ISCI/BADR FEELING UNDER THREAT, RAISING INTER-SHIA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003023

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: ISCI/BADR FEELING UNDER THREAT, RAISING INTER-SHIA
TENSIONS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2904

B. BAGHDAD 2883

C. BAGHDAD 2857

D. HILLAH 76

E. HILLAH 75

F. BAGHDAD 2683

G. BAGHDAD 2089

Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
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1. (S) The influential Shia Islamist party ISCI/Badr has
become increasingly isolated among Shi'a parties in the past
month, and its governing practices have become increasingly
restrictive. Tensions have risen dramatically between
ISCI/Badr and its fellow Shi'a Islamist
coalition partner Da'wa over Prime Minister Maliki's
promotion of tribal support councils and the alleged
politicization of the Iraqi Army. ISCI/Badr is aware that it
has suffered a drop in its already-low popularity as a result
of its alliance with the Kurds during the late July
clashes over Kirkuk in the parliament, and recognizes that it
needs passage of an open-list election law to stabilize its
support levels. Efforts to use inducements to attract
support have been heavy-handed and apparently ineffective to
date. Viewed by many as the face of incompetent governance
and Iranian manipulation, the ISCI party and its Badr militia
could become an object of inter-Shi'a violence, especially if
the tribal support council initiative goes forward as planned
or if elections are not held soon. End summary.

Uniquely Unpopular
--------------


2. (S) Holding the Governor's office in four of nine southern
provinces (Babil, Najaf, Diwaniyah, Dhi Qar) and a majority
or governing plurality of the Provincial Council (PC) in six
provinces (including Wasit and Muthanna),ISCI/Badr is the
party most strongly associated by southern voters with
strong-arm tactics and the failure to deliver key services.
While recent polling indicates that its popularity levels are
not significantly below Prime Minister Maliki's Da'wa or
Ibrahim Ja'afari's National Reform Trend (ref A),most of the
disenfranchised in the south -- tribal, secular, Shi'a and
Sadrist -- show an especially intense disdain toward
ISCI/Badr. As Jaysh-al-Mahdi (JAM) has weakened, in many
places to the point of invisibility, and Da'wa takes an
increasingly nationalist, militarized stance, many
disenchanted Shi'a
leaders see ISCI/Badr as the representative of
Iranian-influenced authoritarianism in Iraq. In a September
18 iftar discussion, Ayatollah Hussein al-Sadr, arguably the
most powerful Shi'a cleric in Baghdad, told us that "Badr is
the new JAM." He also compared ISCI/Badr to the the
government of Saddam Hussein, and likened Ammar al-Hakim to
Uday Hussein (reftel A).

Tribal Support Councils: Squeezed by Da'wa
--------------


3. (S) As provincial elections approach, ISCI/Badr is
particularly worried about losing the support of tribal
sheikhs, whose emphasis on Arab nationalism over religious
identity elevates their political independence and increases
their openness to new political partnerships.
They are especially angry that Prime Minister Maliki, through
the Iraqi Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for National
Reconciliation (IFCNR),has aggressively recruited and funded
tribal support councils throughout the South. Originally
designed as an informal means for
sheikhs to coordinate with the Iraqi Army and provincial
governments on security concerns, tribal support councils are
most developed in Wasit, Maysan, and Basra Provinces. New
support councils were formed in Najaf, Babil, Karbala,
Diwaniyah, and Dhi Qar provinces in early September, with
additional units planned in the central and far southern
provinces. With
councils receiving a reported 25,000 USD from the Prime
Minister's office to form, and a promised 800 USD per month
to continue duties, ISCI/Badr has reason to be suspicious
that support councils will be used to politicize the tribes
in favor of Da'wa.


