MALIKI SCORES BIG AT APRIL 5 PCNS MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001065

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: MALIKI SCORES BIG AT APRIL 5 PCNS MEETING

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d).



1. (C) According to an ISCI representative, the April 5
meeting of the Political Committee for National Security
(PCNS),a body comprised of representatives of all political
blocs, was attended by President Talabani; Prime Minister
Maliki; Deputy PM Barham Saleh; Vice Presidents Adel Abdel
Mehdi and Tareq al-Hashemi; Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari;
CoR Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani and his deputies Khalid Attiyah
and Arif Tayfour; and representatives of all main CoR blocs.
Of particular significance, the Sadrist Trend ended its
boycott of recent PCNS meetings by sending Trend CoR bloc
leader Nisar al-Rubaie and another official. The meeting
produced a 15-point statement (text reported septel) that
gave a big boost to Maliki's recent get-tough posture on
armed groups with a public affirmation that the PCNS "stands
firmly with the government and its various security agencies
in confronting and deterring the militias and outlaws,
regardless of their affiliation, and respects the role that
was played by the armed forces to impose security and order
in Basrah and other governorates."


2. (C) In April 6 read-out conversations with USG officials,
DPM Barham was effusive in his praise of Maliki's performance
at the meeting and FM Zebari gushed that he had never seen
the political blocs so united. In April 6 read-out
conversations with USG officials, DPM Barham was effusive in
his praise of Maliki's performance at the meeting (calling it
"brilliant") and FM Zebari gushed that he had never seen the
political blocs so united. Vice President Hashemi said the
session was "historic" and noted that for the first time the
entire government was united on critical issues; the only
division was within the UIA, and the Sadrists were isolated
(adding that he offered after the session to mediate between
Muqtada Sadr and other leaders within the UIA). Speaker
Mashadani proclaimed: "This was the most successful PCNS
meeting I ever attended," then clarified -- "it was the only
successful PCNS meeting I ever attended."

ISCI Notes Reveal Anti-Sadrist Atmosphere
--------------


3. (C) According to internal ISCI notes of the meeting given
to us by an ISCI representative, meeting attendees were
broadly united against the Sadrists. The ISCI document
provides a flavor of the anti-Sadrist tone of the meeting.
For example, Kurdish representative Fuad Masoum asked that,
if Muqtada al-Sadr is the leader of a political trend, "why
does he not want to come and sit and join us?" Estranged
Dawa Party CoR member Falih al-Fayadh tried briefly to
challenge the consensus opinion against the Sadrists but was
quickly overruled. The Sadrists offered several "excuses"
for their conduct, including a fear of GOI retaliation and
their right to act in self-defense, and then asked why only
the Sadr Trend was being asked to solve the problem of
militias. Maliki,s "well-prepared and organized" response
allegedly "silenced" the Sadrists. ISCI representative
Sheikh Jalal al-Din al-Saghir responded calmly to a charge
from Fadhila's Basim Sharif that he was "inflaming" the
situation, but then harshly criticized the Sadrists and said
that, according to his information, the Sadrists were
cooperating with the forces "they call an occupation." "If
it is true, then release it," Sadrist Trend CoR bloc leader
Nisar al-Rubaie retorted. Near the end of the meeting, Vice
President Tareq al-Hashemi asked the Sadrists if, given the
unified position against them, they were willing to change
their stance: after they answered in the negative, Maliki
noted wryly, "it,s not in their hands, naturally."

Observations of an Accused Mischief-Maker
--------------


4. (C) An ISCI source confided to us that Falih al-Fayadh
played the role of troublemaker who carried water for the
Sadrist Trend at the meeting. For his part, Falih told us
April 6 that he attended the meeting not as a Dawa Party
member but as the personal representative of his mentor,
former PM Ibrahim al-Jaffri, who is currently in Tehran
(Falih, who said he will travel to Iran tomorrow to join his
mentor Jaffri, claimed the purpose of the trip is to express
concern to Iranian government officials about Iranian
interference in Iraq). Falih asserted that he and Sadrist
Trend CoR bloc leader Nisar al-Rubaie sought to have a "real
discussion about the facts" regarding the GOI "Operation
Charge of the Horsemen" in Basrah but were shouted down by
the rest of the group. He recounted particularly sharp and
heated exchanges with Badr strongman Hadi al-Amri,
particularly when he and Nisar demanded that focus on armed
groups include all such groups (read Badr) and not just the
Jaysh al-Mahdi. In the end, he said he expressed strong
reservations about the text of the PCNS statement but was
unable to block it. He characterized the Basrah operation as

