Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD2866
2008-09-06 12:54:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

NINEWA: TRAVELING JUDGES ARE A SHORT-TERM FIX BUT

Tags:  PGOV PTER KJUS IZ 
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VZCZCXRO6900
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2866/01 2501254
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061254Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9255
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002866 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER KJUS IZ
SUBJECT: NINEWA: TRAVELING JUDGES ARE A SHORT-TERM FIX BUT
NOT A LONG TERM SOLUTION

REF: A. BAGHDAD 396

B. 07 BAGHDAD 3572

Classified By: PRT Ninewa leader Alex Laskaris for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) message

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002866

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER KJUS IZ
SUBJECT: NINEWA: TRAVELING JUDGES ARE A SHORT-TERM FIX BUT
NOT A LONG TERM SOLUTION

REF: A. BAGHDAD 396

B. 07 BAGHDAD 3572

Classified By: PRT Ninewa leader Alex Laskaris for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) message


1. (S) Summary. A panel of four traveling Baghdad trial
judges did what the provincial justice system has failed to
do over the last year: convict and sentence defendants guilty
of terrorism-related offenses. Staying on the PRT,
travelling to the Mosul court in 3rd ACR convoys, and working
under the protection of the ISF, the judges heard 27 cases,
delivering 13 guilty verdicts. The judges were highly
critical of their local counterparts, accusing them of
terrorist sympathies and corruption. They believe that good
judges afforded full protection (including of families) is
critical to a long term solution. We are grateful to Embassy
Baghdad for its support for the traveling judge program, and
hope that it can continue to make the case to the GOI that
this is an important component of our COIN and longer term
rule of law efforts. We should publicize the results of this
initiative, but only in a manner that does not increase
threats to the judges. GOI funding and buy-in from the local
judiciary for the proposed Mosul rule of law complex would
contribute to the longer-term reform prospects. End Summary.

Traveling Road Show Redux
--------------


2. (C) For the third time in a year, a panel of traveling
judges has travelled to Ninewa to hear terrorism cases (Ref A
and B) due to the zero percent conviction rate of individuals
on terrorism-related charges. The failure of Mosul trial
judges to try and convict terrorists is not a recent
phenomenon. Iraqi Chief Justice Medhat has previously sent
five panels of trial judges from Baghdad to serve in Mosul on
a rotating basis from December 2006, through July 2007; the
last panel from Baghdad served here in February 2008. After
lobbying by the Embassy and Coalition Forces (CF),Chief
Justice Medhat sent four Baghdad judges to Mosul on August 14
to hear terrorism-related cases. The PRT again hosted the
traveling judges, and CF transported the judges to the Mosul
Major Crimes Court (MCC). The ISF has cooperated with the CF

to provide security inside the court. Four investigative
judges from Baghdad were also dispatched to Ninewa and worked
closely with the trial judges to prepare cases for trial.

Temporary Judges Show Immediate, Positive Results
-------------- --------------


3. (U) The Baghdad trial judges had an immediate, positive
effect. On the first day of trials, the judges handed down
seven convictions out of nine cases for Article Four
(terrorism) offenses, resulting in one death sentence, five
life sentences, and one five-year sentence. The judges sent
two cases to juvenile court since the defendants were minors.
The second day of trials was less positive, with the judges
dismissing five cases for lack of evidence and sending one
case back to investigators for more work. Notably, the cases
heard on the second day were all former IP and IA personnel.
On August 27, the judges heard nine cases, which resulted in
three convictions (one life sentence, one 15-year sentence,
and one five-year sentence),five dismissals due to lack of
evidence, and one case rescheduled for trial. On August 28,
the judges heard three cases, delivering one death sentence
and two 15-year prison sentences.

Local Judges, Lawyers Don,t Roll Out the Welcome Wagon
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Mosul Major Criminal Court (MCC) judges have been
generally uncooperative with the Baghdad judges and at times
antagonistic, questioning their motives. Mosul,s defense
attorneys were also an obstacle for the panel. They
initially failed to arrive for court in a timely fashion, and
several attempted to withdraw, claiming conflict of interest.
After a call from the chief visiting judge, Mosul Chief
Judge Faisal directed two defense attorneys to participate.
In the past, the Mosul Bar Association has actively resisted
the traveling judges, going so far as to boycott trials.
However, the Iraqi Bar Association intervened and, on the
threat of disbarment, the Mosul attorneys returned to the
courtroom.

Baghdad Judges Outline Concerns

BAGHDAD 00002866 002 OF 002


--------------


5. (S) The PRT hosted a meeting between the visiting trial
and investigative judges and 1AD DCG BG Thomas and 3 ACR RCO
COL Bills on August 24 at the PRT to discuss the current
status of the Ninewa criminal justice system. The judges
were critical of the Mosul MCC judges, describing a lack of
commitment and loyalty, and expressing a belief that many
local judges were at least sympathetic to insurgents. They
believe that Ninewa has the worst judiciary of any province
in Iraq; noting that Anbar has 31 judges and Salahuddin has
28 judges, and they do far more work than Ninewa,s more than
47 judges. All agreed that a policy of regularly rotating
judges to Mosul from other provinces would do a lot to
improve the delivery of justice since those judge would be
objective and relatively free from intimidation or
cooptation. They also recommended the construction of a
secure judicial facility that would house trial judges and
their families because the lack of basic security adversely
affects judges, ability to perform their duties. BG Thomas
suggested publicizing the results of the trial as a
deterrent, and the judges agreed, asking only that their
identities be protected. They said that verdicts are often
publicized in Baghdad.


6. (S) The judges were also critical of the quality of
investigations conducted by the IA and IP. They regard IP
and IA investigators as unmotivated and as generally poorly
trained and equipped to conduct these critical criminal
investigations. Investigations are conducted haphazardly,
and investigators fail to collect basic physical evidence and
photos. Witness statements are poorly prepared and lack
essential information. The judges support training for the
IA and IP and are willing to participate in training them,
but believe that the ISF in Mosul are involved in terrorism
and extortion and that the local judges are corrupt and
refuse to do their jobs.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) This program is a success within a broader failure of
the GOI to enforce the rule of law in Ninewa Province. Our
response will have to be along two tracks. First, we need to
continue the practice of rotating Baghdad judges into Mosul
to hear terrorism-related cases. The PRT, along with 3rd ACR
and 1AD, will continue to support such visits as required by
the caseload of the MCC. On a broader scale, this visit
brought into high relief the failures of the Ninewa judicial
system: corruption, intimidation, and terrorist sympathies
coupled with an outdated legal code, untrained staff, and a
justice system that remains reliant on confessions rather
than the integration of police, prosecutors, and judges.


8. (c) We should publicize these results, although it is
imperative that we do so in a way that does not increase the
threat level to the traveling judges or their families.
Longer term, GOI movement on the proposed Mosul rule of law
complex would also contribute to our efforts in this field.
The space has been set aside, although the local judiciary is
opposed to both the location and magnitude of the project.
Even though the current Mosul judiciary cannot or will not
pursue terrorist-related case, Mosul will need a secure
facility to conduct trials, house judges, and hold detaineees.
CROCKER