A TALE OF TWO NEIGHBORHOODS - IDP RETURNS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003004

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREF IZ
SUBJECT: A TALE OF TWO NEIGHBORHOODS - IDP RETURNS IN
BAGHDAD

REF: BAGHDAD 2960

Classified By: PolMinCons Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In the past two months, security gains
and GOI evictions of illegal tenants have contributed to
return of internal displaced persons (IDP) in Baghdad, but
progress is far from uniform. Hurriya, a district in
western Baghdad, and Doura, on the city's southern flank,
both suffered severe sectarian violence in 2006. Today
some neighborhoods in Doura have seen notable returns of
displaced persons, while returns to Hurriya are comparatively
insignificant. For now, the IDP returns in Doura have been
less complicated and may not be a true indicator of progress.

Illegal tenants in Hurriya are reportedly a lucrative source
of income for Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) criminal groups, so it
will be tougher to dislodge squatters there without a
concerted
GOI effort. Senior members of Iraq's Sunni political
establishment
believe the Shi'a-led GOI perceives an electoral advantage in
going
slow on the return of Baghdad's mainly Sunni IDPs. While
there have been some encouraging signs in Baghdad IDP
returns, but perceptions of security problems - real or
exaggerated - are hindering faster return of the large
displaced Sunni Arab population. This in turn threatens
sustained progress on security. End Summary.


2. (C) The highest-ranking Sunni cleric in Iraq, Sheikh
Ahmed Abdelghaffour Samarrai'e, underlined to us on September
14 that Sunni Arabs displaced from their West Baghdad
neighborhoods are concerned first and foremost with security.

Where they feel safe returning, they do. Where they hear
that either Shia militias and/or partisan ISF continue to
operate,
they stay away. Ministry of Displaced Persons and Migration
programs
are important, but less so than perceptions of security, he
said.
Ammar Abdalghaffar Al-Samarrai'e, Sheikh Ahmed's son, told
poloff
on September 3 that the situation in western Baghdad was
tenuous for
Sunni families. The continued presence of JAM and the ISF's
allegedly
sectarian enforcement of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's
relocation
orders were making it difficult for families to return, he
asserted.
Ammar al-Samarrai'e claimed that during the week of September
1,
the ISF evicted approximately 70 Sunni families, originally
displaced
from Hurriya, from interim lodgings in the adjacent
neighborhood
of Adl (Comment: The Waqf appears to be on message, since
the same information was reported by Sheikh Mahmoud to
Refcoord. See REFTEL. End Comment). The families could not
return to Hurriya because there was no concurrent removal
of Shia families squatting in the Sunnis' Hurriya properties.

(Note: Sunni contacts report that Hurriya was roughly 70
percent
Sunni, 30 percent Shia before 2006. They claim the same
area is now 95 percent Shia, following the displacement of
25,000 mostly Sunni families. Baghdad is especially
important
in assessing the situation of returnees. International
Organization
of Migration (IOM) assesses almost 64 percent of Iraqi IDPs
originate from Baghdad. End Note.)


3. (C) Sheikh Mahmoud al Falahy, the Sunni Waqf's
representative in Hurriya, corroborated this information on
September 4. Sheikh Mahmoud also complained that Hurriya
was still plagued by JAM, and that the Iraqi Army (IA) had
made no effort to regain control of Hurriya. Falahy called
for the eviction of Hurriya squatters (mainly Shi'a from poor
neighborhoods),a U.S.-led security operation to clear the
area of JAM, and a sustained security presence to keep the
militias out. Falahy described Huriya as a lucrative
income source for the JAM, which was illegally renting
houses vacated by Sunnis to fund their insurgent
activities. Al Samarrai'e informed poloffs that the Waqf
had given the names of JAM members to the IA, with no
result. These frustrations notwithstanding, Al Samarrai'e
asserted that the security situation in western Baghdad,
from the view of local residents, was better two months
ago. Ammar's father and officially the senior Sunni cleric

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in Iraq, Sheikh Ahmed Abdelghaffour Samarrai'e, underlined
to us on September 14 that Sunni Arabs displaced from their
West Baghdad neighborhoods are concerned first and foremost
with security. Where they feel safe returning, they do.
Where they hear that either Shia militias and/or partisan
ISF continue to operate, they stay away. Ministry of
Displaced Persons and Migration programs are important,
but less so than perceptions of security, he said.


4. (C) IDP returns are faring better in some Doura
mahallahs. Each Doura mahallah (neighborhood) has
adopted its own formal or semi-formal IDP return process,
usually with the assistance of the National Police (NP)
and local Sons of Iraq (SOIs - the predominantly Sunni
militias paid by coalition forces to maintain security).
For example Hadar neighborhood's NP allows IDP returns
once a week, every Thursday; poloffs witnessed moving
vans queuing at a checkpoint. In Mahallah 840, the
process is less formal and relies on less structured
coordination between the NPs and SOIs.


5. (C) At his residence in the Musaffee neighborhood of
Doura, Abu 'Ula, a local SOI commander, explained to us why
IDP returns had not been disruptive in his muhallah. Abu
'Ula said Mahallah 840 is walled-in with two entrances
manned by the NP and SOI; only former residents were
allowed to move back into the mahallah, so the area was not
saturated with new IDPs. Secondly, Abu 'Ula noted that some
of the abandoned homes in his mahallah remained vacant and
returning IDPs were able to move in easily. (Note: This
situation is in stark contrast to Hurriya, where JAM and
JAM affiliates collect rent from illegal tenants and are
therefore financially motivated to fill homes with
squatters. End note).


6. (C) Senior Sunni political leaders, including Deputy
Prime Minister Rafi' Eissawi and top Iraqi Islamic Party
official Alaa Makki, told Polmincouns in recent
conversations that they believe the GOI perceives little
urgency in resolving the Baghdad IDP problem. The murder
and intimidation campaigns of 2005 and 2006 mainly
displaced middle and upper class Sunnis from their Baghdad
neighborhoods, replaced by lower class Shi'a who form a
political base for the ruling Da'wa and ISCI parties.
Should Sunnis return to their neighborhoods in Baghdad,
mainly Shi'a controlled seats in the provincial assembly
will be at risk.


7. (C) Comment: The IDP return process in Baghdad has
just begun, with some neighborhoods showing initial signs
of success, but so far this appears mainly to be "low
hanging fruit." Security remains the bedrock of IDP
returns. Our contacts who at the street level agree
that when displaced persons sense they can return to their
homes in safety they will want to do so quickly. If they
sense their old neighborhoods are still unsafe, they will
hesitate. There are other factors that also facilitate IDP
returns at the mahallah level: vacant homes, walled-in
communities of manageable size, existing diversity in the
community, and a pro-active ISF presence with strong
community ties. Neighborhoods like Hurriya highlight the
obstacles impeding IDP returns: criminal groups and
militias, insufficient or partisan ISF presence, and
half-hearted and uncoordinated enforcement of property
rights.


8. (C) Comment continued: The number of returning IDPs is
an important indicator, but must be viewed in a broader
context. Of particular concern is Baghdad's Sunni
community, which is worried not only about IDPs, but also
about the planned integration of SOI units into the Iraqi
Security Forces as well as the Sunnis' current
under-representation in provincial government. An
inadequate IDP return process could perpetuate Sunni
disenfranchisement and this, combined with an insufficient
or counter-productive transition of SOI contracts to GOI
control could increase Sunni frustrations with the GOI and
increase
the possibility for a return to violence. End Comment.

CROCKER