Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD3099
2008-09-25 17:32:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IDP RETURNS - WHAT WE SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT DO TO

Tags:  EAID IZ PGOV PHUM PREF 
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VZCZCXRO1780
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3099/01 2691732
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 251732Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9616
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 BAGHDAD 003099 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2028
TAGS: EAID IZ PGOV PHUM PREF
SUBJECT: IDP RETURNS - WHAT WE SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT DO TO
SUPPORT THEM

REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 2960

B. B) BAGHDAD 3004

C. C) BAGHDAD 2308

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 BAGHDAD 003099

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2028
TAGS: EAID IZ PGOV PHUM PREF
SUBJECT: IDP RETURNS - WHAT WE SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT DO TO
SUPPORT THEM

REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 2960

B. B) BAGHDAD 3004

C. C) BAGHDAD 2308

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Since the beginning of 2008, over 125,000
Iraqis have returned to their homes out of a total displaced
population of 4.8 million persons (internally displaced and
refugees). About half of the returns have been to Baghdad.
All measures show the numbers are increasing, albeit slowly.
Security remains the overriding factor motivating and
inhibiting returns. The Government of Iraq (GOI) has taken
important steps to encourage returns, in particular the Prime
Minister's order on property restitution. However, its
efforts to establish property restitution and assistance
centers have been slow and under-resourced, pubic awareness
efforts to inform IDPs and refugees of the availability of
grants and stipends and how to access them have been weak,
and actual pay-outs have been slow. The GOI continues to
refuse to assist Iraqi refugees and there will be a
continuing need for large scale humanitarian assistance for
several years to come. Security, stability and political
accommodation are the key conditions for returns and our
support for these priorities will remain by far the most
effective way in which we support returns. We can
facilitate the returns process by encouraging the GOI to
expand and strengthen local returnee assistance centers,
social services and incentives for returnees and public
outreach to IDPs inside Iraq and refugees abroad. We should
promote and support efforts by UNHCR and other humanitarian
actors to enhance delivery of assistance services for
returnees. However, in our efforts to promote durable
solutions for Iraqi IDPs and refugees, we must be mindful of
potential pitfalls and avoid unintended consequences. Return
and reintegration must be a gradual and voluntary process.
We should not rush or force it. End Summary.

FIGURES ON IDPS AND REFUGEES


2. (SBU) According to Ministry of Displacement and Migration
(MODM) - International Organization for Migration (IOM) and
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

figures, 4.8 million Iraqis are displaced. Approximately 1.5
to 2 million Iraqis have fled to neighboring countries,
mainly Jordan and Syria. The largest flow of refugees
occurred after the Samarra mosque bombing in February 2006,
but there are no definitive refugee numbers. Inside Iraq,
there are 2.8 million displaced persons, nearly 1.6 million
of whom were displaced since February 2006. Approximately
two-thirds of Iraq,s post-Samarra IDPs and refugees were
displaced from Baghdad. The September 2008 IOM Returnee
Monitoring and Needs Assessments Tabulation Report indicates
that, since January, 21,066 families (126,396 persons)
returned to their homes, of which 9,790 families or 58,740
individuals returned to Baghdad. The returnee figure
represents less than 2.6% of the total displaced population.
IOM and UNHCR data show that 85% of returnees to date are
IDPs with only 15% refugees. However, the 85% of returnees
who are IDPs represent 7% of the total post Samarra IDP
population. Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B)
estimates of returns for the Baghdad area are considerably
higher ) 31,000 families or approximately 155,000 persons.


3. (SBU) On September 21, RefCoord brought together IOM,
UNHCR and MND-B to share their respective data collection
methodologies and sources to attempt to reconcile their
differing figures. We expect that improved
information-sharing will provide more accurate and timely
reporting on returns in Baghdad. IOM anticipates that access
to data from the Brigades, with their continuous presence and
more numerous data sources from police precincts, will result
in an upward revision in its returnee estimates. One reason
for the difference is that local police may be capturing data
on returnees who are not registered and not seeking
assistance. It will take some time for IOM to reconcile and
analyze data provided by MND-B. There was agreement that
while IDPs and refugees are certainly not flooding back,
there is a clear trend of increasing numbers of families
returning to neighborhoods in the city as security improves.
Most of recent returnees were displaced in other parts of
Baghdad.