4. (C) ISCI/Badr has been particularly insistent that tribal
support councils must not usurp the role of provincial
councils. On August 31, the ISCI Governor in Babil Province,
Salam Salih Mahdi al-Muslimawi, organized a Hillah conference
attended by nine governors with the
express goal of condemning Prime Ministry-backed tribal
support councils and encouraging the governors to form their

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own tribal councils (ref E). On September 5 and again
September 12, ISCI/Badr leader Jalal ad-Din as-Saghiir used
his sermon at Baghdad's Buratha mosque to make specific
political arguments against the councils, condemning the
proposal that support councils will have monitoring,
protection, security, and coordination roles. He strongly
defended the role of Provincial Councils and Governors
vis-a-vis the support councils and also denied claims made by
several sheikhs that the Shi'a religious leadership
(marja'iyah) have endorsed the initiative. On September 16,
Jalal ad-Din called for new legislation to
clarify the role of support councils.


5. (S) Third-party contacts suggest that that PM Maliki and
other Iraqi leaders developed tribal councils primarily for
security reasons, but that the search for new political
partnerships also played a part. In a September 8 meeting
with poloff, Council of Representatives (CoR) member and
former Karbala Province Governor Sa'ad Safuk Sa'ud al-Masoudi
said that he and his CoR Tribal Affairs committee -- mostly
independents with no ISCI/Badr members -- coordinated with
IFCNR to set up a series of recent conferences to encourage
closer tribal coordination with the Iraqi Army. An Iraqqiya
member and a tribal sheikh himself, al-Masoudi said that
Maliki participated in these conferences with the intention
of setting up tribal support councils. Al-Masoudi
acknowledged the risk of these councils being exploited as a
tool for the Da'wa party, but noted that a broad range of
Sunni representatives from diverse parties as well as Shi'a
independents have participated in these conferences. Among
major southern parties, he added, only ISCI/Badr has refused
to participate. Al-Masoudi agreed that councils required
more precise legal definition to clarify their status in
relation to the national and provincial governments.

An anti-ISCI Iraqi Army
--------------


6. (C) The security function of tribal support councils
reinforces the growing feeling by ISCI/Badr that the Iraqi
Army is lined up against them. On September 7, ISCI leader
Ammar al-Hakim met with National Security Advisor Muwaffaq
al-Rubaie to complain about the politicization of the Iraqi
Army. According to an ISCI press release, Ammar "urged
(Rubaie) to have civilians occupy posts inside the military
institution to avoid militarizing the society." Ammar
particularly insisted that the National Operations Center --
which responds directly to the Prime Minister's office --
must be staffed almost exclusively by a nonpartisan civil
service.


7. (S) In a September 10 meeting with poloff, ISCI CoR member
Majid Khairallah Rahi al-Zamili expounded on his party's
unease with the relationship between the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) and government, saying "there is a growing
division between the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi
Police." (Note: The majority of police forces in the south
have police chiefs with Badr links, whereas high-ranking
Iraqi Army officials in the same region are consistently
Shi'a nationalist, formerly Baathist, loyal to the central
government, and anti-Badr. End comment.) Zamili, who
represents Wasit Province, criticized the government's
announcement that it would integrate Sons of Iraq (SOI)
elements into the Iraqi security forces. He acknowledged,
however, that the government needs an aggressive program to
integrate SOI members into the economy. Zamili expressed
concern about Rubaie's public campaign to integrate the
majority of the SOI into the ISF or GOI ministries. He
feared that many would end up as "terrorist cells in the
Iraqi Police" and asked the U.S. to pressure the Maliki
government to come up for a different solution for dealing
with SOI integration. A September 14 PRT Wasit meeting with
provincial ISCI party chief Ahmed al-Hakim reinforced these
views (septel B).

