Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD2864
2008-09-06 06:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

NINEWA - DROUGHT PUSHES AGRICULTURAL SECTOR TO

Tags:  ECON EAGR SENV EAID PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6826
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2864/01 2500640
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 060640Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9248
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002864 

STATE PLS PASS TO DEPT OF AGRICULTURE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2018
TAGS: ECON EAGR SENV EAID PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: NINEWA - DROUGHT PUSHES AGRICULTURAL SECTOR TO
EDGE OF CRISIS; SUNNIS HARDEST HIT

REF: BAGHDAD 1462

Classified By: Classified by PRT Leader Alex Laskaris for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).

This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) message.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002864

STATE PLS PASS TO DEPT OF AGRICULTURE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2018
TAGS: ECON EAGR SENV EAID PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: NINEWA - DROUGHT PUSHES AGRICULTURAL SECTOR TO
EDGE OF CRISIS; SUNNIS HARDEST HIT

REF: BAGHDAD 1462

Classified By: Classified by PRT Leader Alex Laskaris for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).

This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) message.


1. (C) Summary. Ninewa,s farmers are facing the fourth year
of a serious drought and need agricultural inputs for next
season and basic subsistence until then. Farmers, especially
in the Sunni western regions, feel abandoned by the
provincial and central governments. Our experience thus far
has been that central government programs are under-funded
and unresponsive, and provincial government programs simply
do not exist. We need to request from the GOI increased
funding, for both emergency subsistence and inputs for next
season, as well as a re-orientation of programs away from
land owners and towards those who work the land. The
rehabilitation of the Jazeera irrigation system is one
measure that could minimize the impact of drought and bring
more acreage under cultivation. End Summary.

Farmers in Crisis
--------------


2. (SBU) The PRT previously reported that Ninewa farmers were
facing a potential catastrophe as they struggled through the
fourth year of a drought. (Ref A) Farmers were hopeful that
the government could provide assistance to help them get
through the year and allow them to get back on a sound
financial footing. However, GOI relief has fallen far short
of farmer,s needs. The government has proposed a $167
million program (200 billion Iraqi dinars),but this falls
far short of the comprehensive plan needed to carry Ninewa,s
farmers through this difficult season. Local farmers are
increasingly concerned as they face the prospect of trying to
obtain necessary inputs (seed, fertilizer, and fuel for
machinery) when most have exhausted their access to cash and
are reluctant to approach banks for even more loans. For
their part, it is unclear whether banks will even consider
extending more credit to farmers who have been unable to pay
off loans from the past several years.


Four-Year Drought Worsens
--------------


3. (U) On May 5, 2008, the Minister of Water Resources
declared a drought. No rain has fallen since then, and
Ninewa received only about 25 percent of the rain it would
expect over the past year. The lack of rain has compounded
the difficult situation in major storage reservoirs that were
already low due to reduced rainfall over the past several
years. Regions in Ninewa that have either depended fully or
partially on irrigation are facing the prospect of limited
availability because inflows to the Tigris are 55 percent
below normal. The water situation in northern Ninewa is
grim.


4. (U) Farmers from the Al-Jazira irrigation project (in the
northwestern Rabi,ya region of Tal Afar district) have told
us that the flow of water through the system was irregular
throughout the spring, and they complain that the canal
system is showing signs of wear and tear and needs
long-deferred maintenance. (Note: Stages I and II of
Al-Jazira cover about 150,000 dunams, approximately 94,240
acres. Half is irrigated with linear sprinklers (stage I)
and half through traditional flood irrigation (stage II). End
Note.) Conversations with local government officials have
shown that the combination of electricity shortages and
overdue maintenance at the critical Bardiyyah pump station on
Lake Mosul may adversely impact the system,s capacity to
move water out to farmers. Furthermore, the Ministry of
Water Resources has allocated only 10 cu. M of water per
second for the critical months of September and October,
which is only enough for Stage I.


Input Uncertainty: Seeds, Fertilizer, Fuel
--------------


5. (SBU) Farmers also face uncertainty regarding seeds,
fertilizer, and fuel for machinery. Farmers generally draw
seed from GOI silos based on the amount of seed they
deposited after the preceding harvest. However, since
farmers did not harvest any crop in the spring, it is unclear
whether there will be enough seed in domestic silos. The
Director-General (DG) for Agriculture estimated that Ninewa

BAGHDAD 00002864 002 OF 003


alone will need more than 75,000 metric tons of wheat seed
and 85,000 metric tons of barley, and admitted that Ninewa,s
stocks will fall short. However, he is confident that he
will be able to obtain sufficient seed, either from
neighboring provinces or from the Ministry. It is, however,
unclear as to what steps the Ministry has actually taken to
procure needed seeds.


