DOWN BUT HARDLY OUT: ISCI 2008 ELECTION PROSPECTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000300

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: DOWN BUT HARDLY OUT: ISCI 2008 ELECTION PROSPECTS

REF: A. HILLAH 000007

B. HILLAH 000174

C. HILLAH 000006

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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (U) This is a joint southern PRT, REO, ePRT and Baghdad
POL reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary: Public opinion is turning against the
religious parties, including Da'wa, ISCI, and the Sadr Trend,
throughout the south. This reflects widespread
disappointment with the performance and corruption of the
provincial governments, a backlash against violence linked to
Shi'a militias, and the perception that the religious parties
are beholden to Iran. ISCI also risks losing further popular
support for its outspoken stance on regions formation.
However, the political realities of Iraq will likely prevent
this shift in public opinion from translating into real
political change in the south. Although ISCI will struggle
to maintain its current level of political control, the
religious parties are likely to maintain their dominance of
provincial politics. The election prospects of the Sadr
Trend will be reported septel. End Summary.

ISCI's current political strength
--------------


3. (C) ISCI emerged as the clear winner in the 2005
provincial elections and is the dominant political party of
the south. ISCI currently holds a majority of seats in
Babil, Diwaniyah, Karbala, and Najaf and a significant number
of seats in Dhi Qar and Muthanna. Five governors (Babil,
Diwaniyah, Muthanna, Najaf, Dhi Qar) are also ISCI members.
However, ISCI will struggle to maintain this current level of
political power due to a public backlash against religious
parties arising from discontent with the provincial and
national government, its ties to the Badr Corps and Iran, and
its outspoken advocacy of a nine-governorate region in the
south.

Discontent with provincial, national government
-------------- --


4. (C) Corruption and poor governance are seen by many
southern Iraqis as the single greatest problems facing the
country. Most provincial governments are run and staffed by
people with little administrative or budgetary experience,
and the public frequently complains of government failures in
service delivery, job creation, and economic development. As
the party with the most political power in the south, ISCI
stands to lose the most from this public discontent. Even in
governorates controlled by other parties, ISCI could still
suffer a backlash due to its close association with the
national government. The single exception to these
challenges is probably ISCI's spiritual and political capital
of Najaf. Najaf Governor Asad al-Ta'ie (ISCI) has the
support of the ISCI-controlled PC and is regarded as an able
politician.

Ties to Badr, Iran
--------------


5. (C) With some exceptions Badr has been able to integrate
itself into the police forces, and in many southern
governorates Badr is synonymous with the IP. Muthanna
provides a good example: ISCI PC Chair Abdul Hussein
al-Dhalami is also the chief commander of the local Badr
corps. Badr members are also present in various security
organs, including the Criminal Investigative Unit (CIU),the
TSU, and the Mustafa Groups (district-level tribal shock

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troops led by IP commanders). However, links to Badr could
hurt ISCI candidates in other governorates. Despite the
success of "Operation Lion's Leap," contacts in Diwaniyah
have expressed concern over Badr's growing influence and
recent procurement of T-72 tanks from unknown sources (reftel
A). In Babil, public perception of an ISCI/Badr link in the
assassination of IP Chief Gen. Qais has increased public
protests against the governor as well as ISCI/Badr and
benefited their political opponents (reftel B). Finally,
ISCI is widely perceived as the Iraqi party most beholden to
Iran, and this perception could hurt its electoral chances
among nationalist voters in the south.

Region Formation
--------------


6. (C) The upcoming debate over regions formation could also
impact ISCI's electoral chances. (Note: The 2006 Regions
Formation Law goes into effect in April 2008. End Note.)
ISCI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has repeatedly and publicly

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called for the formation of a nine-governorate region in the
south. In a recent meeting with the Babil governor and PC
members, Hakim told them to "do whatever is possible" to
secure the two-thirds vote in the PC necessary for region
formation (reftel C). We do not know but assume similar
meetings have taken place between Hakim and ISCI provincial
leaders in other governorates. There is not a large degree
of popular or political support for a nine-governorate
region. Contacts indicate that Basrah, Maysan, and Dhi Qar
are considering forming their own region, while the Sadrists
consider "federalism" to be a malign American concept and
oppose regions formation as a first step to partition.
Continuing to back the nine-governorate region could cost
ISCI further popular support, particularly if the debate over
regions formation becomes especially acrimonious or violent.

ISCI responds
--------------


7. (C) ISCI leadership is already taking steps to address
the challenges outlined above. ISCI leaders, including
Mohammed al-Mawla, have called for a public education
campaign on regions formation and repeatedly denied they wish
to "impose" federalism on Iraq. ISCI renamed both itself
(taking out the "revolution" from Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq) and the Badr Organization (instead of the
more martial Badr Corps) to emphasize its transition from a
spiritual and military resistance movement into an
established political party. ISCI is also courting the Sunni
tribal movement Sahwa al-Iraq (SAI) in the hopes of finding a
Sunni ally to refute accusations of sectarianism or ties to
Iran (reftel D). Until now these actions do not appear to
have succeeded in altering the public's perception of ISCI.

Impact of Iraq's political realities
--------------


8. (C) Iraq's political realities will likely blunt the
impact of the decrease in popular support for religious
parties. First, independent candidates lack the
organizational strength and name recognition of the religious
parties. Second, the current government is responsible for
drafting the elections law. It remains to be seen whether
the government will acquiesce to any open-list system that
could threaten their power base. Third, ISCI/Badr will use
its control over government institutions and religious
endowments to shore up support before the election. Finally,
Badr gunmen will likely intimidate both voters and opposition
candidates in the run-up to any elections.

Comment: Significant Change Unlikely
--------------


9. (C) Comment: Absent the sudden emergence of strong
independent parties, the political realities of southern
politics will likely blunt the impact of the public turn
against ISCI and other religious parties. Although the
political balance of the south might shift slightly, the
religious parties are likely to maintain their dominance of
provincial politics. It remains unlikely that any one Shi'a
party -- including ISCI or the Sadr Trend -- will sweep the
south. End Comment.
BUTENIS