(S) MAYSAN PC CHAIR RUBBED WRONG BY ISF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003059

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: (S) MAYSAN PC CHAIR RUBBED WRONG BY ISF

Classified By: PRT Team Leader Dan Foote for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

(U) This is a PRT Maysan reporting cable.


1. (S/REL MCFI) Summary: In his first meeting with American
representatives or Coalition Forces (CF) in several years,
Abdul Jabar Wahid, the devout Sadrist chairman of Maysan,s
Provincial Council, expressed intense dissatisfaction with
this summer's "Operation Good Tidings of Peace," describing
it as a politically motivated operation that allowed criminal
elements to flee unfettered to Iran while harassing,
targeting, and detaining innocent provincial officials. He
denigrated GOI Ministry of Defense and Interior information
campaigns during the operations as spreading lies against
provincial government officials, designed for the political
benefit of Iranian-influenced politicians. Without delving
into details, he repeatedly danced around the edges of malign
Iranian influence and its perpetuation of incorrect negative
perceptions about the Sadrist movement in Maysan. Adbul
Jabar offered to meet embassy officials and Team Leader (TL)
in Baghdad to further discuss the political situation and
Iran,s influence. End Summary.


2. (S/REL MCFI) In the semi-clandestine environment of the
Governor,s office, deserted for the occasion of the
anniversary of Imam Ali,s martyrdom on September 22, an
engaging Abdul Jabar Wahid presented a rambling, repetitive,
and passionate discourse to representatives from the PRT, 4th
Brigade Combat Team/1st Cavalry, and 2nd Battalion/7th
Cavalry. (Comment: The PRT has been struggling to find a
comfortable venue at which to meet the PC chairman for
several weeks; he appears willing to engage American
interests but nervous about public knowledge about such
engagements. End Comment.) He took credit for pushing PC
members to meet and cooperate with the PRT since long before
the team could access the province, and lauded several major
USG infrastructure projects such as the 400 Kva generating
station and ongoing highway and hospital projects. Abdul
Jabar proudly noted that sons of Maysan are in charge of the
province for the first time in modern history, with him and
Governor running the show since 2005 elections.

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FRICTION TOWARD MOD/MOI
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3. (S/REL MCFI) The PC chairman spoke ill of the spokesmen
for the GOI Interior and Defense Ministries, Abdul Karim
Khalaf and Mohammed al-Askari respectively, terming their
statements about the provincial government as wrong,
insulting, and ignorant. In a theme he would revisit
countless times, Abdul Jabar stated that the operation, and
successive Iraq Security Forces (ISF, including both Iraqi
Army and Police) acts, were failing because they were not
arresting killers and criminals in the province but rather
targeting innocent citizens for political reasons. While he
did not specifically cite his own detention (he was arrested
and held for several days early in Operation Good Tidings of
Peace, only to be released without charge),he mentioned the
detentions of his political brethren, the mayors of Majar al
Kabir and Ali as-Sharqi, as punishment for peaceful
operations when a reward would have been more appropriate.


4. (S/REL MCFI) In discussing provincial security, Abdul
Jabar offered that Maysan,s security has always been better
than that of neighboring provinces Basrah and Dhi Qar. In an
apparently contradictory statement that has been common from
Sadrist officials, he admitted that security in the wake of
military operations was much improved. Wahid stated that
recent IDF and IED attacks against CF were the direct result
of the return of criminals who had been permitted to escape
to Iran. He described an edict he had issued in the PC that
Maysanis would not attack CF, and expressed hope that
American elements would not suffer as a result of the poor
ISF operations as criminals make their way back into the
province. He floated his idea of cordoning off areas of
Amarah to limit the freedom of movement for criminal elements.

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IRAN,S NEGATIVE INFLUENCE



5. (S/REL MCFI) The PC chairman made a number of passing
remarks, some explicit and all obviously directed at Iranian
influence, about the negative role of outside intervention in
Maysan, describing it a &big conspiracy against the
country.8 While he appeared uneasy about discussing details
in this forum, he offered to meet TL and embassy officials in
Baghdad to delve more deeply into this issue.

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BAGHDAD 00003059 002 OF 002


BUDGET EXECUTION
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6. (S/REL MCFI) Abdul Jabar Wahid remarked that the province
had spent 60 percent of its budget before military
operations, and was performing better than most provinces
with 75 percent of 2008,s budget already spent. He pointed
to the cooperation of his government with U.S. entities (RTI
and the PRT) and GOI,s Ministry of Planning on sharing
budget information. He mentioned that plans for spending the
supplemental budget were already being implemented. He
complained about the approximately $100 million
reconstruction fund for Maysan announced in the wake of Good
Tidings of Peace, stating that its project ideas were
misdirected and the GOI committee did not listen to
provincial officials in determining how to spend this
windfall. He reiterated that the provincial government has
no role in the execution of these funds, stating that he
believes associated projects are in the tender stage, and
that Maysan has seen little if any benefit to date.


7. (S/REL MCFI) Comment: PC Chairman Abdul Jabar Wahid took a
positive step forward in meeting with U.S. elements; he had
historically refused such interactions as hypocritical for a
Sadrist leader. This indicates the acceptance of Sadrist
officials in Maysan that relationships with the U.S. and CF
are critical to progress, and is another example of a
newfound willingness to engage. While Abdul Jabar was
reticent about meeting directly with ISF officials in the
near term, he expressed interest in further meetings and
development of a relationship with Embassy, PRT and CF
leaders. It is difficult to ascertain the value of any
information the PC chairman may share on Iran at this point,
but it is likely worth an invitation to meet at the Embassy.
End comment.
CROCKER