AMB, CG AND PM DISCUSS SOFA, SOI, AMBASSADOR'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003031

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR PTER ENGR EPET IZ
SUBJECT: AMB, CG AND PM DISCUSS SOFA, SOI, AMBASSADOR'S
TRIP TO ERBIL, GOI/KRG RELATIONS AND ELECTIONS LAW.

BAGHDAD 00003031 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Abassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: In the regular weekly meeting held on 18
September 2008, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki,
Ambassador and Commanding General (CG) MNF-I General Raymond
Odierno discussed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),Sons
of Iraq (SOI),the Ambassador's trip to KRG and relations
between the KRG and GOI, and the Elections Law. General
Odierno pressed Maliki on the issue of the SOFA, stating that
U.S. troops would be forced to withdraw from Iraq in the
absence of a suitable agreement. PM Maliki, in response to
General Odierno's personal concern for the SOI program,
remarked that the issue was "being solved." The Ambassador
reported he had stressed to the KRG leadership during his
recent visit to Erbil that Kurdish interests are best served
in Baghdad by means of "serious negotiations and policy
discussions," as part of a vision of a unified Iraq. The
Ambassador commented that there was a "significant lack of
understanding among Iraqi principal leaders about the shape
and direction of the future of Iraq." The Ambassador noted
that Kurdish leaders in Erbil had agreed to United Nations
Assistance Mission Iraq (UNAMI) compromise for paragraph 24
of the elections law; however, it had failed to pass in
Parliament because Kurds would not support an Arab and
Turkmen amendment to the UNAMI compromise. The Ambassador
emphasized the importance of passing an elections law and
concluded that the issue of Kirkuk should be treated
separately, so as to not jeopardize elections. End summary.


2. (S/NF) PM Maliki opened by congratulating General Odierno
on his promotion and position as Commanding General
Multi-National Force-Iraq. General Odierno replied that it
was his honor to return to Iraq and that his primary goal was
for the Government of Iraq (GOI) to achieve full sovereignty
and to take full control of Iraq. The CG said that he would
do whatever he could to assist in this process, as it was
very important to him personally.


3. (S/NF) General Odierno told Maliki that he had met with
his command in Iraq and had informed them that the progress
that was being made was an "evolution toward full sovereignty
in Iraq and that we must respect that sovereignty." CG also
remarked to his command that "we must reduce our visibility,"
while continuing to support Iraq - only in a different way.
PM Maliki replied that he was very pleased with the message
the CG had delivered to his troops.

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STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT
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4. (S/NF) General Odierno told PM Maliki that the Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA) was his number one priority. General
Odierno noted that it was "absolutely necessary to have a
legal framework" for the continued presence of American
troops in Iraq, beyond the expiration of the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1790(UNSCR).


5. (S/NF) General Odierno reported to Maliki that he had
heard rumors that the U.S. would stay without a SOFA. He
categorically denied this and stated, unequivocally, that the
U.S. would not remain in Iraq without either an acceptable
SOFA or an extension of UNSCR. General Odierno noted that an
extension of UNSCR was very unlikely due to the situation in
the UNSC and relations with Russia. The CG remarked that he
understood well the political difficulties Maliki faced with
regard to the SOFA, but urged him to find a resolution.


6. (S/NF) PM Maliki said the he had asked both Secretary of
Defense Gates and CJCS Admiral Mullen if there was any
alternative or "plan B" to a SOFA. Both had stated
emphatically that there was no alternative. General Odierno
and the Ambassador interjected that it was absolutely clear
that there was no alternative to an agreement to allow U.S.
forces to remain in Iraq. General Odierno emphasized that
"plan B" would constitute planning for the immediate
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, should a SOFA not be
reached. The PM said that he hoped that "plan B" would not
be the plan of action. General Odierno responded that he was
holding off on "plan B" for now but at some point he would
have to start determining what to do if there was no
agreement.


7. (S/NF) PM Maliki commented that the period during which
Washington had been considering the draft text had allowed
leaks to the press of supposed drafts of the SOFA and that

BAGHDAD 00003031 002.2 OF 004


now a "political counter-movement" had formed in opposition.
Maliki noted that opposition to the SOFA included
interference from Iran and Syria. Additionally, Maliki
stated that he didn't understand why U.S. Allies in the Arab
world such as Saudi Arabia, did not openly support the SOFA.



