SOUTHERN ELECTIONS FORECAST: MORE OF THE SAME

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 002904

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN ELECTIONS FORECAST: MORE OF THE SAME

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2832 "SISTANI CALLS ON IRAQIS TO
REGISTER TO VOTE"

B. HILLAH 75 "SOUTHERN PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS TAKE
AIM AT PM MALIKI AND HIS

C. TRIBAL SUPPORT COUNCILS"

D. BAGHDAD 2802 "GENERAL OTHMAN TALKS TRIBES
SECURITY IRAN"

E. BAGHDAD 2791 "SADR EXTENDS JAM FREEZE
INDEFINITELY"

F. 08/27/08 OFFICE OF RESEARCH: "IRAQI FEDERALISM
IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER"

G. BAGHDAD 2661 "GRAND AYATOLLAH FAYYADH ON
ELECTIONS"

H. BAGHDAD 2595 "MUTHANNA SHEIKHS ASK FOR U.S.
ASSISTANCE"

I. BAGHDAD 2552 "MORE ON MUQTADA AL-SADR'S
MUMAHIDOON"

J. 08/12/08 OFFICE OF RESEARCH: "IRAQIS WANT
SOLUTIONS NOT POLITICAL WRANGLING"

K. BAGHDAD 2471 "FORMER IHEC OFFICIAL HANDICAPS
WASIT ELECTIONS"

L. BAGHDAD 1601 "IRANIAN-BACKED PARTIES PREPARED TO
DOMINATE PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS"

M. BAGHDAD 1416 "(SOUTHERN) POLITICS AS USUAL:
IRAN'S PLAN FOR IRAQI ELECTIONS

N. 07/20/06 OFFICE OF RESEARCH: "MANY IRAQIS
CONFIDENT IN AL-MALIKI AND NEW GOVERNMENT"

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Provincial elections are unlikely to
result in a radical shift of the southern political map.
Despite concerns about voter fraud and low voter registration
numbers the overwhelming majority of southern Shi'a say
they intend to vote in the elections. Iraq's Shi'a remain
deeply divided politically and none of the major Shi'a
parties have managed to broaden their base of support
beyond a core constituency. Unlike the 2005 elections,
there is widespread disenchantment with the establishment
religious parties and no unified Shi'a Islamist slate
endorsed by the Marja'iyya. According to polling, declining
popular support for Muqtada al-Sadr and a season of
successful
GOI military operations has not translated into increased
support
for PM Maliki and Da'wa or their ISCI allies. Although
former PM Ibrahim Ja'afari, leader of the National Reform
Trend, enjoys the highest polling numbers among the Shi'a
his National Reform Trend still polls in the single digits.
Independents stand to gain relative to their current
standing,
but the institutional and organizational advantages enjoyed
by the
incumbents will likely produce election results similar
to those of 2005: a collection of provincial councils
without clear majorities but ultimately dominated by the
established parties. A continuation of an ineffective and
unpopular political status quo could widen the rift between
southerners and their elected government. End Summary.

A fractured UIA and a silent marja...
--------------


2. (C) In the December 2005 elections, a unified Shi'a slate
ran
with the explicit endorsement of the Marja'iyya. For
example, a banner hung in Muthanna outside the local office
of Sistani's office read, "Those who do not vote for the
555 Alliance are terrorists, Ba'athists, takfiris, or
al-Qaeda. Be an Iraqi and a Muslim and vote 555" (ref K).
Now the members of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) are
intensely campaigning against one another and the Shi'a
clerical class has thus far refused to endorse any party.
On August 27, Grand Ayatollah Sistani endorsed the process
itself, calling participating in the process an "important
duty," but did not give his support to any candidates (ref
A). The most critical statements to date have come from
Grand Ayatollah Ishaq al-Fayyadh, who on August 4 lamented
the "disappointing" performance of elected parties,
instructing Iraqis to "elect reputable and competent
candidates" and warning voters about "unrealistic promises,
rhetorical slogans, and empty propaganda" (ref F).


