Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD2936
2008-09-11 11:45:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

CG DISCUSSES PESHMERGA-GOI CONFLICT, FORCE

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS MARR PTER ENGR EPET IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0567
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2936/01 2551145
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111145Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9360
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH PRIORITY 2340
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK PRIORITY 2279
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH PRIORITY 2286
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002936 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR PTER ENGR EPET IZ
SUBJECT: CG DISCUSSES PESHMERGA-GOI CONFLICT, FORCE
STRUCTURE, POWER GENERATION WITH PM

BAGHDAD 00002936 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002936

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR PTER ENGR EPET IZ
SUBJECT: CG DISCUSSES PESHMERGA-GOI CONFLICT, FORCE
STRUCTURE, POWER GENERATION WITH PM

BAGHDAD 00002936 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: In their regular weekly meeting on 4
September 2008, Commanding General MNF-I GEN David Petraeus
and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (joined by CDA)
discussed disposition of Kurdish forces (Peshmerga) near the
city of Khanaqin and the Green Line, Iraqi military force
structure, and the problem with electricity generation.
Maliki stated his absolute opposition to the presence of
Peshmerga in Khanaqin or beyond the Green Line that
demarcates the limits of the Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG). Concerning the recommendation of General Petraeus
against the recent cap on Iraqi Army (IA) hires, Maliki
listened attentively but did not appear swayed by arguments
that additional soldiers would be required to man the
logistics and enablers he had authorized. Maliki appreciated
the importance of the GOI paying for operations and
maintenance contracts to ensure continued generation of
electricity. GEN Petraeus also informed the PM that he had
recommended troop reductions that would occur over the
several next months, if approved. In response to GEN
Petraeus's questions, Maliki said he was committed to take
care of the SOI. He also said he wanted a SOFA that would
ensure security in Iraq and that could pass through the
Council of Representatives (COR). CDA Butenis noted that
Ambassador Crocker would return September 5 and seek to meet
the PM soon thereafter. End Summary.

No Pesh South of the Green Line
--------------


2. (S/NF) GEN Petraeus asked PM to confirm that an agreement
between he KRG and the GOI had been reached regarding the
disposition of Peshmerga near Khanaqin. The PM stated his
absolute opposition to Peshmerga forces remaining in
Khanaqin, Diyala province. GEN Petraeus agreed that the
Peshmerga forces needed to withdraw, but cautioned that the
rhetoric surrounding the issue was getting out of hand and

needed a cooling off period.


3. (S/NF) Maliki insisted that the KRG has no authority south
of the Green Line. The Peshmerga must withdraw from south of
the Green Line. Becoming somewhat animated, Maliki expressed
his fear that the Peshmerga/Kurds were seeking to place parts
of Diyala under Kurdish control, and would then move onto
Mosul in Ninewa province and then to Kirkuk if Maliki did not
make a stand.


4. (S/NF) Maliki called the Peshmerga dangerous when they
went out of the region, noting they had no arrest authority
and implying they had been arresting Iraqi citizens south of
the Green Line. GEN Petraeus again agreed that the Peshmerga
must withdraw. He noted, however, that the GOI had asked the
Peshmerga to help in areas northeast of Mosul and in the
Hammrins when the threat from Al Qaeda was significant. He
assessed the Peshmerga had remained south of the Green Line
even after they were no longer needed to support IA
operations, a presence that had been tolerated for some time
due to other, more pressing issues for the GOI. GEN Petraeus
advised the PM that given all else that was taking place, he
could not afford a confrontation with the Kurds at this time.
PM Maliki responded that the issue was adherence to and
respect for the law.

Force Structure
--------------


5. (S/NF) GEN Petraeus raised two force structure issues with
the PM: the need to lift the IA personnel ceiling to 300,000
from the PM,s recently imposed cap of 250,000, and the IA's
need for logistics and combat enablers to pursue effective
counterinsurgency operations and be prepared (eventually) to
defend Iraqi territory from external threats.


6. (S/NF) Regarding personnel, GEN Petraeus noted that due to
the recent GOI order for the incorporation of 10,000 former
militia members into the IA, resulting in the exclusion of
other recruits who had been prepared to join the force and
the stoppage of training replacement soldiers at training
centers. He noted that as long as the militia recruits were
qualified and properly vetted, he had no objection to
bringing them in from the pool of former militia fighters,
but he expressed concerns about the qualifications of those
being made officers and noncommissioned officers and the
impact on the professionalism of the IA. In any event, GEN
Petraeus suggested that the staffing ceiling for the IA be

BAGHDAD 00002936 002.2 OF 003


raised to 300,000 from its current level of 250,000.


7. (S/NF) The PM expressed surprise at the news of the
incorporation of former militia fighters, recalling that
there had been an order under the Coalition Provisional
Authority and replying that he was unaware of any such action
more recently. GEN Petraeus passed him a letter calling his
attention to the militia transition program, but stated that
he had not seen the actual GOI order. After some
conversation with his National Security Advisor (NSA) Dr.
Muwaffaq Rubaie, Maliki indicated he would look into the
recruitment matter, but did not express support for an
increase in the number of troops. He opined that the IA had
sufficient numbers of troops to conduct its operations.
Maliki went on to describe that a regular IA division
consisted of three brigades, each with three battalions
comprised, in turn, of four companies; he assessed that such
a unit needed about 1,500 soldiers for logistics and
essential services. GEN Petraeus responded that in which
case the unit would run out of fuel and ammunition.