8. (S/NF) PM Maliki said that he hoped the SOFA delegation
would return soon and that an agreement could be reached to
ensure the vital continued U.S. presence in Iraq. He
commented that the SOFA agreement had come at a particularly
sensitive time for both the U.S. and Iraq, as both were in
the middle of elections - noting that the SOFA was
politically difficult in both the U.S. and in Iraq. The
Ambassador responded that he believed the SOFA delegation
would conclude its process by 22 September and that he hoped
to have a draft text immediately thereafter to present to the
PM.

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SONS OF IRAQ
--------------


9. (S/NF) Switching topics, General Odierno informed the PM
that the Sons of Iraq program was also of great personal
interest to him. General Odierno offered to provide Maliki
with any assistance necessary as the GOI continued to
implement the integration process. Maliki stated that SOI
problem was "being solved," noting General Odierno's positive
work on the issue during his previous tenure in Iraq. Maliki
stated that his primary concern was over the use of fake or
"ghost" names by SOI members, noting that they had discovered
a number of such persons on the lists provided by the SOI.
General Odierno remarked that much work had been done to make
sure the information was accurate.

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AMBASSADOR'S TRIP TO KRG AND GOI/KRG RELATIONS
-------------- --


10. (S/NF) PM Maliki asked the Ambassador about his trip to
Erbil. Ambassador replied that it was good and that
President Barzani et al. had relayed their respect and
regards to the PM. The Ambassador noted that he had met not
only with President Barzani but with senior leaders of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK). The Ambassador remarked that he had
discussed current tensions between the KRG and GOI and told
Kurdish leaders that it was "absolutely vital" that the Kurds
not do anything to jeopardize the progress that had been
achieved in Iraq. The Ambassador further noted that five and
one half years after the fall of the former regime there was
still "a significant lack of understanding among Iraqi
principal leaders about the shape and direction of the future
of Iraq." PM Maliki agreed with Ambassador.


11. (S/NF) The Ambassador also commented on the fundamental
lack of trust between the leaders of the different groups in
Iraq. The Ambassador told the Kurds that they had to be much
more engaged in the central government in Baghdad. He
emphasized that he was not talking about the ordinary
business of government representatives serving in Baghdad,
e.g. Ministers. Rather, he was referring to the need for
"serious negotiations and policy discussions" on education,
health, transportation and oil - oil being of particular
importance, as part of a vision of a unified Iraq. The
Ambassador stated that this should be based on the
convictions that 1) everyone needs to move forward together;
2) gains can not be put at risk; and 3) the Constitution must
be at the center of these issues. He remarked that he
emphasized the last point to the Kurds - that the
Constitution had to be respected.


12. (S/NF) The Ambassador said he had told the Kurds that
Kurdish interests over the long term are better defended in
Baghdad than in Khanaqin or Kirkuk. The Ambassador noted
that the response from the KRG was good, although there was a
great deal of doubt and mistrust. Barzani had acknowledged
that the KRG must engage in Baghdad and said that Talabani
would do so upon his return from the U.S. PM Maliki
commented that the Ambassador's message to the Kurds
contained very important political underpinnings - namely
that Kurdish interests were best served in Baghdad and
remarked that the Kurds had a strong political base in
Baghdad.


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13. (S/NF) PM Maliki enumerated what he perceived to be the
three principal issues with the Kurds. First, the GOI and
KRG did not agree on the political shape of a new Iraq. He
said that Iraq is supposed to be federal state, but the Kurds
actions do not support a federal system. Maliki complained
that the Kurds have their own understanding of many such
issues. He noted that many other groups in Iraq also
maintained their own perceptions of the shape of the new
government. Maliki commented that the authorities of the
central government and the authorities of the KRG were the
other significant issues of disagreement. Maliki said that
solutions to these problems can be found in the Constitution.
The "problem with the Kurds," he said, was that they said
they supported the Constitution but were selective - taking
what they wanted from it and leaving the rest.


