MEK SECURITY TRANSITION: INFORMAL MULTI-PARTY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002304

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2018
TAGS: PHUM KJUS PINS PTER PREL UN IZ
SUBJECT: MEK SECURITY TRANSITION: INFORMAL MULTI-PARTY
DISCUSSIONS MOVE PROCESS FORWARD

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1889

B. BAGHDAD 2215

C. BAGHDAD 2234

D. STATE 76032

Classified By: PolMil MinCouns Marcie B. Ries for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Informal discussions on July 20 among the
GOI, USG, ICRC, UNAMI, and Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK)leaders
from Ashraf helped to clarify the positions and roles that
each party would play in the transfer of responsibility for
the MEK from the USG to the GOI, and the ensuing questions of
legal status and repatriation. The Minister of Human Rights
traveled to a U.S. facility near Baghdad Airport for the
meetings but declined to meet directly with the MEK
leadership. Instead, she delegated a Ministry official to
meet with an attorney for the MEK to confirm the GOI's
intention to treat Ashraf residents in accordance with its
responsibilities under Iraqi and international law.


2. (S) The ICRC and UNAMI expressed willingness to play a
role in support of the transfer of authority, with their
focus on the protection of individual residents' rights and
safety, but stopped short of offering to act as guarantors.
The ICRC is prepared to facilitate repatriation to Iran for
willing members. The MEK leadership from Ashraf were fearful
of coming under GOI protection and asserted that the USG
should protect the organization as long as U.S. forces are in
Iraq. Each party emphasized to the MEK that the transfer was
inevitable, and MEK cooperation in developing the process
would help ensure the protection of each individual. Planned
next steps include a "census" of camp residents with
interviews conducted by MNF-I, a visit by the ICRC to Ashraf,
and a follow-up joint visit by the ICRC and Minister of Human
Rights. END SUMMARY.

PARTICIPANTS
--------------

3. (C) Task Force 134 (TF134) organized informal stakeholder
discussions at Camp Cropper on July 20 about the transfer of
responsibility for the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK) from the USG
to the GOI. The meetings were hosted by TF134 under RDML Gar
Wright. Minister of Human Rights Wijdan Salim represented
the GOI along with two Ministry of Human Rights (MoHR)
officials. PolMil Min-Couns Marcie Ries, PolMil DepCouns and
PolOff participated, as did the ICRC (head of delegation Juan
Pedro Schaerer, Larry Maybee, Laurent Saugy, and Silvana
Mutti) and the UNAMI human rights office (Olivier Bercault
and Martin Bohnstedt). The MEK team from Ashraf included
three of its leaders (Mojgan Parsaii, Zohreh Akhiani, and
Mehdi Braie) as well as Behzad Saffari, Ali Bahari Javan, and
a FARSI-English interpreter.

MEK-ICRC
--------------

4. (C) The ICRC and the MEK members met first in a private
three-hour meeting. According to Schaerer, the MEK were very
fearful of the transfer, mainly due to anti-MEK public
statements from GOI spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh, members of the
Council of Representatives, and the Council of Ministers (ref
A). However, the MEK generally understood that things would
have to change as U.S. forces leave Iraq. The MEK were
concerned that under GOI protection they would be expelled
from Iraq, killed, or detained arbitrarily. Schaerer said,
in principle, the MEK understood they would need to start
planning for a transfer now, but they want to do this
gradually.


5. (C) During the private meeting with the MEK, according to
Schaerer, the ICRC delegation sought to help the MEK
understand that they have rights as individuals, but not as a
group. ICRC legal opinion is that the "occupation" ended in
June 2004, and thus Article Four of the Fourth Geneva
Convention does not apply to protection of the MEK by the
USG. They informed the MEK that the transfer would take
place no matter what, and they needed to start talking and
planning now. They also said there would need to be an
independent "census" of each MEK member, and the MEK agreed
in principle to this request. They raised the issue of
family visits to Ashraf, but decided to postpone discussing
the details until the ICRC visited Ashraf. In response to
MEK fears, the ICRC assured them that they have been talking
to the GOI about ensuring that the MEK are protected.

ICRC-UNAMI-USG-GOI
--------------

6. (C) The ICRC then huddled with the Ministry team, TF134,
and the Embassy to discuss next steps, with UNAMI joining in
the midst of the discussion. To Minister Wijdan, the ICRC
delegation emphasized their organization's red lines: the

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ICRC would not be the spokesman for the GOI, the GOI cannot
use the ICRC as the legitimating factor in the media, and the
ICRC would need to preserve its independence. They added
that the GOI would need to develop a plan for those MEK who
do not want to return to Iran. Schaerer encouraged the
Minister to meet with the leadership and use them to get
access to individual members and entre into Ashraf. He said
the leadership is very strong, and thus it is important to
send them a message that can be relayed to the members.


