Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD2953
2008-09-13 14:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

TENSIONS SIMMER BETWEEN ANBAR,S GOVERNOR AND THE

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2261
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2953/01 2571443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131443Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9383
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002953 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: TENSIONS SIMMER BETWEEN ANBAR,S GOVERNOR AND THE
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2795

B. BAGHDAD 1047

C. BAGHDAD 932

D. BAGHDAD 457

E. BAGHDAD 433

F. BAGHDAD 400

G. BAGHDAD 142

H. 07 BAGHDAD 2229

Classified By: PRT Team Leader James Soriano for
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002953

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: TENSIONS SIMMER BETWEEN ANBAR,S GOVERNOR AND THE
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2795

B. BAGHDAD 1047

C. BAGHDAD 932

D. BAGHDAD 457

E. BAGHDAD 433

F. BAGHDAD 400

G. BAGHDAD 142

H. 07 BAGHDAD 2229

Classified By: PRT Team Leader James Soriano for
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Anbar reporting cable.

Summary
--------------


2. (C) Long submerged tensions between the Provincial
Council (PC) and Governor Ma'amoun surfaced in Ramadi
September 9, with a threat to remove Ma'amoun from office
unless he improves essential services. Published minutes of
a PC meeting record that the governor risks a vote of no
confidence if performance does not improve within a month.
Such a move is unprecedented in recent memory. Two factors
seem to be behind the rift. The first is the PC's search for
a meaningful role in the post-conflict period: the PC has
typically been deferential to Ma'amoun's strong-willed style,
and is uncertain of the boundaries of executive and
legislative authority. The second factor is the rivalry
between the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),which controls the PC,
and its chief opposition, the Iraq Awakening Conference.
Many IIP partisans suspect that Ma'amoun, who has IIP roots
but is nominally non-partisan, is moving closer to the
Awakening, keeping his options open in provincial elections.
Thus the no-confidence threat is the IIP's way of brandishing
its clout. Ma'amoun has been absent from Ramadi; his
reaction to the PC's move is still unknown. End Summary.

Political Tensions
--------------


3. (C) Anbar Province has received positive press coverage
recently with the reduction in violence, the transfer of
security responsibility to the Iraqis, and the general return
to normal life. But the good news ought not to obscure the
fact that like other parts of the country, Anbar is rife with
deep tribal and political factionalism. Such tensions have
always been present (reftels),but rose to the surface this
past week with a public rift between the Iraqi Islamic Party
(IIP),which controls the Provincial Council (PC),and
Governor Ma'amoun Sami Rasheed.


4. (C) At a September 9 PC meeting, Council members sharply

criticized Ma'amoun for alleged mismanagement and "disregard"
for the PC's decisions. The governor was not present at the
session, but PC member and leader of the province's branch of
the IIP, Ashour Hamid Salih, laid down a marker: unless
Ma'amoun becomes more responsive to the council's decisions,
he risks removal from office. The exchange was the first
time PRT observers had heard such sharp criticism of the
governor at a PC meeting.

List of Complaints
--------------


5. (C) During the meeting, Chairman Abdulsalam Abdullah, an
IIP insider on the national scene, read from a letter he
received from several PC members containing a list of
complaints about Ma'amoun. Abdulsalam did not identify the
authors, but he summarized the letter's contents from the
podium. Many of the grievances appear trivial, but include:
the governor has allegedly appointed directors general (DGs)
without authority; he has not properly overseen their work;
he has allegedly mismanaged police affairs, education, and
the distribution of fuel; and he did not consult the PC, as
directed to do so, before signing on Sept. 1 the memorandum
of understanding on the transfer of security in the province.


6. (C) The rift has made national news. Baghdadi TV picked
up the story and ran a streaming news ticker quoting
Abdulsalam as saying that the council has made "suggestions"
to the "executive" on improving services. Abdulsalam did not
name the governor by name. However, the PC's website,
(www.alanbartoday.com),pulled no punches. It reports that
the PC has "decided to hold a vote of no confidence against
Governor Ma'amoun Sami Rasheed Al-Awani if services did not
improve during the course of the next month." That move is
unprecedented in recent memory.

Governor Fires Back
--------------


BAGHDAD 00002953 002 OF 003



7. (C) Ma'amoun has been absent from Ramadi during these
happenings; his reaction to the PC's threat is unknown.
However on September 2 he shot off his own volley against the
PC in a private meeting with the PRT leader. He expressed
irritation that the PC had initiated a series of
"investigations" into several DGs, describing the move as
unreasonable because the PC summoned the DGs to appear at the
council but the PC did not inform him. Ma'amoun argued that
he should be present at any questioning of DGs because he is
ultimately responsible for their performance. "The Council
of Representatives would not investigate a ministry without
informing the minister," he said. "Why does the PC act that
way?"