3. (C) The reluctance of the marja'iyya to endorse parties
is matched only by the eagerness of the parties to hijack
the clergy for political benefit. The legality of using
religious symbols and figures during election campaigns
became
a key issue in the summer debate over the elections law. In
its July 24 veto of the draft law, the Presidency Council
endorsed the right of candidates "to display the strength

BAGHDAD 00002904 002 OF 005


of their connections and influence by mobilizing
personages...in their election campaign." Parties that
convince voters that they enjoy the special blessing of top
religious figures will likely garner extra votes.

...combined with an aggressive Maliki...
--------------


4. (C) Over the last year an increasingly confident and
assertive central government, led by Prime Minister Maliki,
has undertaken a series of aggressive military options
throughout Iraq. The first operation, 'Charge of Horseman,'
began on March 25 in Basrah. Hailed by supporters as
necessary action against "those outside the law," Sadrists
decried the Basrah offensive as a "genocide" (Sadrist MP
Saleh al-Egaily) and accused Maliki of ushering in a "new
dictatorship" (MP Falah Shenshel). Governor Waeli
complained that PM Maliki ignored him after arriving in
Basrah, while Deputy PC Chair Nasif Obeidi criticized
Maliki and the IA for failing to coordinate with local
officials, a lack of "strategic vision," and "inflaming the
Sadrist trend." Criticism mounted as the week wore on
without significant IA progress, and politicians began
plotting to oust PM Maliki with a no-confidence vote in
parliament. However, government forces eventually
prevailed with U.S. assistance, paving the way for
operations in Sadr City and elsewhere.


5. (S/NF) Military and rhetorical resistance to the
military operation "Tidings of Peace," begun in Maysan on
June 19, was almost non-existent in comparison. The first
shots fired against the ISF occurred two weeks into the
operation, and Zaid al-Hoshi, a local official who
reportedly enjoys close ties to JAM, admitted that "people
are starting to feel better and enjoying their
freedom...even former members of JAM are starting to talk
about a new reality, with a new perception of the
government and the ISF" in an August 21 meeting with poloff.



6. (C) Many of the senior JAM leadership fled to Najaf,
Iran, and elsewhere, while most of the rank-and-file
militia members simply disappeared into civilian society.
While the long-term impact of the operations remains
unknown, in the interim Maliki and his allies have been
able to boast that the GOI has established control, however
tenuous, over southern Iraq.

...is Sadr's loss...
--------------


7. (C) The initial success of the government offensives,
combined with public reaction against JAM excesses, has
cost Muqtada al-Sadr some of his popular base. Maysan
governor Adil Mhoder al-Maliki admitted that "the people
want to see new blood. As a Sadrist, I can say that the
people are beginning to reject Sadrists." Muqtada himself
has acknowledged the public backlash, and in response
extended the JAM "freeze" indefinitely and announced the
transformation of Jaysh al-Mahdi into a cultural and social
organization (ref H). Although the Sadr Trend is not
running a specific list in the elections, various Sadrist
fronts have been registered, including 'Abilities of
Maysan' (Maysan),'The Movement of the Cultured and Elite'
(Basrah),and 'Sadr al-Iraq' (Najaf).


8. (C) Polling indicates decreased Shi'a support for Sadr
and his movement. In a June-July State Department (INR/R)
poll, 69 percent of Shi'a respondents (up from 56 percent
in January) expressed "not very much or no confidence" in
the Office of the Martyr Sadr (ref I). Likewise, in
confidential polling conducted by NDI, the percentage of
Shi'a expressing positive feelings about Sadr declined from
40 to 35 percent between May and July. At the same time,
18 percent of Shi'a say they would vote for the Office of
the Martyr Sadr in the next election. This is roughly
equal to ISCI's 20 percent and Dawa's 22 percent among
Shi'a, but far ahead of Fadilah (6 percent).

...but not a gain for Da'wa or ISCI...
--------------


9. (C) Sadr's declining popularity and the increasing
assertiveness of the GOI have not translated into increased
support for the remaining members of the United Iraqi
Alliance (UIA). Roughly half of Shi'a expressed confidence
in Da'wa and PM Maliki (by contrast, three-quarters of
southern Iraqis expressed confidence in Maliki after he
formed his new government in June 2006). Shi'a confidence
in Dawa has declined from 61 percent in January to 51
percent in July. Shi'a confidence in ISCI is also down,
from 56 percent in January to 45 percent in July.

