MALIKI ON CABINET SHAKE-UP, RETURN OF TAWAFAQ, AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000166

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: IZ MARR MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PTER TU
SUBJECT: MALIKI ON CABINET SHAKE-UP, RETURN OF TAWAFAQ, AND
MAJOR LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES

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Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: In a wide-ranging weekly security meeting on
January 17, Prime Minister Maliki told Ambassador Crocker and
General Petraeus that a Cabinet shake-up was very possible
within a few weeks which would likely result in a
technocratic government with fewer ministries. Maliki
expressed hope that the Tawafaq party could be induced to
return to the government at the same time. Maliki expressed
optimism about passage of some form of a Provincial Powers
Law, agreed to push the Accountability and Justice Law
through the Executive Council, and remained doubtful about
the moribund Hydrocarbon Law unless President Talibani
pressed his Kurdish political allies. Concerning employment
of Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs),the Ambassador stressed
the need for the GOI to develop a comprehensive employment
program. Maliki agreed and proposed using a joint USG-GOI
$300 million fund to seed the program. General Petraeus
briefed progress in Baghdad security but noted that Jaysh
al-Mahdi Special Group (JAM-SG) leaders were re-infiltrating
Sadr City. Prime Minister Maliki proposed using Iraqi forces
armed with USG and GOI intelligence to eliminate the problem.
The meeting concluded with a short discussion about the
Makmour Refugee Camp, where Maliki expressed frustration in
diplomatic progress on the issue with Turkey. END SUMMARY.


Cabinet Shake-up and Reduction
--------------


2. (S) In his weekly security meeting with the Ambassador and
General Petraeus, Prime Minister Maliki disclosed that a
possible cabinet shake-up could occur soon, possibly within
the next two weeks. He said he has already taken his proposal
for a technocratic government--without any political party
quotas--to the Executive Council. Maliki said he envisions a
smaller cabinet whose members speak with one voice, remain
partners in the political process, and work towards
reconciliation. He noted, however, that the smaller political
parties may lose currently held ministries in the downsizing.

Tawafaq Return
--------------

3. (S) Maliki expressed hope that this reshuffling would
provide an opportunity for the Tawafaq party to return to the
government. He described the ongoing negotiations noting he
had already acted to extend government pensions to ministers
that Tawafaq would not reappoint. The Ambassador urged the PM
to meet Hashimi half way in his requests. Both sides would
need to compromise.


4. (S) Maliki noted that former PM Allawi's Iraqiyya party
also wanted to rejoin the government but was demanding that
he fire two ministers who had remained in the cabinet after
Allawi ordered their resignation. But even on this issue
Maliki left the door open, saying he did not consider the
loss of ministerial posts during a Cabinet reduction a
"dismissal".


5. (S) In response, the Ambassador urged Maliki to use
performance criteria as the primary basis for keeping current
ministers in a new cabinet. Maliki concurred, but added once
again that loyalty of the two Iraqiyya ministers to their
country--over partisan politics--would be considered an
extenuating circumstance. When the Ambassador asked if Maliki
and the Minister for Communications, Muhammad Allawi, had met
on this issue, the Prime Minister said yes and revealed his
belief that family pressures--not politics--were the primary
reason Allawi boycotted the government.

Pending Legislation
--------------


6. (S) Turning to the Provincial Powers Law currently under
consideration by the Council of Representatives (CoR),Maliki
said he believed one of the two competing bills would pass
and subsequently pave the way for new provincial elections.
He stated that the biggest obstacle to passage was
disagreement among the Shia parties, some of whom feared a
return of a strong central government like that of Saddam
Hussein, while others wanted more control over Provincial
Governors and their security forces.


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7. (S) Agreeing the law could soon generate new provincial
elections, General Petraeus urged Maliki to press the
parliament on the issue. He stressed that this law would give
hope to new political forces in the provinces which had
courageously faced down Al-Qaeda and other militia groups.
These people, he added, now wanted a voice in their own local
government. General Petraeus asked Maliki if he would
compromise on the ability of the PM to fire a governor if the
provinces compromised on their desire for the governor to be
able to control federal security forces in an emergency.
Maliki replied only that he did not want a return to a
Saddam-like central government.