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an utter failure that weakened Maliki and the GOI security
forces. While political bloc leaders are putting on a public
face of support for Maliki, he blurted, behind his back they
are highly critical. Although he is as critical as any,
Falih (who is rumored to be a viable candidate to replace
Maliki) said he would not now back a no-confidence move
against the PM because Iraq has been badly shaken in recent
days and simply cannot withstand any additional turbulence at
this time.


5. (C) While Maliki is weaker after the Basrah offensive,
Falih asserted, Muqtada al-Sadr emerged stronger - and with
his movement more united - than prior to the operation. He
said events in Basrah proved the Sadrist Trend "still has
teeth" and is a cohesive movement. He said the Trend is
feeling its strength and will seek to press the advantage
with a large "anti-occupation" demonstration on Wednesday
April 9, which he predicted would draw a huge crowd. He
replied to our question about Iran's role in the matter by
muttering that it was a sad day for Iraq when negotiations to
end fighting in Basrah were held in Tehran and not Najaf.
Falih said the issue of a long-term USG-GOI strategic
relationship was on the PCNS agenda but was not discussed
since the topic of Basrah took up nearly the entire meeting.

Sadrist Retort
--------------


6. (U) In an April 6 media statement, Sadrist Trend CoR bloc
leader Rubaie criticized the PCNS statement and said the Sadr
trend "strongly rejects" the statement's point regarding
support for the GOI stance against militias, and the
statement's call for "all parties and political entities to
disband its militias." He criticized the use of the word
"militia" as "vague," adding that "it will be interpreted
according to the interests of the political parties." In a
press conference following release of the statement, Talabani
admitted that the Sadrists expressed reservations on the
points but said they "agreed on the general framework and to
control security and impose law and order in the country."

Fadhila Party Readout
--------------


7. (C) Dr. Basim Sharif told us he had represented the
Fadhila bloc at the PCNS meeting. Recounting the meeting,
Dr. Basim said that the PM spent nearly three hours on the
issue of Jaysh al-Mahdi and how the GOI should confront them.
He also believes that the PM remains resolute in his desire
to go after JAM, and that renewed conflict between the GOI
and JAM appeared extremely likely. Discussing Fadhila,s
participation in the meeting, he stated he had emphasized the
need for political reform, as well as the need to reform the
ISF and IP into more professional forces to ensure that their
members, loyalties were with the state and not individual
sects, militias, and political organizations. He seemed
extremely pleased that the first point of the statement
issued by the PCNS came from Fadhila. In a shift from
Fadhila,s recent anti-Maliki rhetoric, Dr. Basim indicated
that though Fadhila would like to see a political solution,
they supported the GOI and understood the threat that
militias posed to the primacy of the central government. He
added that Fadhila,s main concern about any future
operations is mostly humanitarian, expressing his fear that
any future incursions into Sadr City or Basrah could result
in a large number of civilian casualties and lead to a
humanitarian crisis.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Maliki could hardly have asked for a more positive and
public affirmation of political unity and support for his
security crackdown than the April 5 PCNS statement. The best
evidence of his current strength can be found in the stance
of his many political nemeses: VP Tareq al-Hashemi has made
all the right noises about support for the PM; estranged
elements from Maliki's Dawa Party like Jaffri and Falih have
no appetite to take him on under current circumstances; over
the last two weeks, Fadhila has completely reversed course,
moving from unbridled criticism and nearly joining the
Sadrists in a no-confidence vote against the PM to professed
agreement with Maliki's crackdown on the Sadrists; and even
UIA dissident Qassim Daoud is loathe to jump on a
no-confidence motion. That leaves the Sadrist Trend alone in
the Iraqi political wilderness, a familiar haunt for them and
one in which they appear comfortable, and the place where
many observers say the Sadrists are most dangerous and
unpredictable. Their next big opportunity to express their
feelings about Maliki (and the U.S.) will come on Wednesday
April 9, the day of their planned "million man march" through
the streets of Baghdad.
BUTENIS