Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD295
2008-02-01 06:48:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAN-IRAQ BORDER NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME IN FEBRUARY

Tags:  PGOV PREL PBTS IR IZ KU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6825
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0295/01 0320648
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 010648Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5522
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0324
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI IMMEDIATE 0049
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000295 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS IR IZ KU
SUBJECT: IRAN-IRAQ BORDER NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME IN FEBRUARY

REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 3481 B. 07 BAGHDAD 3159

BAGHDAD 00000295 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: ACTING POL-MIL COUNSELOR KAREN H. SASAHARA, REASONS 1.4(
B) AND (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000295

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NOFORN
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS IR IZ KU
SUBJECT: IRAN-IRAQ BORDER NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME IN FEBRUARY

REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 3481 B. 07 BAGHDAD 3159

BAGHDAD 00000295 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: ACTING POL-MIL COUNSELOR KAREN H. SASAHARA, REASONS 1.4(
B) AND (D)


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: At a January 28 meeting with Acting PolMil
Counselor, Iraqi MFA Under Secretary Mohammad Hamoud
discussed GOI preparations for a further round of bilateral
talks with Iran regarding their shared border. He indicated
talks would take place on February 19, since negotiations
planned for January had been cancelled at the request of
Iran, citing the Ashura holiday. While repeatedly referring
to the Iranians as "difficult" to deal with, Hamoud revealed
that in September of last year Iranian FM Mottaki had told
him that Iran agreed that the course of the Shatt al Arab
(SAA) should be returned to the state it was in when the
Iran-Iraq border had been demarcated under the 1975 Algiers
Accord.


2. (S/NF) Redirecting the watercourse and demarcating the
border as agreed under the Algiers Accord would fulfill the
key Iraqi objective of keeping its offshore oil terminals in
Iraqi waters and as far from the border as possible. Iraq,s
delegation will utilize a survey of the SAA completed by
Basrah University last year as a basis for discussion with
the Iranians. In addition to the course of the river and
demarcation of the border, Iraq,s other goals for the
negotiation will include agreement on removal of wrecks
obstructing navigation and remediation of mines, both of
which are largely leftover from the Iran-Iraq war. Hamoud
explained that the GOI was not planning to approach Kuwait
regarding disputes about their maritime border around Umm
Qasr in the near future, as they did not want to jeopardize
otherwise improving relations. END SUMMARY.

--------------
NEGOTIATIONS TO TAKE PLACE IN FEBRUARY
--------------


3. (S/NF) Acting PolMil Counselor, joined by the NAVCENT LNO
to MNF-I and an MNF-I legal officer, met with Iraqi MFA Under
Secretary Mohammad Hamoud January 28 to discuss GOI


SIPDIS
preparations for a further round of bilateral talks with Iran
regarding their shared border. Hamoud, head of delegation
for Iraq, related that negotiations planned for January had
been cancelled at the request of Iran, citing the Ashura
holiday. These talks had now been rescheduled for February

19. The Iraqi delegation will include intelligence,
military, and port officials, among others. Iraq,s goals
for the negotiation were a resolution of the riverine border
running through the Shatt al-Arab (SAA),agreement on removal
of the many wrecks obstructing navigation, and remediation of
mines emplaced during the Iran-Iraq war. Hamoud, explained
that removal of the wrecks will also require legal notice to
the owners.

--------------
ALGIERS ACCORD AS A BASIS FOR TALKS
--------------


4. (S/NF) President Talabani,s public repudiation
(rhetorical, not legal) of the 1975 Algiers Accord
(hereinafter "the Accord"),which delineated the Iran-Iraq
border, had drawn a strong Iranian reaction and made his job
more difficult, confided Hamoud. However, while Iraq would
avoid acknowledging the Accord, the GOI would agree to use
its delineation of the border as this was seen to be in
Iraq,s interest. The border as established under the Accord
would provide a greater buffer between Iraq,s offshore oil
facilities and the Iranian border than might be the case if
the line were redrawn today, since the course of the SAA had
shifted westward, especially near its mouth. Hamoud
displayed a chart drawn up based on a 2007 survey of the SAA
conducted by Basrah University, graphically detailing this
shift which was as much as 1.7 kilometers from its course in

1975.

--------------
IRAN AMENABLE TO SHIFTING COURSE OF SAA
--------------


5. (S/NF) While repeatedly referring to the Iranians as
"difficult" to deal with, Hamoud revealed that in September
of last year Iranian FM Mottaki had told him that Iran agreed
that the course of the SAA should be returned to the course

BAGHDAD 00000295 002.2 OF 002


it followed when the Iran-Iraq border had been demarcated
under the Accord. The border would then be defined by the
thalweg as formalized in the Accord. Iraq had considerable
leverage because in some locations the course of the river
now completely flowed through Iraqi territory, allowing Iraq
to close the river to Iranian navigation in those locations
if it so desired. The costs of redirecting the SAA would be
split evenly between the parties, according to Hamoud. While
Iran preferred to activate the permanent joint committee
referred to in the Accord, Iraq would seek a less formal
mechanism to work out implementation of any final agreement.
Hamoud foresaw that negotiations could take as long as one
year. When asked about implementation of the agreement
between border officials reached in August (reftel),Hamoud
replied that while the Iranians "say yes" to such
coordination, they don,t seem willing to put it into
practice.

-------------- ---
KUWAIT BORDER IN DISPUTE, BUT A LOWER PRIORITY
-------------- ---


6. (S/NF) Hamoud explained that the GOI was not planning to
approach Kuwait regarding disputes about their maritime
border around Umm Qasr in the near future, as they did not
want to jeopardize otherwise improving relations. Iraq did
not recognize the maritime border with Kuwait established by
UNSCR 833, which follows the midline of the Khawr Abd Allah
waterway, and instead claimed the entire waterway. However,
the GOI saw the issues on the Kuwaiti border as less
important than those with Iran, and Hamoud was optimistic
that a resolution could be worked out with Kuwait at an
appropriate time.


7. (S/NF) COMMENT: Our discussion with Hamoud confirms a
maturation of the GOI position regarding the status of the
Algiers Accord since the first round of these bilateral talks
(reftel). While the Algiers Accord "brand" remains anathema
due to its association with Saddam, the GOI now agrees to its
delineation of the border, removing a major point of
contention with Iran. President Talabani,s public
"repudiation" of the Algiers Accord in December appears to
have been walked back, at least in substance, making a
successful round of talks with Iran more likely. END COMMENT.
BUTENIS