APRIL 6 MCNS: BASRAH NEXT STEPS, SADR CITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001112

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018
TAGS: MOPS MARR PGOV PREL PTER SY IZ
SUBJECT: APRIL 6 MCNS: BASRAH NEXT STEPS, SADR CITY
SECURITY, ELECTION PLANNING

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (S REL AUS UK) SUMMARY: The April 6 session of the
Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS) featured
upbeat assessments of the result of the GoI security
operation in Basra, along with agreement on the need for job
creation, development, and humanitarian initiatives to
stabilize the city. Discussion on Baghdad security centered
on the challenge posed by Sadr's planned 9 April "million man
march" in Sadr City, with participants agreeing to seek to
contain rather than obstruct the march. The government and
its security forces would continue to press hard against
Iran-affiliated Special Groups while holding out an olive
branch to mainstream Sadrists who eschewed violence. The
military chief of staff said that a suspect taken in the
kidnap-murder of Iraq's archbishop was a Syrian intelligence
officer, which the Foreign Minister promised to raise with
Damascus. An off-topic discussion of the budgetary needs of
the Independent High Electoral Commission ended with a
promise from the Deputy Prime Minister to arrange funding.
END SUMMARY.


2. (S REL AUS UK) In PM Maliki's absence, Deputy PM Barham
Salih chaired the April 6 session of the Ministerial
Committee on National Security (MCNS),opening the meeting by
inviting Minister of State for National Security Shirwan
al-Waeli to offer an assessment of the status of Basrah in
the wake of Operation "Charge of the Knights."


3. (S REL AUS UK) QUIET IN BASRAH. Al-Waeli judged that
Basrah was largely under control, thanks in part to support
from tribal leaders who had supported the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) and were now helping to organize for the
peaceful development of the city. Al-Waeli said that
creation of quick impact civilian jobs -- e.g. street
cleaning, tree planting -- must be a priority to get some of
Basrah's 25,000 unemployed off the streets. Al-Waeli
cautioned against trying to bring the bulk of unemployed
young men into the ISF precipitously, saying candidates need
to be vetted. Meanwhile, some 6000 security volunteers (i.e.
"Sons of Iraq) are working with ISF in the Basra area,
including by working with MoD and MoI forces on assuring the
peaceful operation of port facilities.


4. (S REL AUS UK) The Ministry of Interior representative
echoed the general tone of satisfaction with the status of
Basra. All Police senior leaders in Basrah had been
reassigned, and the Major Crimes unit (which had drawn
criticism for corruption and sectarianism) finally disbanded.
The INIS reported that food, power, and medical services
were stable in Basrah and that the Basrah Operations Center
had effectively facilitated the movement of ambulances and
supplies.


5. (S REL AUS UK) National Security Advisor Mowaffak Rubaie
declared that Charge of the Knights had been both a military
and political victory. He seconded the call for a major
civilian employment program, saying the PM had called on his
government to spend $100 million on jobs, services and
humanitarian projects in Basra in a matter of weeks. Salih
said that Safa al Safi, the acting Minister of Justice, would
coordinate relief operations for Basrah. Finance Minister
Bayan Jabr requested orders from the Cabinet and clear
accounting of funds.


6. (S REL AUS UK) GEN Babakir Zebari, Chief of Staff of the
Iraqi Armed Forces, offered his perspective, first grumbling
that he had few sources of information in Basra since the
Basra Operations Center reported directly to the Prime
Minister and Minister of Defense rather than to him. He
offered a brief appreciation of the contribution of Coalition
Forces in support of the Basra operation (e.g. by helping
transport supplies and providing air support) and praised the
performance of some Iraqi units -- notably the 8th and 10th
Iraqi Army Divisions for effectively clearing the lines of
communication between Basra and Baghdad. He completed his
brief with a province-by-province recitation of ISF
casualties and enemy attacks the past two weeks, illustrating
his point that security was largely improved after the
flare-up surrounding the Basra operation.


7. (S REL AUS UK) STIRRINGS IN THE MIDDLE EUPHRATES. Along
the Iranian border and in the Shi'a south, two hundred
Iranian-backed JAM Special Groups (SG) continued to run
operations. Diyala, Karbala, and Muthanna were relatively
stable although some criminal elements were active. Al-Waeli
closed by cautioning that heavy-handed ISF action during
searches and raids were alienating citizens and driving some
toward radicalism. The ISF should follow the Rules of

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Engagement that had been laid down in accordance with the
rule of law.


8. (S REL AUS UK) TENSION IN BAGHDAD. Turning to Baghdad,
al-Waeli said that security operations continue in Sadr City
and other troubled neighborhoods, in which militia fighters
are planting IEDs and attacking security forces. Jaysh
al-Mahdi (JAM) supporters are intimidating Sadr City
residents with GOI jobs -- or simply business with government
institutions -- to prevent them from leaving the
JAM-dominated zone. Some had been kidnapped and three
citizens reportedly killed in this context. The next Sadr
City challenge would come on April 9, when Sadrists had
called for a "million man march" there, the Najaf local
government having vetoed the original plan to march in that
city.


