10,400, out of a sub-district
population of 37,700, with ethnic composition in town at 70
percent Shia Turcoman, 30 percent Sunni Turcoman and Arabs.
According to a local source, there are a total of 48,604
registered voters in Tuz city.

KEY POLITICAL LEADERS IN TUZ
--------------


16. (S) The PRT representative in Tuz summarizes local
leadership as follows:

- Talib Mohammad Mustafa Mahmood ) Suleiman Beg Mudir (i.e.
Sub-District Director) is the most important GOI figure in
Suleiman Beg. A member of the Provincial Council, he has
decent contacts with the provincial governor. He has
possible links to insurgency according to classified
intelligence reporting, but has had most of his family killed
by insurgents. It is unclear if he's friend or foe, but
either way, an important figure in Tuz.

- Tuz Qaimmaqam (i.e. District Chief Executive or "Mayor")
Mohammad Rasheed Raouf: PUK, corrupt, ineffective, but he is
still the Qaimmaqam.

- District Council Chairman Qadir Ali Saleh: An IIP member,
Sunni Arab, vaguely technocratic, he seems to be reasonably
well respected.

- District Council Deputy Chairman Ali Hashem Salman: Badr
(ISCI),Shia Turcoman.

- Sheikh Husayn Awad Khalaf: One of two SOI contractors,
Sunni Arab, hostile to GOI.

- Amerli Sub-district Council Chairman Salah Murshid Ahmed:
Turcoman Shia, unknown party affiliation, important Amerli
figure.

- Sheikh Faruq Mustafa Kassim: Shia Turcoman, most important
sheikh in Amerli sub-district, possibly more important
locally than Sub-District Council Chairman Salah.

- Sheikh Sami Husayn Sultan: SOI contractor based in Maftul,
a Sunni Arab village in Amerli sub-district. Feuds with
Sheikh Faruq, and seen by some as an upstart pretender to the
title of Sheikh. Probably venal; undeniably influential due

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in large part to his SOI contract.

- Sheikh Faysal Razi Husayn: Little interaction with
Americans, but probably the most influential sheikh in
Suleiman Beg.

The supposed head of the PUK in Tuz is Akram Ali, and of the
KDP is Arksalan Ali, but the PRT cannot assess how
influential they are.

COMMENT
--------------


17. (C) Despite the district's many problems, the situation
in Tuz remains relatively calm and subdued, and in the
absence of a sharp external stimulus in the form of security
problems in Kirkuk or Khanaqin, it should stay that way.
However, in terms of commercial connections, ethnic makeup,
proximity, and historical links, Tuz sits very much in
Kirkuk's orbit, and any major instability in Kirkuk will
unavoidably affect Tuz.
CROCKER