Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD3063
2008-09-23 15:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

DEMISTURA VISIT TO IRAN: OPPOSITION TO SOFA,

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM PTER 
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DE RUEHGB #3063/01 2671550
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O 231550Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9560
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003063 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER
SUBJECT: DEMISTURA VISIT TO IRAN: OPPOSITION TO SOFA,
PRAISE FOR MALIKI

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003063

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER
SUBJECT: DEMISTURA VISIT TO IRAN: OPPOSITION TO SOFA,
PRAISE FOR MALIKI

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Senior Iranian leaders told SRSYG
DeMistura during his recent visit to Iran that, given
improved security conditions, there is no longer a need for a
foreign troop presence in Iraq. The Iranians were adamantly
opposed to the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
and said UNSCR Chapter 7 on Iraq must be abolished.
President Ahmadi-Nejad urged that there be "more of the UN
and less of the US in Iraq," and said stability in Iraq was
in Iran's interest, since this would hasten a U.S. withdrawl.
Ahmadi-Nejad also praised Prime Minister Maliki's efforts to
strengthen central government authority. DeMistura said Iran
and Turkey have reached a unified position on Kirkuk, and
that he suspects the two have conveyed this joint position to
Maliki, which has emboldened him vis-a-vis the Kurds.
DeMistura noted that none of his interlocutors raised the
MEK, a possible indication that this issue has become less
resonant for the Iranians. DeMistura and the Ambassador also
discussed provincial elections and Kurdish issues; these will
be reported septel. END SUMMARY

Trip to Iran: Chapter 7 and SOFA
--------------


2. (C) UNSYG Special Representative Staffan DeMistura told
the Ambassador September 20 that during his recent trip to
Tehran the Iranians gave him a warm welcome and consistent
talkiQ points: UNSCR Chapter 7 on Iraq must be abolished,
and the U.S.-Iraq Status of Force AgrQment (SOFA) is a Qd
idea. Di Mistura met with senior Iranian leaders, including
President Ahmadi-Nejad, NSC Director Larijani, and Foreign
Minister Motakki. On Chapter 7, DeMistura replied that it is
up to the Iraqis to request this and then for the Security
Council to decide.


3. (C) As for the SOFA, DeMistura said the Iranians
stressed the importance of preserving Iraqi sovereignty,
arguing that the improved security situation has eliminated
the need for foreign troops and thus for a SOFA. The SRSYG
acknowledged security improvements but said Iraq is not yet
stable. The Iranians urged that UN troops replace American
forces, asserting that this support for Iraqi sovereignty

would restore the UN's damaged reputation. DeMistura replied
that he would be surprised if the Iraqis accepted such an
arrangment, which might also be considered as an infringement
on Iraq's sovereignty. In any case, he said, the SOFA is not
a UN issue. DeMistura also related that, at the Prime
Minister's request, he had conveyed to his Iranian
interlocutors the GOI request that Iran not pressure Iraq
publicly or privately on the SOFA.


4. (C) DeMistura said that he told Ahmadi-Nejad very
directly that Iraq does not want interference from its
neighbors, including Iran. Ahmadi-Nejad said he understood
this, but that Saudi Arabia and Turkey, not Iran, are the
source of Iraqi concern. Reiterating Iran's opposition to
the presence of foreign troops in Iraq, Ahmadi-Nejad urged
that there be "more of the UN and less of the U.S." and said
stability in Iraq was in Iran's interest, since this would
hasten a U.S. withdrawal. Commenting on Iraq's internal
politics, Ahmadi-Nejad praised Prime Minister Maliki. Iraq
needs a strong central government, he said, and Maliki is
working to achieve that. DeMistura said other Iranian
officials had echoed these positive comments on and Iranian
support for Maliki.


5. (C) The Ambassador noted that it was surprising that the
Iranians are taking positions that anyone with a cursory
knowledge of the UN knows are not in DeMistura's purview. He
also found it odd that the Iranians were advocating positions
that, even if they were possible, the Iraqis would oppose.

Iranian-Turkish Understanding on Kirkuk
-------------- --------------


6. (C) DeMistura said it was clear from his talks that Iran
and Turkey have reached an understanding on Kirkuk. He said
the Iranians told him there have been bilateral meetings,
that Iran appreciates Turkish concerns, and that Iran
understands why Turkey would not hesitate to intervene should
the KRG try to annex Kirkuk. DeMistura said he suspects the
Turks and Iranians have conveyed this joint position to
Maliki, and that this has served to embolden the Prime
Minister vis-a-vis the Kurds.

UNAMI Liaison Office
--------------


7. (C) DeMistura said the Iranians were unenthusiastic in
response to his informal query about the possibility of

BAGHDAD 00003063 002 OF 002


establishing a UNAMI liaison office in Tehran. Given that
there is already a UN Resident Coordinator in Tehran,
DeMistura said he didn't see a need for a separate UNAMI
liason office or UNAMI Ambassador, but would recommend to UN
Headquarters that a junior officer be posted under the UN
Resident coordinator in Tehran to monitor and report on the
press, assist on UNAMI-related issues, and help with SRSYG
visits. The Ambassador agreed on the inadvisability of a
high-profile UNAMI presence in Tehran. This would send the
wrong political signal and hinder U.S.-UNAMI coordination
efforts.

Political Observations
--------------


8. (C) DeMistura noted that the visit was interesting not
only for what the Iranians raised, but for what they didn't
raise. For example, the MEK never came up, which he took to
be an indication that this is no longer a hot-button issue
for the Iranians. DeMistura noted with interest that his
interlocutors did not mention Moqtada al-Sadr, either, which
he interprets as evidence that the Iranians do not consider
him an important political player.


9. (C) DeMistura also recounted how his trip to Iran was a
near disaster. The UN had arranged a direct flight of the
SRSYG's plane from Baghdad to Tehran with civilian Iranian
air traffic officials. However, at the moment the plane
entered Iranian air space, the Iranian air force ordered it
to reverse course within 20 seconds or be shot down. The UN
team later discovered that the Iranian military was in the
midst of conducting three-day war games with an antiaircraft
component. The team changed course and flew via Kuwait.
DeMistura pointed to the lack of coordination between Iranian
civilian and military air traffic officials as emblematic of
the lack of communication and coordination between Iran's
diffuse power centers.
CROCKER