9. (S REL AUS UK) Dr. Safa'a Rasul, Deputy National Security
Advisor, commented that it is hard to draw a sharp line
between mainstream JAM and SG members. Threats against GoI
staff, for example, could emanate from either SGs or JAM
members. Some of the latter were interested in peaceful
resolution of their problems with the GoI; others were
looking for confrontation.


10. (S REL AUS UK) Salih noted the consensus that Basrah was
quiet -- although it could be the proverbial calm before the
storm. Baghdad, however, remained dangerous. He offered
condolences to MNSTC-I Commander LTG Dubik for MNSTC-I
casualties in a rocket attack earlier in the day. The Deputy
PM declared that the GoI would not tolerate criminal behavior
from JAM-affiliated criminals, as the Political Committee on
National Security had said in the just-released 15-point
declaration (septel). The PM, Salih said, was committed to
seeing the ISF clear and disarm Sadr City. The MoI rep
commented that the PCNS declaration would likely result in an
escalation of tension between the Special Groups and ISF.
Minister al-Waeli said that Baghdadis and Basrawis wanted to
rid themselves of the SG, but these groups used bribes and
intimidation to radicalize mainstream JAM members and induce
them to fight against the GOI. Al-Waeli said it would be
desirable to see the militias disarm, but asked rhetorically
whether it was really possible for the GoI to clear and
disarm Sadr City. How long would such an operation take?


11. (S REL AUS UK) IRAN IN THE SHADOWS. Foreign Minister
Zebari noted that at the previous day's Presidential Council
on National Security, all representatives present save the
Sadrists had supported the PM's stance on the militias as
encapsulated in the 15-point declaration. This was not a
purely domestic matter and the Special Groups were not just
disjointed gangs: they had an "international" (i.e., Iranian)
dimension. Rubaie said that even the mainstream Sadrists had
supported action against the Special Groups, and said the PM
had declared that no parties would be permitted to
participate in elections unless they divested themselves of
their militia arms.


12. (S REL AUS UK) MNF-I Deputy Commanding General Lt.Gen.
John Cooper said he agreed that Basrah was stable and shared
concern over the planned 9 April Sadr City march. He
requested the GoI to share its security plan for the march
with MNF-I soon so that MNF-I could be prepared to assist.
Salih concurred and noted that numerous ministries would be
involved and must have a clear concept of their roles.
Lt.Gen Cooper and Rubaie agreed that both the National
Operations Center and Baghdad Operations Center would have
roles to play. GEN Babakir added that even if the marchers
predominantly intended no violence, a violent minority could
be expected to try to hijack the event. He requested clear
orders as to how the ISF should deploy on the route of march.


13. (S REL AUS UK) PROGRESS IN THE NORTH. GEN Babakir
reported that, despite the distraction caused by the Basrah
operation, progress continued in Ninevah and Diyala. ISF had
found numerous major caches in Ninevah and, due to Coalition
intelligence support, had freed 42 kidnapped students. In
Diyala the ISF, Coalition Forces, and local government and
tribal leaders were cooperating to bring peace to the
province. Lt.Gen Cooper noted the importance of maintaining
momentum on the fight in the north.


14. (S REL AUS UK) A SYRIAN SUSPECT. Babakir was pleased to
announce that a suspect in the recent murder of Iraq's
Archbishop had been detained. Babakir asserted that the
suspect was a Syrian intelligence lieutenant colonel. Salih
said the GoI would be sure to raise this with their "Syrian
brothers."


15. (S REL AUS UK) OTHER BUSINESS: CASH TRANSPORT. Babakir

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said that nobody from the Central Bank of Iraq had shown up
for scheduled MNF-I training related to the planned transfer
of authority to the Bank of the responsibility for
transporting cash shipments. Lt. Gen Cooper requested action
to ensure the GOI and ISF were prepared to accept this
authority on April 8 as planned.


16. (S REL AUS UK) OTHER BUSINESS: FUNDING ELECTIONS. The
meeting concluded with a discussion of the budgetary needs of
the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). The IHEC
rep, Kerim al-Timimiy, appealed for funding, saying the
agency had not received the estimated $25 million it needed
now to prepare for parliamentary elections. The Finance
Minister explained that it was not possible to fund the
program until legislation had been passed authorizing said
elections, but he would see what he could do when programming
the upcoming supplemental budget. Al-Timimiy requested an
urgent loan instead; Salih said he would see to this in light
of the importance of IHEC's work, and added that the GOI
would work with the CoR, the UN, and other stakeholders to
accelerate passage of elections legislation. Salih closed
the meeting by saying the MCNS was the wrong venue for
discussion of the IHEC budget and arranging for an
appropriate follow-on meeting.
BUTENIS