Paranoid Governance
--------------


8. (S) In response to perceived threats to their authority,
ISCI-led provincial governments have taken additional
measures to restrict access and reduce civil liberties. In
the latest of many examples from Babil Province, the ISCI-led
Babil Provincial Council instituted a ban in late August on
interaction with the PRT -- since lifted on September 4 --
due to concerns about an MNF-SC decision to release a Sunni
detainee from the Northern part of the province (ref D). In
Diwaniyah, Governor Khudari instituted new rules in August
prohibiting any contact with
Coalition Forces or PRT without his approval. Like his Babil
counterpart, he has also taken recent steps to shut down
media coverage of public events (ref F). Much of the change
in Diwaniyah happened shortly after it moved to Provincial

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Iraqi Control (PIC),an ominous signal for projected PIC
transfer this fall in Babil and Wasit provinces. (Note: As a
general rule, ISCI governors and Provincial Council Chairman
have roots in the leadership of Badr Corps; many have limited
education. The ISCI governing team in Najaf Province has
higher education levels and the PRT reports that the
government has exhibited fewer heavy-handed tendencies. End
note.)


9. (S) Reports of assassination attempts in the southern
provinces have grown increasingly common in the past month,
with the highest number in ISCI-run Babil and Dhi Qar
provinces. Several were either orchestrated by or targeted
toward ISCI/Badr leaders. In Dhi Qar, Iraqi Police announced
on August 21 three separate Badr-associated attempts to
assasinate the Provincial Chief of Police, General Sabah
al-Fatlawi. ISCI governor Aziz Kadum Alwan al-Ogheli has long
been an opponent of the police chief, a non-partisan with
strong tribal roots. PRT Dhi Qar reports that Aziz was
particularly angry at the police chief's decision earlier
this year to shut down the ISF Tactical Support Unit, a haven
for Badr Corps. Local media also
implicated Governor Aziz in assassination plots against other
key local figures in recent weeks, including the Mayor of
al-Batha and leading sheikhs of the al-Ghizi and Bidur
tribes. On September 11, former Basra former police chief
Jalil Khalaf al-Mozani noted to poloff that the Ministry of
Interior (where he now works) is monitoring credible threats
of Badr targeting several 'independent' police chiefs and
high-ranking military officers throughout the country,
specifically mentioning Dhi Qar, Babil, and Karbala. In
recent meetings with Senior Advisor Gray, sheikhs from
Muthanna have reported "death threats from Iran," which they
believe would be carried out through Badr operatives.


10. (C) In provinces where ISCI/Badr is part of the
governing structure but does not hold the governor's seat,
ISCI performance within local government varies. In Maysan,
the ISCI Deputy Governor appears to work in partnership with
the ruling Sadrist coaltion; no serious issues with ISCI
governance are indicated (ref B). In Basra, ISCI and Badr
operatives are troubled by the possible formation of a
one-province Basra Regional Government. Their approach to
the provincial government -- run by anti-Iranian Fadilah
Governor Wa'eli -- is openly hostile in a manner not seen
elsewhere in the south. (Note: ISCI continues to favor
formation of a nine-province Southern Regional Government;
the proposal has no visible support outside of ISCI itself.
End note.)

Provincial Elections: The Kurdish Albatross
--------------


11. (C) ISCI/Badr representatives returned to CoR this week
recognizing that their weaknesses have been exacerbated by
the decision to vote with the Kurds on July 22 in opposition
to the Provincial Elections Law. According to al-Masoudi
(Iraqqiya CoR member from Karbala),most people in the south
know that ISCI was the Shi'a party that supported the Kurds.
Voters are angry, he continued, and think ISCI and the Kurds
just want to use the Kirkuk issue to delay elections and stay
in power. He added that ISCI CoR members aren't happy
either. "Most of them want to vote against the Kurds but
their bloc leader won't let them," Masoudi said. Multiple
ISCI leaders throughout the south have expressed to poloffs
and Senior Advisor Gray in recent weeks that they want the
U.S. to pressure the Kurds to compromise on the Kirkuk issue
and allow an election law to go forward. This appears to be
both a function of genuine anger with the Kurds by provincial
ISCI leaders and recognition of the need to be seen by voters
as supportive of early elections and a unified Iraq.