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE RETURNS


4. (SBU) Security continues to be the principal, overarching
factor prompting and impeding returns. Other factors may
influence returnee decisions, but they are secondary.
Returnees (in IOM and NGO returnee surveys, reports from
UNHCR and conversations with U.S. officials) have stated that
news on security and other conditions from neighbors and
relatives in their home neighborhoods was the key factor in

BAGHDAD 00003099 002 OF 006


determining whether the time was right to come back. While
the GOI has publicly announced its policy on property
restitution and the standing-up of return registration
centers, government promises of assistance have minimal
influence on decisions to return. Those who have returned
did so in areas where they had confidence in the police and
local councils to maintain public safety and to carry out
their responsibilities in a professional and non-sectarian
manner.


5. (C) We have heard reports of intimidation and violence
against returnees in some areas. Indeed, a week after
RefCoord and other Emboffs visited the Saydiyah Support
Council on August 28 (reftel A),one of the council members
we met with was assassinated by an IED placed under his car.
It is unclear why the Support Council member, a Shia, was
murdered or who killed him. Subsequent to the murder,
another councilman fatalistically told Baghdad PRT that he
too expects to meet the same fate. The Support Council has
been functioning more or less at its own expense, financing
its efforts out of the pockets of the leadership of the
council. The volunteer members do not enjoy any special
security arrangements and must live in their neighborhoods.


6. (C) In late August, local media reported on three sniper
incidents targeting returning Shia IDPs to Sunni
neighborhoods in the Mansour district of western Baghdad. In
early September, a group of 30 IDP families in the Abu
Ghurayb area of Baghdad seeking protection from terrorist
attacks so they could return home got an Imam and a sheikh to
successfully intercede on their behalf with the Iraqi Army
commander in their area to boost security presence at a main
intersection. Even in Rashid, with some of the most
successful returns efforts, including Sayedia, there have
been several recent incidents of Molotov cocktails thrown at
houses of returnees by members of the opposite sect.


7. (S) Seventeen attacks involving IDP returns were reported
in western Baghdad between August 28 and September 13. Both
Sunni and Shia returnees were targeted. Not surprisingly, an
analysis of IDP-related violence reveals that the greater the
number of returnees, the greater the risk of violence. Of
particular concern are those neighborhoods that suffered a
sectarian shift as a result of people fleeing violence (for
example, Sunni to Shia or vice versa) and now must change
back.


8. (SBU) The decision to return is also influenced by
property restitution, destitution in displacement, employment
and/or entrepreneurial opportunities, schools, health care,
and basic services (sanitation, electricity, etc.).
Government incentives in the form of one million Iraqi Dinar
(USD 849.62) return grants and rental stipends are welcome,
and in many instances sorely needed, but their availability
or absence does not drive individual return decisions.
Iraq,s severe housing shortage has exacerbated displacement
and impedes solutions. (Note: The Ministry of Construction
and Housing estimates that two million additional housing
units will be needed in the next five to seven years. End
note.) Large numbers of vacated houses drew in opportunistic
squatters to neighborhoods where the sectarian balance had
been upended by sectarian violence. In some areas, militias
organized and continue to control this &resettlement8
process as a means to obtain illegal rents and to hold ground
in neighborhoods they took over.


9. (SBU) Returns have been and will likely remain a
neighborhood-by-neighborhood phenomenon. People are
returning where security is good and the atmosphere is
welcoming. The returns process we have seen in the Sayedia,
Hadar and Risalah areas of Rashid are not generalized across
the city. Returns in other areas will be more challenging,
such as Hurriya, where 7,500 Sunni families were displaced by
Shia militias in 2006-2007. Even here, however, there is
some progress. The National Police Karkh District Commander
told Baghdad PRT September 23 that police assisted returns
are starting to address the Adel-Hurriya problem. (Note:
Sunnis being evicted from Adel to make room for returning
Shia, but not getting assistance returning to their homes in
Hurriya (reftel A). End Note) The commander cited 259
recent police-assisted returns to Adel and 188 returns to
Hurriya. He said that these figures could understate actual
returns, as many IDPs do not register or seek assistance if
their houses are vacant.


10. (SBU) IOM data show refugees constituting approximately
15% of surveyed returnees to date. We assess that refugees
will remain slower to return than IDPs because they are
heavily Sunni and many were displaced from areas of Baghdad
that experienced the worst ethnic cleansing. As the GOI has
done little to assist them, there is a very low level of
trust for the GOI among the refugee population and they are

BAGHDAD 00003099 003 OF 006


likely to have less knowledge about conditions inside Iraq.
In addition, it is much easier for IDPs displaced in
different parts of Baghdad to assess conditions in their
original neighborhoods and to move back, all the while
knowing that they could easily leave if the situation
deteriorates. For the refugees, a return move is likely to
be a one-time event. It would be very difficult for most to
return abroad. Many Christians and other small minorities,
who are disproportionately represented among the refugee
population, are unlikely to return. Additional factors
inhibiting return are that some refugees are relatively well
off and some professionals may have found acceptable
employment. In general, we expect that most refugees will
want a higher degree of certainty about improved conditions
before consenting to return and they will lag substantially
behind IDPs in returning.

