Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD2838
2008-09-04 14:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT DIYALA: IRAQI ARMY ACTIONS IN KHANAQIN RAISE

Tags:  POL PREL PTER PINS PINR MOPS IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5348
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2838/01 2481455
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041455Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9215
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002838 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2018
TAGS: POL PREL PTER PINS PINR MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: PRT DIYALA: IRAQI ARMY ACTIONS IN KHANAQIN RAISE
KURDISH FEARS

REF: BAGHDAD 2759 BAGHDAD 2820

Classified By: Political Affairs Minister-Counselor Robert S. Ford
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002838

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2018
TAGS: POL PREL PTER PINS PINR MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: PRT DIYALA: IRAQI ARMY ACTIONS IN KHANAQIN RAISE
KURDISH FEARS

REF: BAGHDAD 2759 BAGHDAD 2820

Classified By: Political Affairs Minister-Counselor Robert S. Ford
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Diyala reporting cable.

Summary
--------------


2. (C) Diyala Provincial Council Chairman Ibrahim Bajellan
(Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK) told us that negotiators,
who have met the past few days in Baghdad, have worked to
defuse the tense confrontation between Kurdish forces and the
Iraqi Army (IA) in the town of Khanaqin in Diyala province.
According to Bajellan, on September 2, negotiating teams
agreed on a key point essential for preventing further
aggression - that any Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) entering
towns with substantial Kurdish populations would be comprised
of IA and Kurdish Peshmerga. Bajellan commented that
Assistant Governor Emad Jaleel Abdullah (Kurdish Democratic
Party, KDP) had remained in Khanaqin this week because he and
his KDP colleagues were less optimistic about an equitable
outcome. Although clearly tense, our Kurdish contacts
expressed guarded optimism that the confrontation would be
resolved within a few days. Bajellan reiterated that Kurds
fear they will once again be subject to GOI aggression while
holdovers from Saddam Hussein's regime command ISF in Diyala.
There could well be some posturing on the part of these
local Kurdish leaders as well in order to stir up the local
population. We also note that a march in Khanaqin last week
organized by the Kurdish political parties to protest the
approach of the Iraqi army did not generate a huge outpouring
of marchers. End Summary.

Tensions Appear to Slightly Ease in Khanaqin
--------------


3. (C) On September 2, PRT Team Leader and Government Rule
of Law Advisor met with Diyala Provincial Council Chairman
Bajellan and members of the "Kurdish Bloc," including Hussam
Ali Hamad al-Jaaf (PUK),Amal Shakir al-Zankani, and Chairman
of the Provincial Council Tribal Reconciliation Committee
Kadhem Ibrahim al-Mahdawi (an independent Sunni who is a
member of the Kurdish bloc) to discuss the current status of

Khanaqin. All stressed the need for both sides to talk and
avoid any developments that could have negative long-term
consequences. Although clearly tense, they expressed guarded
optimism that the confrontation would be resolved within a
few days. Bajellan said Kurdish representatives from
Khanaqin had met every day with the IA since the August 26
Kurdish protest in Khanaqin (reftel). He added that Khanaqin
residents had provided food and water for the troops because
the IA had failed to deliver supplies to its troops.

Khanaqin Revives Kurds' Historic Fears of Arabization
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Bajellan and al-Jaaf stressed the Kurds' concern
about LTGen Ali Ghedan and other top ISF generals in Diyala
who previously served in Saddam Hussein's army and, in their
opinion, still possess strong Arab nationalist tendencies.
Al-Jaaf noted that the IA had implemented Saddam's
anti-Kurdish campaigns, including the 1975 removal of over
1,000 Kurdish families from Khanaqin Qada (district),which
emptied 55 villages and over 400 houses in the city of
Khanaqin. Additionally, thousands of Kurdish families were
subsequently forced out of Khanaqin by smaller army
operations. They told us that Saddam had then moved Sunni
Arabs into the Kurdish houses and farms and paid them
substantial amounts of money.


5. (C) Bajellan and the other members of the Kurdish bloc
criticized the IA for allegedly moving into Khanaqin while
skipping over Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) hotspots such as Imam
Wais, the Hamreen Mountains, and other areas in eastern
Diyala during the recent security operations. They
characterized Khanaqin as the peaceful refuge where many
Iraqi officials from nearby Qadas (districts) located their
families for security reasons. Bajellan added that not one
Coalition Forces (CF) soldier has been killed in Khanaqin.
(Note: Although Diyala was the only province that the GOI
characterized as "lost to al Qaeda" in 2007, AQI was not able
to extend its control into Khanaqin Qada. End Note.)
Bajellan said the fact that the ISF ignored nearby AQI
hotspots and went to Khanaqin showed that Operation
Benevolent Diyala was really a political purge, not an
anti-terrorist campaign.

Call for the GOI to Adhere to Article 140
--------------


BAGHDAD 00002838 002 OF 002



6. (C) Bajellan and al-Jaaf said that an equitable long-term
resolution of the issues in Khanaqin could only be achieved
through the implementation of Article 140. Al-Jaaf noted
that the GOI should expedite resettlement of internally
displaced persons (IDPs). He said that a number of Kurds
have returned in the past three years, but that many had been
unable to reclaim their houses as prescribed by Article 140.
(Comment: Article 140 stipulates a period of "normalization"
prior to census and elections. Kurds insist that
"normalization" include the return of Kurds to land they
occupied before Arabization and removal of Arabs relocated to
formerly Kurdish areas. End Comment.) Bajellan claimed the
GOI must provide housing to Kurdish squatters, but that the
GOI was instead offering them a piece of land in the
provinces they came from in addition to 20 million Iraqi
Dinars (ID). According to Bajellan, many squatters had
refused the GOI's offer. Bajellan said that once this was
resolved, they can conduct a census as required by Article
140 followed by a referendum to determine whether the people
of the area want to remain in Diyala province or become part
of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Al-Jaaf added
confidently that the vote would surely be to join the KRG.

PC Chair Roughed-Up?
--------------


7. (C) Rumors swirling around the Governance Center and
alleged eyewitness accounts suggest that ISF personnel beat
Bajellan and other male Provincial Council members - except
for an older Shi'a sheikh - during the ISF's August 19 raid
on the Governance Center and Provincial Council chambers.
Although Bajellan denies these rumors, we have seen him
limping and heard complaints of serious back problems since
the raid.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) The events in Khanaqin have added a sense of urgency
in Diyala to resolve outstanding internal border issues and
implement Article 140. As described by Bajellan, the
agreement reached September 2 in Baghdad will lower the level
of tension, but the presence of the IA in the area could
prove to be the irritant that unhinges Diyala.


9. (C) Both Bajellan (a Talabani supporter) and Assistant
Governor Emad (a Barazani backer) have been increasingly
critical of ISF's conduct during Operation Benevolent Diyala
(also known as Glad Tidings of Benevolence). Before the ISF
launched security operations, Bajellan and Emad had expressed
support for security campaigns focused on terrorists and
militias (both have been repeatedly targeted by AQI and other
extremists),but worried about rumors that the operation
would be sectarian in nature. They subsequently charged that
Operation Benevolent Diyala is really a campaign to suppress
Sunni and Kurdish participation in the political process.
The Kurdish leadership in Diyala now appears convinced that
the GOI plans to first deal with the Sunnis and then go after
the Kurds. There could well be some posturing on the part of
these local Kurdish leaders as well in order to stir up the
local population. Interesting, a march in Khanaqin last week
to protest the approach of the Iraqi Army did not generate a
huge outpouring of demonstrators. End Comment.
BUTENIS