BAGHDAD 00002904 003 OF 005




10. (C) As incumbent parties (both nationally and in many
provinces),ISCI and Da'wa probably bear the brunt of
public dissatisfaction with flagging service delivery,
widespread corruption, and linkages of the parties to
militias, Iran, and extremist ideologies. Iraqis
constantly complain about the failure of provincial and
central government to provide water, sewage, employment,
and electricity. In a June NDI poll, for example, 36
percent of south-central respondents and 34 percent of
southern respondents identified basic services as the
"most important problem" (security received 9 percent
and 6 percent, respectively). Government corruption
is another frequent complaint from contacts. As Basrah S
unni leader Abdel al-Kharaji said, "Right now 100 percent
of PC funds go into (PC members') pockets, so if we elect
people that take only 50 percent, even that would be an
improvement." Finally, the parties suffer from their
perceived ties to Iran, militias, and strict
interpretations of Islam.

...Ja'afari waits in the wings...
--------------


11. (C) Ja'afari could benefit from dissatisfaction with
the government and the National Reform Trend is believed to
enjoy the support of many Sadrists. "It received a lot of
attention," ISCI MP Taki said on August 26, adding that he
expected many Sadrists to support the trend. Wasit PC
member and Sadrist Ahmed Ebrah said Ja'afari's party had a
"good future" and "a good mix of secular and religious
representatives." In two separate, recent polls, 62
percent of Arab Shi'a expressed a positive view of
Ja'afari. However, the former prime minister does have his
detractors. Dhi Qar sheikh Ali Munshid called Ja'afari a
"moron" during a July 30 meeting with the PRT, while
Fadilah leader Dr. Bassam Sharif told poloff that "We
already had him once, we don't need a repeat" on July 17.
At present Ja'afari's personal popularity has not
transferred to his new party. In an August NDI poll, only
5 percent of southern Shi'a identified the National Reform
Trend as their first choice of parties.

...and everyone's a nationalist.
--------------


12. (C) All parties and candidates strike similar themes,
portraying themselves as nationalists and emphasizing their
Iraqi identity and commitment to stability and
development. Two issues on which politicians can
distinguish themselves are federalism and the SFA
negotiations. In a recent poll a majority of Iraqis in the
south agreed that "a system in which the central government
has most of the power is best for Iraq for now" (ref E).
ISCI continues to support a nine-province region in the
south but has backed away from its strong public rhetoric,
perhaps in recognition of this lack of public support.
Fadilah claims to support a strong central government even
as Basrah Governor Waeli campaigns to make Basrah a
one-province region. Da'wa and the Sadrists both back a
centralized government. Despite private assurances of
support, both ISCI and Da'wa figures have criticized
the SFA publicly to inoculate themselves against
criticism from Fadilah and the Sadrists.

...And southern independents remain unorganized...
-------------- --------------


13. (C) 112 parties and 117 individuals in southern
provinces registered for the provincial elections, only 30
of which competed in the 2005 elections. Over half of the
parties contain some variant of the word 'independent' in
their name, and only 3 refer to themselves as 'parties'
(Note: Colloquially, the Arabic "party" (hizb/ahzab) is
synonymous with the establishment religious parties. End
note.) Self-styled independent and secular candidates
portray themselves as poised to ride a wave of public
reaction against the corruption, violence, and ineffective
governance associated with religiously-based parties. At
the same time, independents have repeatedly asked for U.S.
assistance to balance a playing field allegedly distorted
by Iranian influence and the institutional and
organizational advantages enjoyed by the incumbent
parties. Tribal sheikh and independent politician Khasan,
for example, likened the elections to "a war in which one
side has planes and tanks and the other only has pistols."
There is no polling data available on independent
candidates.

...Maliki is courting the tribes...
--------------


BAGHDAD 00002904 004 OF 005



14. (C) The established parties are campaigning for the
tribal vote. The controversy over PM Maliki's Tribal
Support Councils (TSCs) is driven by recognition of the
importance of the tribal vote. Many observers (including
allies of the PM) have characterized the councils as a
means to mobilize political support for Da'wa (ref C). On
August 31, provincial officials, including governors and PC
chairs and deputy chairs, attended a conference calling for
provinces to oppose the TSCs and establish their own tribal
councils. Babil Da'wa officials alleged that Amar al-Hakim
led this effort, and an ISCI-backed tribal council was
reportedly established in Hillah on September 4 (ref B).