8. (C) Ma'amoun is a blunt former civil engineer, who took
over the chief executive's reins in June 2005 after his
predecessor was kidnapped and killed. During the insurgency,
he stubbornly held office hours at the fortified Government
Center in Ramadi, the target of almost daily attacks,
motivated no doubt by a deep sense of tribal honor that
prevented him from abandoning his place of duty. Large parts
of the provincial government, including the DGs and the PC
itself, went underground or fled abroad or to safer parts of
Iraq. Anbaris have long regarded Ma'amoun as having an
imperious style with a proclivity to hold all meaningful
power (budget execution, e.g.) close to himself.

Provincial Powers
--------------


9. (C) The source of the PC-Ma'amoun break is complex.
Certainly one factor is the PC's self-image. As a body it
sees itself as weak and dominated by a governor not given to
sharing decision making. It has long been deferential to
Ma'amoun, and its criticisms of him, at least until now, have
been muted. Oddly, both the PC and the governor seem to be
accusing each other of the same thing--that the other has
overstepped its rightful authority to act or does not know
the boundary of its authority. This has no doubt led to
misunderstandings and the breakdown in communication. The
country's statutes on provincial powers feed the
recriminations. Since the existing provincial powers law
leaves unsettled many questions about the provincial
executive and legislative power, and with the new law not yet
in effect, a kind of statutory vacuum has appeared that is
more readily filled by a strong-willed executive than by a
weak and uncertain council.

Political Jockeying
--------------


10. (C) However, the rift goes deeper than interpretations
of authority. It goes to the remarkable rise of the Iraq
Awakening Conference, or Muatammar Sahwa Al-Iraq (MSI),which
has transformed itself within two years from a collection of
Ramadi-based tribal sheikhs determined to fight Al-Qaeda into
a political party with national aspirations. Its presence on
the local scene throws control of the PC in the next election
up for grabs. Both the MSI and the IIP are eyeing election
strategies. In this context, political jockeying is to be
expected.


11. (C) Anbar's IIP leaders have long suspected that
Ma'amoun has been playing political footsy with MSI chief
Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha. This coziness would not have been
possible 12 months ago, when Ma'amoun was frequently at odds
with Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, the founder of MSI's
predecessor organization, and Ahmed's late brother. Today,
however, there are indications that Ma'amoun has done his
political arithmetic and has decided to hitch his wagon to
MSI. At least that is the thinking of our IIP contacts.

Straws in the Wind
--------------


12. (C) One tip off is that MSI aims its public barbs at the
PC and the IIP, but generally spares Ma'amoun. In other
signals, the governor prominently sat Sheikh Ahmed in the
place of honor at the September 1 ceremony in Ramadi for the
provincial Iraqi control MOU signing and allowed him to make
a public address, the only non-official to do so. After the
MOU signing, Ma,amoun organized a visit to Baghdad to thank
PM Maliki for his support on the transfer of the security
file. He was accompanied not by provincial officials but by
Sheikh Ahmed, the leader of the political opposition. The
optic did not sit well with the IIP. When Ma'amoun unloaded
on the PC in the meeting with the PRT leader on September 2,
he paused long enough to point out that several of his
cousins are married to Sheikh Ahmed's sisters. His intent
was clear: he wanted to send a message to an outsider that
he has strong ties to Ahmed.


BAGHDAD 00002953 003 OF 003


Comment
--------------


13. (C) How these Ramadi rumblings play out remains to be
seen. The governor and PC leaders have yet to sit down to
iron out their differences. But what may be evolving is a
kind of limits-to-growth case study. During the insurgency,
Ma'amoun Sami Rasheed "was" the provincial government. He
was the only symbol of public authority on the scene; the PC
scarcely met, never mind assumed any responsibility.
Ma'amoun openly cooperated with the Coalition Forces, called
them his friends, and provided the type of strong leadership
necessary in a successful counter-insurgency strategy. But
Anbar has entered into the period of post-conflict recovery.
The public expects more effective delivery of essential
services, and the PC must be responsive. It is searching for
an assertive and meaningful role. It may conclude the person
who did so much to defeat Al-Qaeda may not be the same person
to lead the province in the period ahead. And it may gamble
on boosting its electoral prospects in the process by
disparaging Governor Ma'amoun. End Comment.
CROCKER