DPM SALIH ON: THE SOFA, KURDISH ISOLATION, THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003097

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL EINV IZ
SUBJECT: DPM SALIH ON: THE SOFA, KURDISH ISOLATION, THE
CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE, CORE ISSUES

REF: BAGHDAD 2968

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met September 20 with DPM Barham
Salih for an exchange of views that included: the status of
the SOFA negotiations, increasing Kurdish isolation, the
crisis of confidence resulting from recent tensions between
the Kurds and the GOI, and the need to tackle the core
issues. On the SOFA negotiations, Salih said that the Kurds
would not cause much trouble, yet would likely seek
additional language referencing the constitution and its
implicit guarantee of territorial integrity. Ambassador said
that it is imperative that the Executive Council endorse and
not try to negotiate the SOFA document when it is submitted.
On increasing Kurdish political isolation and the crisis of
confidence between Kurds and their traditional Shi'a allies,
Salih said that Masoud Barzani and the KRG leadership agree
with Ambassador's recommendation that Kurds must engage in
Baghdad, create issue-based alliances, and try to tackle the
core issues. Ambassador reiterated admonitions he had given
both Barzani and Maliki -- that neither side should provoke a
confrontation, but rather work to lower temperatures. The
passage of a Provincial Elections Law would be a good place
to start. In other matters, Salih raised the idea of
expanding the next U.S.-Iraq Business Forum to include a
trade mission and other programs to indicate a tangible
demonstration of the international community to the future of
Iraq. End Summary.

SOFA: Kurdish Language
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador Crocker, accompanied by poloffs, met with
DPM Barham Salih to discuss key issues in Baghdad.Starting
with the SOFA negotiations, Ambassador Crocker said that the
U.S. hoped that parties would not use the security agreement
as a political football, that leaders would not give in to
the strong temptation to treat bilateral issues as elements
of local politics. Ambassador said he thought Prime Minister
Maliki's comments on the SOFA at a media roundtable had been
somewhat constructive. The Prime Minister characterized the
situation much as we see it: that if a agreement is not
reached, Iraq might seek a UN Security Council resolution
that would be difficult to achieve in the light of recent
U.S.-Russian tensions over Georgia and that, in the end,
might be vetoed by the U.S. Responding to Salih on the
timetable of a U.S. response to Iraqi requests on the SOFA,
Ambassador said that the US team planned to hold a final
meeting on September 22 to take a careful look at the issues
before returning to Baghdad.


3. (C) DPM Salih asked whether Ambassador thought the SOFA
would be an "eleventh hour" issue, volunteering that, on this
particular issue, his sense was that such would be the case.
Ambassador replied that there is already a broad agreement on
the issues other than the issue of jurisdiction and the
withdrawal language. Once those two points have been agreed
upon, the agreement should go to the Executive Council.
Ambassador said that it was important that the Executive
Council understand that it should not try to further
negotiate it, but rather endorse it in the same way it
handled the Declaration of Principles. Opening up the
document, once agreed upon, risks having all the strands come
apart. Ambassador said he understood some (Kurdish) MPs
publicly started.


4. (C) Salih replied that what is being sought is some
wording" that guarantees of the idea of "territorial
integrity," something that can be achieved by a reference to
the constitution, adding that the more references to the
constitution that are placed in the SOFA agreement, the
better for everyone. Ambassador noted that when the U.S.
talks about "territorial integrity," it is usually referring
to international borders (vice the disputed internal
boundaries suggested by Salih's comments). Ambassador
continued that everyone talks about the constitution and yet
for different people these can be radically different things.
Ambassador said that in back to back meetings with KRG
President Masoud Barzani and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki,
each had referred to the constitution but each interpreted it
in different ways. Salih concluded the discussion on the
SOFA with the comment that the U.S. would not find the Kurds
any trouble on the SOFA. (Comment: He appeared to dodge
the Ambassador's questionas to whether the Kurds would press
for such a reference inthe Executive Council, saying he had
not yet seen the textand reiterating the importance of an
agreed reference to the constitution. End Comment.)