8. (S/NF) Noting the PM,s reluctance to address the issue,
GEN Petraeus noted that the Coalition bailed out the Iraqi
Security Forces in Basra and won the fight in Sadr City. He
noted that army units and soldiers without food, water, and
other support, they were just a bunch of guys with AK-47s who
could be wiped out quickly. The PM told GEN Petraeus that he
had a vision for a very well trained force of police and
soldiers. GEN Petraeus noted that the PM,s vision was a
good one, but he added that a counterinsurgency requires a
large number of soldiers, and while the Iraqi Security Forces
are making the transition from quantity to quality, it will
take time. GEN Petraeus suggested that LTG Helmick,
Commanding General of the Multi-National Security Transition
Command in Iraq (MNSTC-I),could give the PM a brief laying
out the force structure the IA required to include the
enablers, logistics, and training institutions. Pushing
back, the PM insisted he was not focused on numbers of
troops, but on a properly equipped and trained force, with,
of course, the logistics support needed to perform
operations. GEN Petraeus added that the GOI and its security
forces faced a complex and daunting task of protecting
everything well while the terrorists need to only succeed
against a select number of targets. Iraq's needs to deploy
combined arms (integrated joint forces) against its enemies.
GEN Petraeus offered a second time to send LTG Helmick to
show the necessary elements of a capable force that answers
the GOI's needs. The PM acknowledged the offer. In summing
up, GEN Petraeus reminded the PM that currently the ISF could
not succeed in a fight against organized forces, to include
the Peshmerga.

Power Generation
--------------


9. (S/NF) GEN Petraeus had opened the meeting by reminding
the PM of the urgency for the GOI to sign maintenance
contracts for the electricity generators, noting that Monday
September 8 was a deadline for the Minister of Electricity to
sign contracts . PM seemed a bit surprised at the news,
believing that the minister had met with GE and signed
contracts with them. GEN Petraeus noted that the minister
had not yet signed with GE, but this was a separate issue -
the operations and maintenance contracts are with a different
company. He then showed the PM a chart of the notable
increase in power generation over the last year, due in part
to increased security that allowed the repair and operation
of plants, but that also revealed a very recent decline in
power production, due to the failure to properly maintain and
repair the equipment.


10. (S/NF) PM noted that the Ministries of Electricity and of
Oil continued to feud, presenting separate energy plans. An
integrated approach was needed, he observed. GEN Petraeus
agreed, emphasizing the need for a single national energy
strategy. He also noted that demand was increasing and that
while the contracts the GOI was pursuing with GE would
address that problem in the long run, he urged immediate
action before dissatisfaction with the GOI's failure to close
the demand-delivery gap grew. GEN Petraeus also noted that
Iraq should look to foreign investors to help in upgrading
its refineries as it was doing with GE regarding its
electricity generation. Again, he urged action now.

Troop Reductions
--------------

BAGHDAD 00002936 003.2 OF 003




11. (S/NF) GEN Petraeus alerted the PM to his intention to
recommend that the U.S. reduce its forces in Iraq. The fall
in the level of violence in Iraq, for example from 180 to 25
acts of violence a day over the last six months, indicated
that Coalition Force numbers could be reduced. The
reductions would be modest and carefully timed with
conditions. He stated that other reductions after the
provincial elections could also be foreseen and reductions in

2009. He wanted the PM to be aware of his intentions before
he advised Washington or it was announced in the media. The
PM expressed appreciation for the heads-up but did not
otherwise comment.

Sons of Iraq
--------------


12. (S/NF) GEN Petraeus also said it was his intention to
announce at a press conference soon that the Sons of Iraq
(aka Awakening) would soon be on the GOI payroll and the GOI
was committed to supporting the SOIs. The PM concurred with
this plan, stating that the GOI supports the SOIs, "We will
honor them." He added that there were one or two "bad eggs"
to be arrested, but most were sound. GEN Petraeus agreed,
noting that the Coalition had already arrested some SOI
members and was ready to assist against others.

IDPs/Refugees Returning
--------------


13. (S/NF) GEN Petraeus told the PM that he had reports
indicating the return over the last six months to Baghdad of
about 50,000 families, an estimated 250,000 people. He urged
the PM to ensure the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
(MOLSA) continued to support the returnees. The PM indicated
GOI efforts would continue to support the returnees,
underlining the complexity of dealing with competing
ownership claims, lease contracts, etc. GEN Petraeus nodded
in understanding. He remarked that notably there were some
Shi'a seeking the return of their former Sunni neighbors and
vice versa in several different neighborhoods - apparently
the residents found the squatters who had supplanted their
former neighbors to be of too low a socio-economic class.
(NOTE: IOM and MNF-I are working to resolve numbers of
returnees, as there may be some mixing of IDP registrants
with IDP returnees.)

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Status
--------------


14. (S/NF) GEN Petraeus asked the PM about the status of the
SOFA that would allow the continued presence of U.S. forces
in Iraq after the expiration of UNSCR 1790. The PM replied
that the GOI awaited a U.S. reply to its proposals, adding
that he had told Secretary Rice that Iraq wants a stable
agreement that it can pass in the Council of Representatives
(COR). GEN Petraeus responded that the U.S. would look to
the PM's leadership to move the agreement through the COR.
CDA noted that Ambassador Crocker would return to Iraq on
September 5 and seek an appointment with the PM soon
thereafter.

Elections by December 22
--------------


15. (S/NF) In response to a question from GEN Petraeus,
Maliki declared his commitment to hold provincial elections
no later than December 22, even if they would have to be held
under the existing law rather than a new one.
CROCKER