15. (C) Although numerous 'independent' tribal leaders and
parties registered for the elections, until now the
majority of sheikhs seem unwilling or unable to actively
campaign without U.S. support. For example, U.S. officials
have repeatedly met with Ali Munshid from Dhi Qar and Hakim
Khasan from Muthanna, two prominent sheikhs who founded
political parties and formed an alliance. A planned
fund-raising rally for the alliance, hosted by Anbar sheikh
Abu Risha, was delayed indefinitely over a question of the
PM's attendance. The sheikhs recently asked for U.S.
funding and assistance brokering meetings with Gulf Arab
countries. Ultimately, the majority of the tribal vote will
likely go to the party best able to funnel reconstruction
projects, jobs, and money through the sheikhs.

...allegations of IHEC/GEO corruption...
--------------


16. (S/NF) Many contacts allege that the Governorate
Electoral Offices (GEOs) and Independent High Electoral
Commission (IHEC) will be compromised by intimidation and
corruption. On August 19, unknown gunmen killed two IHEC
staff members and wounded a third in Basra. Zainab al-Ribhawi
(strictly protect),a former IHEC observer, told poloff
earlier this month said that she expected
fraud in the election. "The IHEC does not directly belong
to parties," she said, "but the staff have an idea about
who should win the election." Asked which parties IHEC
staff support, she laughed and said "all of the female IHEC
staff in southern Iraq wear veils." The former manager of
the Wasit IHEC office, Haidar Allawi, accused the Wasit GEO
head of being an ISCI partisan and predicted that "ISCI
will manipulate the elections process by selecting
elections observers" (ref J). In the 2005 elections,
polling station directors and employees forged ballots,
disqualified ballots from opposition candidates, and
'encouraged' illiterate citizens to vote for the religious
slate (ref K).

...but Iraqis still intend to vote...
--------------


17. (C) Despite doubts about the fairness of the
elections, the overwhelming majority of southern Iraqis say
they intend to vote in the provincial elections. In a
recent poll, 81 percent of Iraqis in southern and
south-central Iraq said they were "very or somewhat likely
to vote" (ref I). About 40 percent of Iraqis said they
expected either "major problems" with the elections or the
elections "to not be free and fair at all." By comparison,
roughly 3,500,000 Iraqis in southern Iraq, or 68 percent of
eligible voters, participated in the 2005 provincial
elections.

...and the likely result may resemble 2005.
--------------


18. (C) Of the 369 provincial council seats awarded in the
south, 169 went to the slates of the four major parties -
Da'wa, Da'wa Tanzim, Fadhilah, and ISCI. Many more went to
coalitions and 'independent' candidates affiliated with a
larger party (for example, ISCI/Badr-affiliated Shahid
Mihrab slate in Diwaniyah or the Islamic Basrah
coalition). Wasit Fadhilah head Jaafar Sayidi referred to
this phenomenon on June 23, saying that in 2005, "a number
of parties were created just to get people elected and then
disappeared after the elections." Although the parties
enjoyed majorities in only a few of the provincial councils
they ultimately dominated southern politics by virtue of
their ties to national government, superior funding, and
militias.

Comment
--------------


19. (C) Provincial elections are unlikely to deliver the
political change desired by many Iraqis. With the
exceptions of SFA and federalism, it is difficult to
identify policy differences between the major Shi'a

BAGHDAD 00002904 005 OF 005


parties. In the absence of clear policy positions, voters
are likely to define parties based on the party leadership
and its relation to provincial and national spheres of
power. This may explain why the popularity of the party
leader and the party itself are often identical in polling
results, and the tendency to conflate parties and
personalities could reduce the impact of an open versus
closed list electoral system. With each party enjoying a
committed but small base, real electoral gains will depend
on securing the votes of Sadrists and other disenfranchised
voters. Absent a radical shift in Iraqi politics, the
likely result of the elections will be a fragmented
southern political map dominated by Da'wa and ISCI. A
continuation of an ineffective and unpopular political
status quo could widen the rift between southerners and
their elected government. End comment.
CROCKER