Kurds: Isolation, Alliances, Too Close for Comfort
-------------- --------------


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5. (C) Salih said that President Talabani would return to
Baghdad via Austria and Kurdistan on/about October 8,
following his speech at the United Nations General Assembly.
Salih asked whether, during their recent talks, KRG President
Barzani had indicated to Ambassador that he would be
traveling to Baghdad. Ambassador said he had suggested to
Barzani that Kurdish interests are best defended from Baghdad
-- that Jalal Talabani and Barham Salih had been working in
Baghdad for the future of the Kurds. The Kurds, Ambassador
noted as an example, should not leave the education of Iraq's
children solely in the hands of the likes of (conservative
Da'wa Party member) Education Minister Khodair al-Khozaei.
And if the army is important then military appointments and
military academy appointments must be monitored in the
capital.


6. (C) Ambassador said that Barzani had complained about the
situation in Khanaqin, noting that the Peshmerga had been
there at the request of the federal government, had invoked
Article 140 of the Constitution and Article 53A of the TAL,
declared "they" are trying to force us back to the borders of
the Saddam era, and concluded that there was a "crisis of
confidence." Ambassador said he had told Barzani that the
Kurds were increasingly isolated and that they had placed
potential allies such as Tariq Hashimi in a difficult
position as a result of the problem of Kirkuk and the
perception that the Kurds have overreached. In the end,
Ambassador said, Barzani had acknowledged the need for the
KRG to manage affairs in Baghdad and to look into maintaining
and creating alliances based on issues.


7. (C) Salih agreed that the atmosphere "has never been more
poisonous." Nevertheless, Ambassador said, the Kurds must
not provoke a fight -- if the situation turns into a shooting
war, the Kurds will have lost everything gained. Ambassador
said he had delivered the message both to Barzani and to
Maliki in recent days that a confrontation must be avoided.
Ambassador noted general agreement that Talabani's return to
Baghdad will be important as he may be able to help stabilize
the situation. But in fact, pulling back the Peshmerga would
be the best way to achieve stability.


8. (C) Commenting that recent events have been instructive,
but perhaps "too close for comfort," Salih said that ForMin
Zebari and DefMin al-Ubaidi have been working to develop
policies to defuse future such instances. Any future
operation in Mosul would be more difficult. In Mosul, an
effective solution would require security; there is a need
for transitional arrangements and the military needs to be
taken out of the equation. Ambassador said that transitional
arrangements, which have been tried successfully in Anbar,
for example, would be a good approach to the problem. Salih
said that Minister of Interior al-Bulani was also interested
in reducing tensions and working to rebuild confidence
between the Kurds and the Shi'a. The problem, Salih said,
lies with PM Maliki who, having gained some confidence, has
tended to interpret issues his way, has insisted on a
centralized system of government and structures which Kurds
oppose and is trying to concentrate power in the hands of his
Da'wa party. This concentration of power poses a problem
both for the Kurds Da'wa's Shia Islamist ally, the ISCI
party. While it may be true that the Kurds are isolated with
some groups, on the larger issues, Maliki is becoming
increasingly so.

Core Issues; Kirkuk, Control, Consultation
--------------


9. (C) Ambassador said that the larger issues are precisely
where there needs to be discussion. The U.S., he commented,
had been struck by the extent to which the issue of Kirkuk
has dictated the course of other negotiations. The U.S. was
disappointed by Iraqi leaders' failure to deal with the core
issues which can no longer be ignored For instance, it is
likely that there will some day be other regions, and there
must be an agreement arrived at as to how the process will
proceed. What if Karbala were to become a region and then
proceeded to move into Nukhayb in Anbar Province, arguing
that its Shi'a population had been a part of pre-Saddam
Karbala? Ambassador said the temperature in Baghdad needs to
be lowered and passage of the Provincial Election Law could
help do that. An agreement also would further improve
overall Kurdishrelations with Shi'a. But Iraq must move
forward on this with a consensus; a community cannot be
forced out "intothe night". Ambassador said that Barzani
fully appreciatesthat Kurds have to deal with the law so that
all of the people -- Kurds, Turkoman and Arabs -- are
considered.


