SADRIST SWEEP OF SOUTH NOT A GIVEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000296

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: SADRIST SWEEP OF SOUTH NOT A GIVEN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Patricia A. Butenis for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) This is a joint Baghdad POL - ePRT, PRT, and REO
reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary: Contrary to popular opinion, it is not a
foregone conclusion that the Sadrist Trend will sweep the
southern governorates in the next round of provincial
elections. Numerous PRT engagements suggest that the
reduction in Coalition Forces (CF) presence and continuing
militia violence have decreased the appeal of the Sadrist
narrative and threatened Sadr's popularity. Sadr's freeze
declaration and attempts to expand into service delivery are
attempts to remake the Sadr Trend and Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)
into legitimate political organizations. However, continuing
battles with Badr, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and CF
have weakened JAM's street presence and have limited its
ability to co-opt existing service delivery mechanisms
outside of Baghdad. Lacking control of official government
institutions in many areas, unable to deliver services,
saddled with a deserved reputation for violence, and
struggling to adapt their message to a diminished Coalition
presence, Sadr and his followers may struggle to gain a
significant number of seats in the next round of provincial
elections. ISCI's election prospects will be reported
septel. End Summary.

Police, Badr, and CF Persecution
--------------


3. (C) Though the conventional wisdom holds that the Sadrist
Trend will emerge as the big winner in the southern
governorates during the next round of provincial elections,
such a victory is not a foregone conclusion. There are
several reasons to believe that OMS/JAM may face a
surprisingly difficult electoral battle. For example, in
several provinces JAM is on the defensive. ISF commanders in
Dhi Qar, Babil, Karbala, Wasit, Diwaniyah and Muthanna have
repeatedly targeted OMS offices and JAM members. Only in
Maysan does JAM essentially control the security services,
while in Basrah the police commander is politically neutral
but hampered by JAM infiltration of the police force. Some
of what JAM perceives as ISF persecution is legitimate
response to JAM violence, yet there is little question that,
where possible, Badr uses the IP to weaken its primary
opponent. Despite nominally adhering to a public cease-fire,
Badr militia units have also attacked JAM elements directly.
Finally, CF have continued interdiction and arrest operations
in some areas of the south. The cumulative effect of these
operations has weakened OMS/JAM's structural and
administrative base and hindered the Sadrist Trend,s ability
to expand into humanitarian charities and service delivery.

Public and Tribal Resentment
--------------


4. (C) Numerous contacts indicate a shift in public
perception against religious parties due to the inefficiency,
corruption, and violence linked to religious parties and
their militias. This shift also reflects growing public
resentment towards Iran's support of militias and political
parties, particularly outside of Karbala and Najaf. A
Sadrist government in Maysan and Sadrist mayor in al-Kut will
be judged on their development and governance performance.
Meanwhile, the public reputation of Sadrists throughout the
south will continue to suffer due to JAM-associated violence,
including the unrest in Karbala during the Shabiniyah
pilgrimage in August 2007 and the assassinations of public
officials. For Sadr and JAM, this general shift is
compounded by the declining power of an anti-coalition
narrative. The diminishing CF presence in the south and
continuing violence between Iraqis has shifted responsibility
to Iraqi institutions and parties. As a movement founded on
opposition to the coalition, this shift directly threatens
JAM's base of support.


5. (C) This public backlash extends to the south's tribes.
JAM recruits from populations of unemployed young men in
urban areas. Many of these men have tribal ties, and their
involvement in militia activity has subsequently pulled the
tribes into violent conflict, costing lives and resources.
In response, many sheikhs are taking steps against JAM. In
Muthanna, tribal leaders forced JAM members to pay blood
debts at 10 times the normal rate or face expulsion from the
province. The resulting financial burdens incurred on tribes
with JAM members caused tribes to withdraw their support for
any tribal member belonging to JAM. Similarly, the Karbala
Tribal Council ruled that paying of a blood debt is no longer
required for the killing of a tribal member associated with a
militia after JAM repeatedly violated an agreement signed
with tribal leaders not to kill tribal members.


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6. (C) Established parties such as ISCI, Da'wa and Fadhilah
have the advantage of being able to counter anti-religious
party sentiment by using their control of government
institutions to distribute goods, money and services to
voters before an election. The Sadrists lack real political
control outside of Wasit and Maysan and are correspondingly
less able to use official largesse to guarantee votes.
Instead, JAM is likely to rely on voter intimidation in areas
where it maintains a formidable street presence, particularly
Wasit, Basrah, and Maysan.

Failure in service delivery
--------------


7. (C) Part of JAM's popular support in Baghdad stems from
its involvement in service delivery. Despite its best
efforts, JAM has been largely unable to duplicate this model
in the southern governorates. JAM lacks the organizational
structure and knowledge base to effectively distribute
resources across the south, even in Basrah. Similarly,
constant battles with CF, ISF and Badr have weakened JAM,s
street presence and prevented it from co-opting existing
delivery mechanisms. In Babil, attempts to expand into
service delivery have lagged due to continued pressure from
the security forces, a normalizing fuel market, and lowered
demand for ice during winter months. There are no reported
efforts by JAM of any significance in other southern
governorates.

Comment: Political futures of OMS/JAM
--------------


8. (C) Comment: The Sadrist Trend,s struggle to maintain
its powerbase in the south raises several possible political
futures for OMS/JAM. One is that the Sadrist movement will
continue to fracture, with mainstream elements distancing
themselves from JAM and Iran while emphasizing a "core"
Sadrist message of Iraqi nationalism and opposition to
foreign intervention. The second is that public
dissatisfaction with religious parties will create a third
space for independent and more secular candidates able to
capitalize on public disenchantment with religious parties.
Finally, there remains a chance that OMS/JAM will overcome
their current challenges and increase their political power
through a combination of populism, intimidation, and social
welfare. The degree to which any of these trends emerge will
depend largely on local factors and vary widely from province
to province. However, it remains doubtful that any single
Shi'a party, be it Sadr or ISCI, will sweep the southern
elections. End Comment.
BUTENIS