6. (U) Farmers have reported that in the recent past, they
have received less than 50 percent of the seed they need, and
have been forced to buy the rest on the open market at their
own expense. In addition to concerns over availability of
seeds, farmers have complained about the decreasing quality
of seeds, commenting that they are receiving increasing
percentages of &dirty8, i.e. uncleaned, seed that contains
higher percentages of weeds or lower quality seeds. Farmers
desperately need high-quality, drought resistant seed, but
have received none. Farmers have also told us that they
often receive only half the fuel and fertilizer that they
need, forcing them to buy the balance from the black market.


7. (U) The availability of credit is a key concern for Ninewa
farmers. Many are already heavily in debt for loans from
previous years, and some have told us that they will not go
further into debt. As noted in reftel, a
government-sponsored credit program would go a long way to
calm Ninewa farmers, concerns.

Drought Relief Program Inadequate
--------------


8. (U) The GOI drought relief program is less than it might
appear. Although the program promises $167 million (200
billion ID),it also covers purchase of seed wheat and barley
for this year, purchase of feed barley for animal herders,
and compensation of rice farmers affected by this year,s ban
on rice farming in some areas. The program is also highly
bureaucratic, requiring that applications be approved by
multiple government committees and seems to be focused mainly
on land-owners, rather than at farmers who actually work the
land. Many farmers work under long-standing traditional
agreements with absentee landlords or by renting government
land. It is still unclear whether these farmers will be
covered. The local DG of Agriculture told the PRT that he
should have some initial feedback on the progress of
applications by the end of August.


8. (U) Only farmers in high- and medium-rainfall areas will
be eligible to request compensation, excluding those from the
southern areas of Ninewa (Sinjar and al-Hadr districts). The
program will compensate farmers for their seed and fertilizer
expenses from last year, basically allowing them to cover
last year,s loans without providing any ready cash for this
year,s planting or for family survival. Animal herders will
receive some relief in the form of (an as of yet undetermined
amount of) government-provided animal feed. Given the
failure of this year,s crops, many farmers are just as
concerned with feeding their families as with farming.

Winning Hearts and Minds
--------------


9. (C) Farmers, especially in the hard-hit western region,
frequently say they feel abandoned by the government.
Without a chance to put in another harvest, the viability of
the province,s 75,000 farming families may be at risk. By
extending a hand to Ninewa,s farmers, the federal and
provincial governments could achieve two important goals:
revitalizing Ninewa,s critical agriculture sector and
undercutting the insurgency,s message that the government
does not care for the Sunnis of Ninewa.


10. (U) A well-funded program could win wide-scale support
for the GOI at an affordable price. Key elements should
include:

--Credit: Expanding on the current drought relief program,
the GOI should forgive agricultural loans at the state-owned
Ag Bank, rather than simply reimbursing farmers for expenses,
and offer special, low-interest loans to help farmers cover
this year,s expenses. This would serve the dual purpose of
relieving farm family debt and liquidating bad loans held by
the state-owned Ag Bank.

--Inputs: Provide sufficient seed, fertilizer, and fuel to
ensure that Ninewa,s farmers can grow and harvest a crop.
In the past, farmers have received de facto guarantees from

BAGHDAD 00002864 003 OF 003


the DG of Agriculture, based on acreage farmed, that allowed
them to borrow enough from the government-owned Ag Bank to
cover seed and fertilizer and received vouchers that allowed
them to purchase fuel at a discounted price. This year,
however, a grant program would be of much greater assistance
to farmers reeling from four years of drought.

--Emergency aid: Many farmers are facing difficulty just
surviving. The GOI drought relief program should be
re-oriented to provide wide-scale relief in the form of cash
payments to those actually farming so they can survive until
the next harvest.

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (C) The central and provincial governments, lack of
concern for the rural Sunni population of Ninewa is
troubling, both for the humanitarian impact of the current
drought as well as for the COIN implications. One of Al
Qaida,s primary propaganda points is that the government
does not care about the Sunni population. Without tangible
change in current policies, we cannot make the case with
Sunni interlocutors that that their provincial government is
attentive to the needs of the Sunni population. A
well-funded and executed drought relief program could help us
salvage the credibility of at least the central government.
CROCKER