10. (C) Salih said that Kurdish bloc chief Fu'ad Ma'asum and
Tuwafuq bloc chief Ayad al-Samaraee were talking, and that
CoR Speaker Mahmud Mashhadani, July 22 bloc leader Salih

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Mutlaq and others were scheduled to visit him on September
21y to discuss the Provincial Election Law. Salih continued
with familiar refrains: "Above all the current confrontation
is about power in Baghdad, nothing more;" "Kirkuk is about
the future character of Iraq;" and "There needs to be a
win/win solution." Salih concluded that on Kirkuk, Maliki
wants to say "We are here and we are in control;" but, in
fact "They are not here; they are not in control; and there
needs to be consultations."

An Expanded U.S.-Iraq Business Dialogue
--------------


12. (C) Salih said he had discussed with Ambassador Wall the
idea of holding US-Iraq Business Forum early next year that,
in addition to the usual discussions, would involve a large
American trade delegation and the participation of the Iraqi
private sector. Discussions about "developing the private
sector," and exhibitions by American companies, including
setting up of offices in Baghdad, would be tangible evidence
of progress, Salih offered. Ambassador said he would take on
the project and agreed that setting up offices in Baghdad
would be important in the future because firms must be in
Iraq to be truly effective. He added that the next set of
discussions should also focus on what Iraq has to do to
create the conditions for such trade to be possible.

Other Issues, Comments
--------------


13. (C) Other issues that arose during the conversation:

--- Salih reported that CoR member Mithal al-Alusi, whose
recent trip to Israel had resulted in a CoR vote to lift his
immunity and protection privilege, visited on September 19.
Salih had told him it was stupid to have gone to Israel. That
said, Salih professed to be concerned for al-Alusi's safety.
Ambassador said we had spoken with the PM's office and to NSA
Muwafaq al-Rubaie on the seriousness of the issue, adding
that the CoR does not have many fine hours and this was not
one of them.

--- On filling the open Justice Minister position, Salih
said that Maliki has indicated he will not accept the Kurdish
nomination of Kurdish Islamic Party (KIP) member Dindar
Baijan al-Douski for Justice Minister. Salih said that the
Kurds "dropped the ball" and that he was going to talk to the
parties about renewing the nomination of Darra for the
position.

--- On budget execution, Salih said that he wanted to
compare his numbers with those of the U.S. He said that this
month and next month, the execution rates would go up.

--- Salih said he had spoken with UN Envoy Ibrahim Gambari
Friday night about a proposed regional forum. Salih said he
was not keen on the idea at the moment.

--- Salih said that he did not believe that Iraqiyya leader
Ayad Alawi would pose much of a problem in the SOFA debate:
he would make noises and would allow no one to outdo him in
nationalist rhetoric, but he has not been and would not be a
player in the SOFA talks.

--- Salih asked whether Ambassador had heard that the
Bahrainis had recalled their ambassadors to Iran and Iraq,
supposedly because of the interference of some religious
clerics. PMIN offered that the Bahraini ambassador had yet
to arrive in Iraq and was not due here until some time after
Eid al Fitr.

--- Ambassador raised the upcoming U.S. Higher Education
Fair and asked how (Senior Adviser to VP Adil Abdul Mehdi)
Zuhair Humadi's plan to send ten thousand students to the US
for training was proceeding. Salih, consulting a copy of the
PM's budget said he could find no special line in the budget
for it and unless it was a part of the education budget
itself, was probably not in the budget proposal.
CROCKER