Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD2944
2008-09-11 18:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

FINANCE MINISTER JABR ON KUWAIT DEBT ISSUES: LET'S

Tags:  PREL EFIN ECON KU IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2944/01 2551831
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111831Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9369
INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// IMMEDIATE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0431
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002944 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2028
TAGS: PREL EFIN ECON KU IZ
SUBJECT: FINANCE MINISTER JABR ON KUWAIT DEBT ISSUES: LET'S
FOCUS ON OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP

Classified By: EMIN Marc Wall, Reasons e.o. 12958 1.5 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002944

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2028
TAGS: PREL EFIN ECON KU IZ
SUBJECT: FINANCE MINISTER JABR ON KUWAIT DEBT ISSUES: LET'S
FOCUS ON OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP

Classified By: EMIN Marc Wall, Reasons e.o. 12958 1.5 (b,d)


1. (U) This is an action request, please see para seven.


2. (C) SUMMARY: Iraqi Finance Minister Jabr told EMIN
September 11 that "as a politician" he hoped that the Kuwaiti
government would understand (and hear from the USG) that the
future relationship between the people of Iraq and Kuwait is
more important than the marginal dollars the Kuwaitis might
extract from Iraq over debt, war reparations, and the
Bombardier/Boeing airplane litigation. Jabr said that during
his recent trip to Kuwait he and the GOI delegation worked
out a deal on the Kuwait Air claim against Iraqi Air that led
to a Canadian court freezing GOI assets in a Bombardier
airplane purchase. The deal would offer the Kuwaitis $500
million against their inflated (sic) claim of $1.2 billion
against Iraq Air, together with a partnership between the two
airlines that would provide additional revenues to Kuwait
Air. Jabr accepted this deal even though he fears that the
figure of $500 million is not politically sustainable in
Iraq. Unfortunately, he said, the Kuwaitis immediately
reneged even on that deal, and Jabr awaits a revised offer.
Jabr believes that the GOK may be holding out to see whether
the Canadian litigation develops in Kuwait's favor. A late
call from his staff revealed that the Kuwaitis want $500
million, but paid in full by January 7, 2009, impossible
given Iraq's budget calendar. Jabr expressed his wish that
USG interlocutors would impress on Kuwait the need to not/not
treat every issue between Iraq and Kuwait as a matter for the
souk. Instead they need to focus on developing positive
relations between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi peoples, who are
fated to live next to each other. End Summary.


3. (C) EMIN met with Finance Minister Bayan Jabr September 11
to discuss Jabr's trip to Kuwait earlier this week. Jabr's
purpose was to explore resolution of outstanding bilateral
debt issues. Jabr opened the meeting with a long and at
times emotional explanation of growing Kuwait claims against
Iraq, which include a Kuwait Airways case against the GOI

seeking $1.2 billion in damages for four planes that Saddam
Hussein removed from Kuwait during the occupation of Kuwait
(and which were subsequently destroyed); $8.2 billion in debt
owed to the GOK and Kuwaiti state entities; and billions of
dollars for damages and reparations from the 1990 invasion.


4. (C) Jabr's talks in Kuwait, with the Minister of
Transportation, "Deputy Foreign Minister" and an Ambassador
charged with claims negotiations, focused solely on the
aviation claims. (Note: these have taken on urgency due to
a judgment in a London court putting the value of the Kuwait
claim at $1.2 billion, and a separate judgment late last
month in a Quebec court granting Kuwait Air's request to
freeze ten Bombardier jets being built for Iraqi Airways. End
note.) Jabr described his success in the talks and the
signature of an agreed conclusion with the Minister of
Transportation. (Note: the Arab language text of the agreed
conclusions makes no reference to a specific sum, rather it
refers to "an amount to be determined through negotiations."
End note.) Jabr had initially offered to pay $150 million to
settle the claim, saying that this was the amount that Kuwait
had initially asked the CPA to approve in 2003 in order to
settle this claim. The Kuwaitis rejected this. An unnamed
member of the Iraqi delegation -- acting without Jabr's
approval -- then proposed $450 million. In addition, the GOI
offered to establish a partnership with Kuwait Air that would
funnel passengers from Iraq Air to Kuwait Air for onward
connections, increasing the latter's revenues. The Kuwaitis
countered with a demand for $500 million which Jabr accepted
after consulting with PM Maliki.



5. (C) After his return to Baghdad, Jabr said the Kuwaitis
began tacking on additional conditions. First was a bank
guarantee, which Jabr reluctantly accepted. Then the
Kuwaitis demanded that the full $500 million be paid in two
months. Jabr (and Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih) said
this is practically impossible. It would require a second
supplemental budget request to the Council of
Representatives, which would revolt. Jabr said he asked the
Kuwaitis to "help us help you," by paying the $500 million in

2009. Far better, Jabr said, would be to fold it into the
"seven thousand lines of the FY 2009 budget" than to risk a
"revolution in the COR." Now he had heard from his Kuwaiti
interlocutors that the $500 million-plus-airline-partnership
deal is not acceptable, and, Jabr explained, he is expecting
a second "agreed conclusion" of the conversation clarifying
the Kuwaiti position. Jabr speculated that the GOK may up
the ante and wait until the Canadian court rules on the
Bombardier case. If the court rules in Iraq's favor, Jabr
implied, he might call the deal off. (Note: in a late night

BAGHDAD 00002944 002 OF 002


call September 11, his senior advisor Dr. Azez told Treasury
officer that the Kuwaitis have agreed to the $500 million
figure but insist that it be deposited in full in a "first
tier" foreign bank by January 7, 2009. These conditions, Azez
said, would be very hard to meet given Iraq's budget calendar
and history of passing the budget law well after January 7.
End note.)


6. (C) Jabr underscored that the Kuwaiti "toughness" on
this had the potential to endanger other bilateral issues,
such as border and oil field demarcation. Further, it would
cause hard feelings among average Iraqis, who view Kuwait as
a rich country and Iraq as a poor country after years of war,
sanctions and Saddam era mismanagement. Asked how the USG
could help, Jabr replied that he would prefer that the USG
not engage on the specifics of the negotiation. Rather, "as
a politician," he preferred that we impress on Kuwaitis the
fact that Iraq and Kuwait are and will remain neighbors, with
intertwined histories. He feared that Kuwaiti hard
bargaining for every advantage as if this was a souk would
lead to lasting hard feelings on the part of average Iraqis,
and lasting damage to bilateral relations.


7. (C) Action Requested: Jabr views Kuwatis favorably from
his days in opposition when, he said, they gave him great
support. As a result, he believes he has a special
relationship with the GOK. This dispute threatens that, and
risks increasing bitterness among Iraqis toward Kuwaitis,
which is not in anyone's interest. Jabr was clear that he
would not go to the COR with a supplemental request that will
fail. We suggest that we urge the Kuwaitis to stick to the
original $500 million amount and accept payment via Iraq's
2009 budget -- and do so before the PM's visit to the U.S.

CROCKER