GOI POLICY


11. (SBU) The Prime Minister's property restitution decree
was designed to facilitate returns (reftel A). The decree
and the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM)
payments policy provide a process for evicting squatters,
grants and stipends for IDPs, and the opening of centers to
assist IDPs with return registration and property restitution
claims. MODM has also informed us of other GOI steps aimed
at facilitating returns, such as re-employment rights for
displaced GOI employees, re-integration programs for
returning school children, vocational training, and customs
exemption for returnees, HHE and one vehicle per family.
Implementation and impact remain to be seen. While the GOI
announced in August the opening of two centers in Baghdad
where returnees could apply for property restitution and
financial grants and stipends, only one center, in Rusafa,
was actually functioning by mid-September. As of this week,
that office had processed only 426 cases, using a slow and
cumbersome process. MODM,s Director General for
Humanitarian Affairs acknowledged to RefCoord and to UN
agencies September 23 that the Ministry lacks the staff and
the capacity to handle a large influx of applicants. In
early September, MODM asked UNHCR for $300,000 and technical
assistance to stand up the Karkh office. Meanwhile, it
appears that the Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) and Iraq,s
Implemention and Follow-Up Committee for National
Reconciliation (IFCNR) have opened the office in Karkh and
are starting to enforce evictions in West Baghdad. While
returnees seem widely aware of GOI promises of assistance,
many returnees do not know how to apply and many face
difficulty going from West Baghdad to Rusafa to file their
claims.


12. (SBU) The Rusafa assistance center is a promising start,
but MODM needs more centers and more employees to staff them.
The USAID representative on Baghdad ePRT2 visited the Rusafa
returnee registration center for east Baghdad on September

14. He found the center "swamped" with returnees. Staffers
at the center were busy registering those who had returned
and found their homes occupied by squatters. The eviction
data is supposed to be passed to police, who would give
squatters 72 hours notice to move out or face eviction.
However, the director of the center indicated that only five
evictions had been completed. It was unclear if the reason
was inaction on the part of the police or a communication
breakdown relaying eviction information and tasking the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) units who would carry out the
evictions. In a separate visit the same day to the regional
area police command for east Baghdad, the e-PRT met with the
senior commanding officer who, during the visit, reminded his
men to inform squatters they must move out of illegally
occupied houses or face eviction. The officer reportedly
ordered his men to physically evict non-complying squatters.


13. (SBU) The GOI has no policy for undoing sectarian
cleansing in the areas where there has been a wholesale
displacement of one sect by another. MODM Minister Sultan
and IFCNR Chairman Mohamed Salman have stated on several
occasions that the property restitution policy depends on
individual requests for restitution from property owners.
There would be no wholesale eviction of squatters from
neighborhoods (reftel A). As such, in neighborhoods like
Hurriya, which went from heavily Sunni to heavily Shia and
remain under militia influence, property restitution may not
necessarily result in large numbers of returns. It could
result in Sunni property owners opting to rent or sell their
vacated properties if they do not believe their neighborhoods
secure enough to return to. Sunni leaders frequently cite
the inability and perceived unwillingness of the GOI to take
steps to reverse the worst of the sectarian cleansing as
calling into question whether the GOI genuinely wants Sunni
refugees and IDPs to return to Baghdad.


14. (C) A continuing element of GOI policy is its refusal to

BAGHDAD 00003099 004 OF 006


support the refugee population. Apart from the $25 million
which the GOI pledged in April 2007 and took until June 2008
to fully disburse, the Iraqi Government has provided little
assistance to its 1.5 to 2 million citizens displaced outside
the country. PM Maliki and other senior GOI officials have
consistently opposed assistance to the refugees, based to
alternating degrees on the views that they are mainly
Baathists and Sunnis who oppose his government, that the
refugees are well off and on the contradictory view that
assistance perpetuates the presence of refugees in
neighboring countries. Some senior officials, including MODM
Sultan, articulate the view that the refugees should all
return and agree that assistance allows them to remain
abroad. MODM most recently expressed this view in an
interview published in Sharq al Awsat September 19.
(Comment: UNHCR and the humanitarian community reject as
absurd the argument that UNHCR is impeding returns with its
very modest support ($130 per month stipends in Syria and
$166 per month in Jordan, food distribution and other forms
of life saving assistance) to fewer than 40,000 of the most
vulnerable refugees in Jordan and Syria. Sultan might think
such statements will help deflect attention from criticism of
own ministry's poor performance and inability to push the
pace of returns.) Other GOI and Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) officials and Council of Representatives
(CoR) leaders believe the GOI should provide much more
support to assist refugees and IDPs. They privately
recognize that the GOI could not accommodate large scale and
rapid returns and acknowledge that reintegration will take
years. The GOI,s absence in taking care of its own citizens
has sown distrust and alienation among the refugees in
particular, which decreases the credibility of GOI promises
of assistance to returnees.