7. (C) The ICRC and UNAMI expressed willingness to play a
role in support of the transfer of authority, with their
focus on the protection of individual residents' rights and
safety, but stopped short of offering to act as guarantors.
ICRC said they were prepared to facilitate repatriation to
Iran for willing members.


8. (C) The ICRC said they wanted to remind the USG that it
must assess the risks of a transfer. If the risks are
verified, the USG should prevent a transfer, and
responsibility should only be transferred if individual
rights are respected. On next steps, the ICRC said the
census should be conducted entirely by TF134, who needs to
explain to each individual his or her rights. The ICRC did
say they would look over any questions TF134 wanted to ask,
but stressed they would not take part in the interviews.
After the census, they said they want to soon visit Ashraf
alone, before they decide on future involvement, and then
visit the camp with Minister Wijdan. The delegation said
they would be involved in facilitating family visits, and
believe these visits are important to put the members more in
touch with reality. In the future, the ICRC could help with
any new refugees who wish to repatriate to Iran.


9. (C) Minister Wijdan emphasized that the GOI wants to
focus on the protection of individuals and questioned the
necessity to meet directly with the MEK leadership. Wijdan
said the next step should be to conduct interviews of each
individual in the camp in order to get identification
information and ask each whether he or she would leave if
given the chance. TF134 undertook to carry out this
"census." After that, Wijdan said she would go to Ashraf on
a "humanitarian visit," stressing that this visit must be
carried out jointly with the ICRC in order to show the MEK
that the GOI has international credibility. U.S. officials
urged Wijdan to meet with the MEK leadership soon,
emphasizing that many of the fears that individual members
may have come directly from the leadership, and it is thus
essential to allay the concerns of the leaders. TF134 will
soon conduct the census and interviews and will then
facilitate trips for Minister Wijdan to Ashraf.


10. (C) UNAMI reiterated their main points from a previous
meeting with TF134 and the Embassy (ref B). They want to
make sure the transfer includes non-refoulement assurances,
protection of the MEK, and finding a legal status solution
for each individual. They said that in random interviews
they conducted with members in 2007, the majority strongly
wanted to remain with the MEK in Iraq.


11. (S) Separately, an MoHR official, accompanied by a TF134
observer, met with an attorney for the MEK to confirm the
GOI's intention to treat Ashraf residents in accordance with
its responsibilities under Iraqi and international law.
According to the TF134 observer, the atmosphere was tense and
hostile.


12. (C) The final meeting included the MEK, ICRC, UNAMI,
TF134, Embassy Pol, and Embassy Pol-Mil (minus Min-Couns) but
no MoHR personnel, the Minister having received guidance from
the PM on short notice that she should not meet that day with
the MEK (septel). In a prepared statement, Mojgan Parsaii
emphasized the MEK's view that so long as U.S. forces are in
Iraq, the USG has the responsibility to protect the MEK. The
responsibility, she argued, arises under international law,
and in particular Article Four of the Fourth Geneva
Convention and the principle of non-refoulement. Although
the MEK representatives accepted that U.S. forces will leave
in the future, the MEK believes that until the day these
forces leave, they must protect the MEK. Parsaii further
argued that protection of the MEK should be enshrined in any
SOFA or long-term agreement between the GOI and USG.


13. (C) After expressing disappointment that Minister Wijdan
was not present, Parsaii said they hoped to pass the message
to the Minister and to PM Maliki that the MEK - "contrary to
Iranian propaganda" - was not against the GOI and even
supported the PM. Parsaii added that the MEK only view Iraq
as a temporary home. She invited the GOI to Ashraf and hoped
that Wijdan would meet with them.


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14 (C) Emboffs responded that the U.S. wishes to find a
solution and will work with all parties to ensure individual
rights are protected; waiting to transfer authority until the
departure of the last U.S. troops was imminent was not a
formula for success. The presence of the ICRC and UNAMI
reps, and the PM's selection of the Minister of Human Rights
as the lead on resolving the Ashraf problem should reassure
the MEK that they were not alone in seeking protection for
the rights of camp residents. The UNAMI officials warned the
MEK that MNF-I will not be in Iraq forever, and all parties
need to find a solution, especially on the legal status of
the MEK.


15. (C) COMMENT: The informal discussions clarified the
roles that each party would play in the transfer of
responsibility and thereafter. While the last*minute
refusal of Minister Wijdan to meet directly with the MEK was
discouraging, we believe she is sincere in wanting to visit
Ashraf and meet with MEK members soon. To do so she will
have to persuade the PM, the Interior Minister, and other GOI
leaders with deeply felt grievances that dealing correctly
with the individuals at Ashraf does not equate to indulging
terrorism. The ICRC is engaged and will be an essential
partner throughout this process, albeit not willing to act as
a formal guarantor of MEK security. We will encourage a
visit by Minister Wijdan to Ashraf and a face-to-face meeting
with MEK leaders in the near future.
CROCKER