In Favor of Open List?
--------------


12. (S) The wishes of the marja'iyah have also pushed
ISCI/Badr to back open list provincial elections, though most
observers believe ISCI members still privately prefer closed
lists and would benefit from them. In a short September 10
conversation with poloff, ISCI CoR member
Jenan Qasim al-Obeidi said that her party will support open
list elections simply because the Shi'a religious hierarchy
in her hometown of Najaf supports open lists. Jalal ad-Din
Saghiir said the same to PMIN on September 4. Other ISCI
leaders make the argument that ISCI genuinely wants open list
elections. Zamili told poloff that ISCI will support an open
list -- whether as part of the 2008 law or as an amendment to
the 2005 law -- not only because religious
leaders want it, but because it can help ISCI expand
coalitions on the provincial level. He expressed confidence
that, in his home province of Wasit, ISCI has made many
connections with technocrats and tribal leaders running on

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independent lists. (ISCI Party Chairman delivered a similar
message to PRT Wasit in July; see ref G) While conceding
that some voters in Wasit may not want to vote for ISCI/Badr,
he argued that most voters want to be tied to ISCI in some
manner, because Iraqis are "religious and pragmatic people."

ISCI Seeking Buyers
--------------


13. (S) While many PRTs report that ISCI/Badr has set up
alliances with 'independent' provincial election candidates
who are really ISCI/Badr members, the party has had little
visible success recruiting new tribal, secular, and
technocratic support. Expressing views representative of
many tribal leaders who have met with PRTs, two sheikhs from
Dhi Qar and Muthanna told Senior Advisor on September 2 that
they have several times refused the offers of ISCI
representatives offering them cash inducements, saying, "We
will not support Iran." (ref C) Heavy-handed ISCI/Badr
tactics can often create a backlash toward the party. In
Diwaniyah earlier this eyar, Governor Khudari confiscated
several million dollars of Coalition-purchased seed,
fertilizer and equipment, and is holding them as a carrot to
win support from rural tribal sheikhs. Early returns
indicate that he has only succeeded thus far in raising the
level of tribal resentment. A few scattered examples of
recruiting success exist, such as an independent qadaa
chairman in Mussayib who indicated to ePRT North Babil in
late July that he would run as an ISCI member in upcoming
elections. Meanwhile, the party continues to dig into its
relatively deep pockets to sway the impressionable. As an
anecdotal example, Babil University students reported to PRT
Babil in early September that the Badr youth wing (Safwa
Gathering) is arranging a contest for free student vacations
to Erbil. It remains to be seen how much support can be
bought.

Comment
--------------


14. (S) Dynamics in southern Iraq are increasingly working in
a way that isolates ISCI/Badr as a convenient target for
widespread frustration with poor government services, the
excesses of religious parties, and Iranian manipulation. If
provincial elections are not held soon,
many will hold ISCI/Badr responsible, not only lowering their
electoral popularity but also raising the potential for
sporadic violence. Certain disaffected tribal sheikhs might
be willing to confront ISCI by violent means, but do not have
the financial wherewithal to sustain activity. ISCI's
awareness of its isolated position, especially relative to
Da'wa, increases the potential for inter-Shi'a conflict. A
potential reconciliation deal between Prime Minister Maliki
and Sadrist/JAM elements, as reported in Iraqi media on
September 14, may exacerbate the isolation. With many
provincial Governors and police chiefs trained through Badr
Corps, ISCI can be expected to follow its own historical
pattern of acting aggressively when viewing itself under
threat. The rising strength of PM Maliki and the direct
challenge to provincial security and governance systems
represented by the tribal support councils may pressure Badr
such that increased inter-Shi'a violence by year's end
becomes a real possibility. This wouldn't be
the first time, of course. Southern Iraq saw occasional
fighting and constant competition between ISCI/Badr elements
and Jaysh al-Mahdi in 2004 - 2005. End comment.
CROCKER