15. (SBU) MODM's grants and stipends are laudable, however
its performance in implementing the system and making it
known and accessible to has been weak inside Iraq and
non-existent in neighboring countries. MODM needs to
substantially strengthen outreach efforts to IDP's, refugees
abroad, and to returnees alike.

UNHCR POLICY ON REFUGEE RETURNS


16. (SBU) UNHCR assesses that basic conditions for
sustainable, large scale return of Iraqi refugees in
conditions of safety and dignity are not yet in place. As
such, UNHCR does not promote return to Iraq and also remains
concerned about conditions which may unduly force refugees to
choose to return. UNHCR has appealed to asylum countries to
extend protection to Iraqis who originate from Central and
Southern Iraq and to refrain from forcible returns to these
regions at this time.


17. (SBU) However, UNHCR acknowledges that the GOI has
launched an initiative through its embassies and with
countries of asylum to encourage and assist Iraqis to return
home. While UNHCR will neither encourage nor discourage a
refugee from returning, it will assist refugees who choose to
return voluntarily on an individual basis with transport
costs and return grants. However, UNHCR will not carry out
organized return transport by bus because organized buses
could become targets for attack. Inside Iraq, UNHCR will
continue to provide shelter reconstruction and
community-based assistance to returnees and will offer legal
assistance through its protection assistance centers.
UNCHR,s policy put it at odds with MODM,s desire to promote
large scale returns. Given MODM,s desire for highly visible
returns, UNHCR has cautioned the ministry to avoid bus
convoys which could be difficult to protect. For now, MODM
appears to have taken that advice and is looking at arranging
air transport for Iraqis wishing to return from neighboring
countries.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD RETURN AND REITEGRATION


18. (S) Coalition Forces (CF) have partnered with the ISF to
monitor resettlement operations in Baghdad and ensure that
security gains are not jeopardized or negatively impacted by
returns of displaced Iraqis. Working in coordination with
the ISF, CF prepare the security environment for return by
anticipating areas more susceptible to violence through
identification and analysis of resettling Iraqis, contentious
areas, and attacks on displaced/returnee populations. The
ISF play the decisive role in resettling and protecting the
returnees. CF are prepared to reinforce security if violence
levels exceed ISF capabilities, but will not participate in
resettling returnees and will not serve as the primary
security enablers for returnees.


19. (C) Security is the key to successful voluntary returns.
As IDPs and refugees perceive that their areas are safe, we
expect that many will seek to return and will need help to do

BAGHDAD 00003099 005 OF 006


so. However, we should have no illusions -- the voluntary
return and reintegration of Iraq's IDP and refugee
populations will be a slow process that will take years (if
returns averaged 250,000 per year it would take nearly 20
years). We should avoid any appearance of forcing the
process or siding with a GOI policy that Sunnis widely
perceive as biased. We should recognize that a significant
portion of the displaced will never return, opting to
integrate locally or resettle in third countries. We should
also be cognizant that a slow and gradual pace of returns is
likely to be sustainable and less likely to provoke renewed
sectarian violence and instability. Responsibility for a
successful returns plan ultimately rests with the GOI and
depends on its ability to foster security, stability and
political accommodation. These remain the overriding U.S.
objectives in Iraq. If the GOI generates the right
conditions, many Iraqis will eventually return.

PROGRAMS TO PROMOTE AND SUPPORT


20. (C) There will be a continuing need for large scale
humanitarian assistance programs for refugees and IDPs for
several years to come. The U.S. can support efforts promoting
voluntary return.


21. (C) We should continue to press the GOI to pursue
confidence-building efforts and tangible programs to assist
the return-reintegration process. The GOI should:

-- Ensure that Sons of Iraq (SOI) elements are fully in sync
with and supporting National Police and national policy on
returns;

-- Improve police performance, rid the ISF of sectarian
elements, and follow-through consistently on enforcing
private property rights by evicting squatters to return
property to owners;

-- Strengthen MODM presence in neighborhoods and improve GOI
effectiveness in distributing promised return grants, damage
compensation, and rent stipends to evicted squatters;

-- Ensure adequate support to governorates to support local
integration of IDPs who wish to remain in where they were
displaced.

