Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD2968
2008-09-15 09:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

DPM SALIH PLEDGES TO TRY TO DEFUSE KHANAQIN

Tags:  PREL PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2730
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2968/01 2590917
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150917Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9410
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002968 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: DPM SALIH PLEDGES TO TRY TO DEFUSE KHANAQIN
CONFRONTATION BUT WARNS KURDS TIRING OF MALIKI

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2859

B. BAGHDAD 2838

C. BAGHDAD 2820

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002968

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: DPM SALIH PLEDGES TO TRY TO DEFUSE KHANAQIN
CONFRONTATION BUT WARNS KURDS TIRING OF MALIKI

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2859

B. BAGHDAD 2838

C. BAGHDAD 2820

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Although the Kurds say they have complied
with the August 30 agreement by withdrawing additional "new"
Peshmerga from the Khanaqin area, the situation remains
tense. DPM Barham Salih agreed to continue defusing the
situation. Salih believes that Prime Minister Maliki,s
decision to move tanks into the area was a political maneuver
that the PM hoped would provoke a Kurdish military response,
uniting Arab Sunnis and Shia. The Ambassador warned that the
USG would publicly condemn any military action from either
side. Salih promised to promote calm but cautioned that
Kurdish trust in the GOI is waning. He warned that if Maliki
continues to renege on agreements, there would be an
"October" surprise worse than we could possibly imagine. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) On September 7, the Ambassador met with DPM Barham
Salih for an update on Khanaqin. Salih stated that even
after the withdrawal of the "new" Peshmerga from Khanaqin to
their original locations in Kalar and Kefri, the situation
remains tense. Salih clarified that the location of the 34th
brigade Peshmerga is exactly where they were before this
situation arose. In Khanaqin city, the Peshmerga have been
replaced by the local guards. Salih said he has been in
frequent contact with Minister of Defense Abdul Qadr who has
been very helpful. He added that the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) representative in Diyala has been working
side-by-side with the Iraqi Army (IA) Commander of the Diyala
operations. Salih stated that PM Maliki simply changed his
mind about the agreement and opposes the withdrawal of IA
troops. Salih claimed he persuaded PM Maliki to cancel the
emergency PCNS and allow the four-way political party talks
(the so-called Gang of Four -- PUK/KDP/ICSI/DAWA) to resolve
the situation. Salih acknowledged that the PM has the legal
right to move troops anywhere in Iraq. However, the Kurds
must insist that there be notification and coordination with
the KRG.

--------------
Risking Confrontation
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador urged Salih to defuse this crisis, and

focus on issues where the Kurds have support and allies. The
Ambassador stated that the U.S. will not support armed
confrontation by either side. Both should expect the U.S. to
loudly condemn all military action. Salih agreed that
military action would be disastrous. He reported that the
Kurds are committed to Article 140 to resolve disputed areas.
The Ambassador stressed that Masoud Barzani and PM Maliki
must find a way to deal with each other constructively and
not risk confrontation. He commented that while there are
fissures in the Shia-Kurd marriage, they must think very
carefully about the consequences before divorcing.


4. (C) In the coming days, Salih said that he plans to meet
with PM Maliki, Dawa leaders, ISCI,s Humam Hamudi, and
Sistani. Salih added that Masoud Barzani plans to speak with
VP Tariq al-Hashimi and House Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani.

-------------- --------------
Accusing Maliki of Political Opportunism
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Salih questioned the timing of PM Maliki,s actions,
claiming that Maliki is trying to provoke a Kurdish military
reaction. Salih reported that one of his Ministry of Defense
sources told him that two battalions are earmarked for
Kirkuk. The Ambassador reported that President Jalal
Talabani said &the Kurdish situation has never been so
good.8 Salih explained this political maneuver is Maliki's
way of unifying Arab Sunnis and Shia and further isolating
the Kurds. Salih believes that Maliki cannot be seen as
backing down from this confrontation because the prestige of
his government is at stake. He added that Maliki,s
leadership style has IIP and ISCI concerned. The Ambassador
indicated that VP Hashimi did not side with the Kurds on the
Diyala operation, and that ISCI VP Adel Abdul Medhi is only
partly with the Kurds, warning that the Southern Shia believe
the Kurds have overreached.


6. (C) Salih compared Maliki to General Abdul Karim Kassim
who in 1961 neutralized political parties by using the
military. The constant betrayal of various political groups
was ultimately Kassim,s demise. Salih predicted that if
Maliki continues to renege on agreements, he will fail. In
any case, the Kurds end up suffering.

BAGHDAD 00002968 002 OF 002



--------------
Waning Trust in GOI
--------------


7. (C) Salih added that the real battle is in Baghdad and
not in Khanaqin. Salih said that Kurdish trust in the GOI is
waning, citing government structure and misuse of the
military. Salih claimed that Maliki is attempting to
undermine the Kurds in the Iraqi Army, including the
courtmartial of Major General Jamal (PUK),who was most
recently the chief of MoD Intelligence. Salih called on the
Ambassador to dissuade PM Maliki from taking any unilateral
actions. Salih warned that if Maliki again reneges on the
latest Khanaqin agreement that we should expect an October
surprise worse than we could possibly imagine.

--------------
Other Business
--------------


8. (C) Regarding Kirkuk and the provincial election law,
Salih reported that there is no resolution to the
power-sharing agreement being applied to Kirkuk's Provincial
Council. He does not consider it useful to refer this to the
Executive Council. That approach would bring in VP
Abdul-Mehdi, whom the Kurds perceive as a friend, but Salih
noted that Abdul-Mehdi is receiving criticism for not siding
with PM Maliki on a number of issues.


9. (C) Salih flatly added that no government business is
getting done these days. The Ambassador inquired about why
the Parsons-Brinckerhoff Operations and Maintenance and
General Electric contracts have not been expedited. Salih
said he would look into it. Salih reported that the
detentions group is back together. He remarked that Minister
of Human Rights Wijdan has been very supportive. The
Ambassador asked that DPM Salih remain engaged on that issue.


10. (C) Salih informed the Ambassador that former President
of American University Beirut John Waterbury will visit UAI
in October. Waterbury has offered his services to aid UAI,s
development.


11. (C) Salih informed the Ambassador that Ayad Allawi's
uncle died. He was the father of the former Minister of
Communications Ali Allawi. Salih planned to pay his respects
later that evening.
CROCKER