Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD3021
2008-09-19 10:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

FORMER PM ALLAWI: IRAQ NEEDS PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS KDEM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191040Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9492
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003021 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER PM ALLAWI: IRAQ NEEDS PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS
AND NO PRECIPITATED AMERICAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003021

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER PM ALLAWI: IRAQ NEEDS PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS
AND NO PRECIPITATED AMERICAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During a September 15 meeting, Iyad Allawi,
former Prime Minister and current leader of the secular
"Iraqiya" parliamentary bloc, told the Ambassador that Iraq
needs its political leaders to develop a greater consensus
about key issues like provincial elections, constitutional
reform and security. He outlined for the Ambassador his
efforts to convene broad-based discussions among the
country's various power blocs, with the aim of forging that
national consensus. The Ambassador noted that Allawi and
many in his parliamentary bloc were too often absent from
Iraq and thus missed the chance to influence the national
debate. Allawi assured the Ambassador he would be spending
more time in Baghdad. After the Ambassador explained the
necessity of putting in place a Strategic Framework
Agreement, Allawi criticized the GOI's handling of
negotiations for the SoFA and worried that in its absence a
"bloody massacre" would follow a premature withdrawal of
coalition forces. Allawi also considered an extensive
international monitoring effort essential to ensure
successful provincial elections, and tied the passage of an
elections law to his national dialogue concept. We believe
PM Maliki would likely perceive Allawi's national dialogue
effort, should it gain any traction, as an attempt to
undermine him and empower his adversaries. End summary.

--------------
Kurds and Turks
--------------


2. (C) On September 15, the Ambassador called on Iyad Allawi,
former Prime Minister and currently leader of the secular
Iraqiya parliamentary bloc (with 25 parliamentary seats)
September 15. The Ambassador conveyed his condolences over
the death of Allawi's uncle, Tawfiq Allawi (the father of
Mohammed Allawi, former Minister of Communications).
Thanking the Ambassador, Allawi noted that he had recently
returned from a trip to Turkey, where he had met with
President Gul. Allawi said he had urged Gul to engage with
the KRG leadership, which was not supportive of the

anti-Turkish PKK.


3. (C) Allawi reported that Gul had been amenable to the
suggestion, and penned a constructive message to KRG
President Barzani, which Allawi delivered during a brief stop
in Erbil on his way back to Baghdad. Allawi said that he had
told Barzani that he could not keep fighting everyone.
Barzani needed to slow down and calm down. The Ambassador
agreed, noting that the Kurds' current position is the best
they have enjoyed in their modern history. It was not in the
Kurds' interest to jeopardize this position by over-playing
their hand (e.g. by trying to expand Kurdish controlled areas
farther southward) at this stage.

--------------
Dialogue for National Unity
--------------


4. (C) Allawi said that he had pitched to Barzani, (Sunni)
Vice President Hashemi, and key Shi'a (and ISCI) leader Ammar
al-Hakim, the idea of a broad meeting encompassing all of
Iraq's major power blocs, to include the Sahwa (Sunni
awakening councils) and "the resistance." Allawi saw such a
gathering as an opportunity to forge a new national consensus
which could break Baghdad's political deadlock and bridge
deepening fault lines between the GOI and the Kurds, between
Sunnis and Shi'a, as well as divisions within the Sunni and
Shi'a communities. Barzani, Hashemi, and Hakim had each
reacted favorably, Allawi reported.


5. (C) The Ambassador observed that the atmosphere of
improved security had brought to the surface a whole host of
issues that had previously remained in the background.
Allawi heartily agreed and expanded on this theme. Iraq
continues to suffer from constitutional ambiguities and
contradictions - the foundation for the state laid out in
2005 remains shaky, he argued. A national unity dialogue
should confront and remedy the gaps in the constitution.
Given the growing tensions between the Kurds and the central
government, the implementation of Article 140 (which
addresses resolution of territorial disputes created by
Saddam's policies) should be among the first topics the group
dealt with.


6. (C) Repeating that Barzani, Hashemi, and Hakim had
expressed support for a national unity dialogue, Allawi also
anticipated that (former Prime Minister) Ibrahim Jafari,

BAGHDAD 00003021 002 OF 002


though not PM Maliki's Dawa party, would support the effort.
Allawi urged the Ambassador to lobby Embassy contacts to
support his dialogue initiative. "Your good offices will be
key" to convincing the various parties to participate, he
underlined. Without more discussions among Iraqi political
leaders, the security situation will again deteriorate, and
the GOI will ultimately founder, he warned. The Ambassador
noted that Allawi and many in his parliamentary bloc were
often absent from Iraq and thus missed the chance to
influence the national debate. Allawi assured the Ambassador
he would be spending more time in Baghdad.

--------------
SOFA
--------------


7. (C) Allawi lamented that the GOI has been sending out
mixed and contradictory signals about the official Iraqi
position on the Strategic Framework Agreement. The
Ambassador cautioned that while the two sides were close to
an agreement, until there is agreement on every point there
is not an agreement. "There is no third option," the
Ambassador emphasized, and U.S. forces will not remain in
Iraq without a legal basis. The atmosphere in the UN
Security Council appears to preclude an extension of the UN
mandate. A precipitate withdrawal of U.S. forces would
result in a "bloody massacre" in Iraq, Allawi noted darkly.
The GOI must "act responsibly" and in its handling of the
negotiations and "pay attention to details."


8. (C) Reacting to an earlier SOFA draft text he had seen,
Allawi expressed discomfort with a provision authorizing
military operations in pursuit of "outlaws." Allawi worried
that the GOI would manipulate the definition of "outlaws" for
political gain. The Ambassador assured Allawi that U.S.
would be able to distinguish between legitimate security
targets and political adversaries and would not be bound to
undertake any operations that lacked a valid security basis.


--------------
Elections
--------------


9. (C) Allawi considered an extensive international
monitoring effort essential to ensure successful provincial
elections. "The intimidation and killing has already
started," he warned, citing an early September attack that
killed three Iraqi elections officials in Basra. A petition
is circulating in the parliament, already signed by 126
members, demanding international observation of the next
elections. The Ambassador observed that the first hurdle was
for parliament to pass a law that will allow the elections
take place. Allawi agreed there was a danger that Iraq might
continue to drift indefinitely without elections, a situation
that would be "extremely dangerous" and leave Iraq vulnerable
to forces opposed to stability and reconciliation. Allawi
said that the continued deadlock on the elections law, and
its harmful implications, underscored the need for the
national dialogue he was proposing.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) We doubt that Prime Minister Maliki will support
Allawi's efforts to bring Iraq's competing power blocs
together for a national unity dialogue. Instead, we
anticipate Maliki will perceive the concept, should it gain
any traction, as an effort to undermine him and empower his
adversaries.

CROCKER