-- Implement social and incentive programs that encourage
return and reintegration: health and psycho-social care,
remedial education and recognition of credentials from
foreign schools, vocational training, re-employment rights
for civil servants, specialized incentive and training
programs for highly skilled professionals, such as doctors,
and duty free entry of returnees, HHE.

-- Promote information campaigns in neighboring countries
about available assistance (and how to access it) and
facilitate registration process;

-- Publicize information about where returns are taking place
and the numbers of returnees to those neighborhoods; and

-- Ensure a consistent non-sectarian implementation and
message.


22. (C) The U.S. should encourage and support UNHCR and NGO
efforts to strengthen GOI capacity to assist IDPs and to
prepare for returns. Things we can do:

-- Returnee Assistance Centers: MODM,s plan to stand-up
centers for property restitution and assistance to returnees
is sound, but implementation remains weak and MODM lacks the
capacity to handle the current caseload. It is increasingly
clear that MODM will only succeed in distributing benefits to
the large number of eligible returnees if the international
community provides the capacity. International Medical
Corps had submitted a technical assistance proposal. UNHCR
and IOM are considering approaches now. We will need to be
prepared to fund them urgently.

-- Legal aid: We should work with UNHCR and NGOs to expand
legal services assistance with regard to accessing the public
distribution system (PDS),property records, civil documents
and filing claims to quiet title or to obtain eviction
orders. Services could also include conflict mitigation to
address issues arising out of the evictions process. UNHCR
has one Protection Assistance Center (PAC) in Baghdad which
provides these services on a small scale. It plans to
provide staff to the GOI return centers. We should work to
expand UNHCR and NGO capacity in Iraq and establish similar
centers to assist refugees in neighboring countries.

-- Property: The GOI has launched a sound restitution

BAGHDAD 00003099 006 OF 006


policy, but it is too early to judge implementation. $1.5
million in reprogrammed IRF will continue IOM technical
assistance to the Commission for Resolution of Real Property
Disputes (CRRPD) on Saddam-era claims and advising the GOI on
potential post-Saddam ere claims mechanisms.

-- IDP/refugee housing: Urge the creation of a body
(inter-ministerial, with appropriate outside participation,
such as Embassy, UNHCR, UN Habitat) to determine what kind of
housing inputs would promote returns, particularly at the
neighborhood level.

--Social programs: Support health and education programs
targeting needy returnees.

--Non-Food Items (NFIs) and Food: Continue to support
international organization and NGO programs to provide
non-food items, shelter repair kits and food to needy
returnees.

COMMENT


23. (C) The GOI,s focus on enforcing private property
rights is the most important element of its returns policy.
It enhances the rule of law and the credibility of the state
and is an essential element of reconciliation. As security
gains continue, effective implementation of this policy has
the potential to draw back large numbers of the displaced and
permit those who opt not to return to make use their
properties as they deem fit. At the time, local leaders and
MNF-I have expressed concern that a rush of returnees, with
concomitant evictions of squatters, could restart sectarian
violence. Low levels of violence and intimidation against
returnees continue, especially in contentious areas of Adel,
Hurriya, East Rashid and Abu Gharaib. Sunnis express
concerns about fair treatment in the property restitution
process -- some Shia do not want the Sunnis back and so far
there has been no sign of GOI readiness to evict large
numbers of Shia squatters. Moreover, returns of large
numbers of Sunnis could upset Shia dominance in Baghdad and
influence election outcomes. Indeed, Hurriya will be a bell
weather of GOI intentions in this respect.


24. (C) We must beware that the GOI may perform badly and not
gain Sunni trust. Strong USG support for a flawed returns
process that is widely viewed by Sunnis as sectarian could
provide ammunition to Sunni extremists. Jordan and Syria
continue to maintain that they will not expel Iraqi refugees.
This is critical to stability in Iraq by preserving the
voluntary nature of return and preventing massive flows of
people that could overwhelm the absorption capacity of the
GOI and provoke renewed sectarian violence. IOM surveys of
GOI assisted returns from Cairo show that half of returnees
cited destitution as the principal factor prompting their
return. UNHCR views this as forced return. It is critical
that we maintain strong support for UNHCR and NGO programs
providing basic assistance to refugees for several years to
come. We can help to supplement the GOI,s weak returns
capacity. Unwinding the massive sectarian cleansing and
displacement of 2006 and 2007 has started and will be
sustainable if it proceeds gradually and the GOI performs
well. We are going to great lengths to support return and
reintegration, but we cannot rush or force it.
CROCKER