Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD23
2008-01-03 06:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT MAYSAN: IA OFFICIALS SHARE SECURITY CONCERNS

Tags:  IR IZ PGOV 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3618
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0023/01 0030632
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030632Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5101
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000023 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2018
TAGS: IR IZ PGOV
SUBJECT: PRT MAYSAN: IA OFFICIALS SHARE SECURITY CONCERNS

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Rob Waller for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000023

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2018
TAGS: IR IZ PGOV
SUBJECT: PRT MAYSAN: IA OFFICIALS SHARE SECURITY CONCERNS

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Rob Waller for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Maysan reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary: In private and official discussions the
Iraqi Army 10th Division Commander and his Maysan Brigade
Commander expressed concern over the security situation in
al-Amarah since the December 12 bombing. They advised that
an ongoing series of successful raids on insurgents and
criminals made the population nervous, and that it would not
be prudent for PRT staff to conduct project visits at the
present time. However, they said they would be able to
provide full security for future visits when the situation
was calmer. The officers added that provincial officials
were complying with the ongoing operations. End Summary.


3. (C) While arranging a meeting for PRT staff on December
30, PRT Bilingual Bicultural Advisor (BBA) briefly chatted
with the Iraqi Army (IA) 10th Division Commander Major
General Habib Talib Abbas al-Husayn and his Maysan Brigade
Commander, Brigadier General Nabil Yasin Ibrahim. The
following day, PRT Deputy Team Leader (DTL) paid a courtesy
call on General Habib to discuss the security situation in
Maysan.

The (In)Security Situation
--------------


4. (C) Asked about Maysan,s security situation and the
status of the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM),Habib answered with three
points: 1) JAM provides the linkage for &other countries8,
2) JAM receives training from &other countries8, and 3)
there are different kinds of JAM in the province. Although
he initially used 'other countries' to mean Iran, Syria and
Saudi Arabia he later only mentioned Iran. He mentioned a
new group forming in Maysan called the &Ashab al-Qadiyya8
(Friends of the Cause),made up of disaffected or rejected
JAM members. He added that this new group was receiving
considerable outside support. He noted that while Muthanna
and Nasiriyah were quiet, there was &no stability8 in
Maysan at the present time. Asked about the prospects of the
PRT traveling to the province to visiting ongoing and planned
projects, he sought to reassure us, saying, &We have
control. We have strength. We had a request from Baghdad to
take control of the security situation.8


Warning to Provincial Officials
--------------


5. (C) Habib indicated that during his last visit to Amarah
in the wake of the December 12, 2007 bombing, he spoke with
members of the Provincial Council and representatives of the
Governor. He told them that he had to fix the security
situation and warned them not to get in his way. Habib added
that he met with the Chief of Police (COP),giving him a
&strong message8 and saying that he needed to make sure
that he had their full cooperation. He said &that,s why we
changed the chief of police8. Habib confirmed IA was
conducting regular, house-by-house raids, successfully
catching both insurgents and criminals, and that provincial
officials had not resisted these operations.

No JAM-Badr Reconciliation
--------------


6. (C) Asked about the possibility of renewed JAM-Badr Corps
fighting in Maysan, Habib answered, &they will never
reconcile8 adding, &Badr supports the Coalition. We (IA)
support the Coalition. JAM blames Badr for the problems.8
Regarding Moqtada al-Sadr,s (MAS) recent renewal of the
six-month &freeze8, Habib observed, &Sadr changed his mind
because of the bad reputation of the Sadrists. He wants to
give JAM a nice image; many people are criticizing him.8

Full support for PRT visits
--------------


8. (C) Understanding our strong interest in visiting project
sites and provincial officials in Maysan, Habib repeatedly
assured us of his readiness to control the situation and
provide security. He made clear that he would spare no
resource to ensure we had full protective cover while
traveling and were able to visit project sites. Asked when
we might be able to go, he said &It will be no problem. We
will take you, but at the appropriate time. We will get you
there and back safely, but we need a little time.8 In a
personal visit with the BBA the day before, Habib said,
&Right now, don,t go. If you want my advice, stay here. I
can provide IA security when you do go, and your team will
have no problem.8

Nabil: We need more time

BAGHDAD 00000023 002 OF 002


--------------


9. (C) During the BBA,s brief hallway encounter, Nabil
confided that since the bombing the security situation in
Maysan was very bad. He said authorities had indeed caught
the perpetrators who confessed under interrogation to being
JAM members receiving support from Iran. Nabil told the BBA
that Iran-sponsored JAM had &taken over the city (Amarah)8.
He clarified that they weren,t FARSI-speaking Persians but
JAM members being paid by Iran. Asked about the purpose of
the bombing, he opined that the Iranians needed violence to
keep things unstable and that they did not want any safety or
success in the south. Nabil insisted that he still needed
time to clean out the insurgents. He added that they often
did raids at night, and that the people were feeling
insecure. He also noted that the confessions of the bombers
provided useful intelligence that led to some successful
raids. Nabil said they were arresting both criminals and
insurgents, and that he would let us know when it was safe to
visit.
CROCKER