MAYSAN SADRISTS, ISCI PRESS U.S. TO PRESSURE THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002883

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: MAYSAN SADRISTS, ISCI PRESS U.S. TO PRESSURE THE
PRIME MINISTER TO RELEASE FUNDS

REF: BAGHDAD 2806

Classified By: Senior Advisor Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Sadrist and ISCI provincial leaders in Maysan asserted
to Senior Advisor Gordon Gray on September 3 that they are
not associated with militias and that they want to work with
the U.S. to promote security and development. Sadrist
leaders leveled sharp criticisms at Prime Minister Maliki,
complaining that increased militarization hinders the
government's ability to deliver services. They also praised
Coalition Forces for having a positive influence on Iraqi
Army treatment of detainees. The Provincial Director of
Reconstruction, in a joint meeting with the new Deputy
Governor, argued that Maysan needs direct U.S. support to
push the Prime Minister to release development funds promised
after June 2008 security operations in the province.
Specifically, they requested U.S. presence at an upcoming
meeting with Kurdish Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh and
representatives of several Government of Iraq (GOI)
ministries. End summary.

Sadrist PR campaign continues
--------------


2. (C) In a meeting with Gray and PRT Team Leader at FOB
Garry Owen, Provincial Council (PC) member Mohammed Wahid,
founder of the Sadrist umbrella organization that controls
the PC and the governorship in Maysan, continued his campaign
to convince U.S. officials that Sadrists are not working with
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) (reftel). He compared JAM militants to
"an American soldier who shoots a bullet in the Koran" --
with the former not being representative of the Sadrists and
the latter not being representative of the U.S. When asked
about Muqtada al-Sadr's recent edict to move from politics to
social services, Wahid blamed Iranian intelligence for
filtering information that goes to Muqtada. While Wahid
would not give straight answers to questions about Muqtada,
he seemed to believe that the edict was not to be taken
literally. He also said that ISCI/Badr, not the Sadrist
Hussein Ideology Front, is the prime conduit for Iranian
influence in the province.


3. (C) Wahid leveled strong criticism at the Iraqi Army and
Prime Minister (PM) Maliki. Discusing the role of 10th Army
Division Commander Habib in security operations, Wahid said:
"he was just out for revenge...The real militants escaped
through Maysan and Wasit to Iran." He contended that PM
Maliki's heavy role in security operations was directly
limiting the government's ability to provide services. In
Wahid's view, the Prime Minister has taken advantage of
popular support for early withdrawal of Coalition Forces to
set up a system in which "no government business gets done
unless the (Iraqi) army takes care of it." Wahid also
emphasized that local Sadrist opinion of the U.S. has risen
recently because many party members who were detained by
Iraqi troops during security operations thought they would be
tortured, but were treated well in prison, with regular
visits by human rights organizations. He said that the
detainees credit Coalition Forces for influencing the Iraqi
Army to treat prisoners better.

Coordination With U.S. Desired
--------------


4. (C) Wahid was accompanied by Zaid al-Hoshi, the Provincial
Director of Reconstruction and a close aide to the province's
Sadrist governor. First in the meeting with Wahid, and later
in a second meeting with Gray accompanied by Deputy Governor
and ISCI/Badr provincial deputy party chief Abdul Hussein
Adbul-Ridha Rasan, Hoshi pressed for more cooperation with
the U.S. on reconstruction efforts. Hoshi said that he
wanted the Embassy (through PRT Maysan) to play a big role in
the area for the next several years, similar to what it does
currently in Najaf and Karbala. (Note: Najaf and Karbala are
provinces under Iraqi control, have active PRTs carrying out
multiple development projects, and have a very limited U.S.
military presence at Forward Operating Bases. End note.) The
Deputy Governor echoed Hoshi's positions, emphasizing that
university and medical facilities are in particular need of
upgrades, including a chemical laboratory.

Meeting with Barham Saleh?
--------------


5. (C) Hoshi used both meetings to make the case for direct
U.S. pressure on Prime Minister Maliki to release funds for
Maysan Province promised by the Iraqi Government after
Operation Good Tidings of Peace, and to make more detailed

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plans for how funds will be spent. Hoshi invited U.S.
presence at a meeting planned in Baghdad with Deputy Prime
Minister Barham Saleh, which would include Maysan PC
President Abdul Jabbar Wahid Hamidi (also Sadrist),Hoshi,
and high-level representatives of the Ministries of Finance,
Health, Education, Higher Education, Reconstruction, and
Electricity. The following day, a representative at Saleh's
office confirmed to econoff that a meeting had been scheduled
for September 7 but would be postponed for several days. He
also said that these planning meetings occur regularly and
that the USG had participated in similar meetings in the
past, and was welcome to do so again.
CROCKER