14. (S/NF) PM Maliki pointed to the lack of trust between the
Kurds and Arabs. It was obvious that the Kurds had certain
ambitions, he commented. He noted that while the Kurds had
been allowed to create offices in Embassies, they had instead
created their own Embassies flying the KRG flag and were
issuing visas for entry by Arabs into the KRG. Maliki also
noted that the KRG had overreached in Khanaqin and pointed to
other indications of encroachment - citing KRG maps that
often depicted borders far more expansive than the 19 March
2003 "green-line" established in the Constitution. Maliki
mentioned that Barzani had previously said he did not believe
in red, yellow or green lines. He reiterated that the Kurds
must abide by the Constitution.


15. (S/NF) Ambassador said that with respect to the
Constitution, he had raised the issue of Article 143 with
President Barzani. The Ambassador noted that Barzani's
response was interesting, as it was essentially the same
argument that PM had just made in reverse. Ambassador said
that Barzani argued that GOI was selective in its application
of the Constitution, specifically referring to Article 140
and the resolution of disputed areas. Barzani said that the
GOI insisted on enforcement of Article 143, but was not
willing to enforce Article 140.


16. (S/NF) PM Maliki said that his intent with regard to
Article 140 was honest. He said that he had formed a
committee to deal with Article 140, noting that the most
influential persons on the committee were Kurds. Also, when
the leaders of the committee were not Kurds, the Kurds had
"bought them off" to support Kurdish aims. The committee was
frozen and nothing was coming out of it, Maliki complained.
The PM had told President Barzani that Article 140 was a
complicated issue and was difficult to implement because of
the procedures outlined in it. He further commented that
Article 140 was poorly written as a result either of malign
intentions or ignorance. He added that the Article was held
up by the President's Council and not the Cabinet.


17. (S/NF) Maliki asserted that there needs to be an
independent solution to Kirkuk and that perhaps it needed to
be its own independent region. Maliki noted that if there
was to be a conflict between the KRG and GOI, it would likely
be sparked by Kirkuk. The Ambassador replied that it was for
this reason that the PM and President Barzani had to discuss
the nature and direction of the State. Maliki concurred but
added the discussion should be on the basis of the
Constitution.


18. (S/NF) General Odierno remarked that Maliki must consider
how others would view the decisions and actions of Iraq with
regard to these issues - whether they were solved politically
or by conflict.

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MINISTRY OF ELECTRICITY OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCE CONTRACT
-------------- --------------


19. (S/NF) The Ambassador thanked Maliki for his support in
authorizing the Minister of Electricity (MOE) to sign the
Parsons Brinckerhoff contract for maintenance of Iraq's
electrical power generation system. The Ambassador added
that he would appreciate it if he could now get the MOE to
actually sign the contract, even if it required holding the
Minister's hand. Maliki expressed frustration that the issue
was not closed and added that the Council of Ministers had
now given him signatory authority on all matters related to
power generation and that perhaps he would have to sign the
agreement himself.


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ELECTIONS LAW
--------------


20. (S/NF) With regard to the elections law, the Ambassador
noted that on the same day he had traveled to Erbil to visit
President Barzani, the COR had considered the United Nations
Assistance Mission Iraq (UNAMI) compromise for paragraph 24
of the elections law. The Ambassador had pressed the Kurds
and they had said they would accept it if it was not modified
in any way by any other party. However, Arabs and Turkmen
had come up with an amendment that the Kirkuk council would
not be based on "fair and balanced representation" of each
party but would be based on "equal" representation, e.g.
32/32/32/4. The Kurds could not agree to this arrangement.
The question was then whether the arrangement would apply
before the elections were held or after. PM Maliki pointed
out that the Kurds had changed their position on that point.
The Ambassador said the important issue was to get the UNAMI
language adopted as it had been drafted.


21. (S/NF) The Ambassador expressed his concern that we were
2/3 of the way through September and still did not have a new
elections law. He urged PM to work to resolve the few
remaining issues. The Ambassador underscored that the GOI
and KRG should not attempt to resolve the Kirkuk issue
through elections. This would derail any possibility of
holding elections this year. The Ambassador stated they must
address Kirkuk separately so that they could have a new
elections law.
CROCKER