8. (S) Regarding the Accountability and Justice
(de-Baathification) Law, the Ambassador recalled the strong
endorsement given it by Secretary Rice during her recent
visit. He emphasized the Secretary's desire that this
completed legislation move quickly through the Executive
Council into law. Maliki agreed and noted the next meeting
of the Council was Monday, January 21.


9. (S) The Ambassador also expressed his belief that the
pending Hydrocarbon Law would be the toughest legislative
issue of the three and would require high-level Iraqi
government attention to move it forward in the CoR. He noted
that Under Secretary Jeffrey had come to Iraq to encourage
progress and asked whether it was time for the Prime Minister
to make a strong public statement endorsing its provisions.


10. (S) Maliki agreed the hydrocarbon legislation was a
complicated issue, and he blamed the parliamentary delay on
the Kurdish parties. Rather than make a statement himself,
he proposed waiting for President Talibani who, as a Kurd,
would be in a better position to influence his political
allies. Maliki added that Talibani had assured him that the
KRG had agreed to freeze their demands for changes in the law
and stop signing new contracts.

Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs)
--------------


11. (S) Ambassador Crocker thanked the Prime Minister for his
assistance in the hiring of CLC members into Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) and other local security units. The Ambassador
also acknowledged these security forces could not absorb all
the CLC personnel. He urged Maliki to concentrate on creating
alternative jobs in the civilian sector. General Petraeus
added that the infusion of about a billion dollars into the
program now, coupled with a public announcement, would be a
very positive step until the jobs creation processes caught
up.


12. (S) Although Prime Minister Maliki expressed his strong
support for the program, he proposed starting with the $300
million USG-GOI matching funds which have been previously
identified. He remarked that his staff was already
considering options like job training centers, small business
loans, and civil service employment. He agreed to solicit
additional ideas from USG counterparts.

Baghdad Security
--------------


13. (S) General Petraeus gave the Prime Minister a brief
overview of Baghdad security issues, describing extensive
combat operations against Al-Qaida (AQI) in the South, noting
that no civilians had been seriously injured or killed.
Acknowledging media reports regarding the large number of
coalition aircraft bombing missions, General Petraeus said
they successfully targeted large numbers of hidden improvised
explosive devices (IEDs),which had produced some secondary
explosions. He reported that Coalition Forces (CF) had also
discovered, and were in the process of clearing, a large
number of AQI bunkers to the southwest of Samarra. Turning
to Sadr City, General Petraeus reported that Jaysh al-Mahdi
Special Group (JAM-SG) leaders were infiltrating back into
the densely populated Shia neighborhoods but that additional
Interior Ministry checkpoints around the area had reduced the
number of IED attacks there.


14. (S) Maliki thanked General Petraeus for the update and
expressed hope that newly trained Iraqi units--which Maliki
had personally observed--would be able to assume security

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duties in Sadr City. National Security Advisor Rubaie
wondered if the CF could share the intelligence data on the
JAM-SG leaders who had returned. Maliki added that many
Sadrists were now providing the ISF with additional
intelligence. Maliki said it was desirable for Iraqi
security forces to arrest these individuals with a minimum
disruption to the local community.


15. (S) General Petraeus reminded NSA Rubaie that he already
possessed most of the CF intelligence available on these
individuals but offered to provide an additional briefing
detailing their transit routes from the Iranian border to
Baghdad.

Makhmour Refugee Camp
--------------


16. (S) Rounding out the meeting, General Petraeus
highlighted the recent visit of Turkish Deputy Chief of Staff
General Saygun to MNF-I headquarters. General Petraeus said
he had urged the Turkish Deputy to carry back a message for
the GOT to pursue a diplomatic solution to the Makhmour
Refugee Camp, perhaps through the UNHCR. General Petraeus
said it would be useful if the Prime Minister could press
UNAMI to use whatever influence it had on UNHCR. Maliki
shrugged his shoulders and lamented that when the GOI last
broached the subject of negotiations with the GOT, the Turks
told him "it's our business but we'll think about your
offer."
CROCKER