APRIL 2 MEETING BETWEEN THE AMBASSADOR, GENERAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001052

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: APRIL 2 MEETING BETWEEN THE AMBASSADOR, GENERAL
PETRAEUS AND PM MALIKI

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Prime Minister Maliki, flushed with the
success of recent ISF operations in Basrah, reviewed next
steps with the Ambassador and General Petraeus on April 5.
Maliki noted that he was dedicating $100 million dollars
towards Basrah's reconstruction, and is using Tribal Support
Councils to put thousands of southern tribesmen on
three-month contracts before ultimately incorporating them
into the security services. Maliki expressed interest in
procuring armed helicopters to support Iraqi Special
Operations Forces. He balked at attending the upcoming
Neighbors' Conference in Kuwait (although he did not
categorically refuse to go) and acknowledged that Iranian
support for JAM Special Groups remains a continuing challenge
that must be addressed jointly by Iraq's various political
movements. End summary.

Participants
--------------


2. (S) The Ambassador and General Petraeus, accompanied by
Pol-Mil Counselor Marcie Ries and NSC Senior Director Brett
McGurk, met April 2 with Prime Minister Maliki at his
residence. Maliki was joined by NSA Mowaffaq Rubaie, Chief
of Staff Tariq Abdallah, Media Advisor Yassin Majid, and
Political Advisor Sadiq Rikabi.

The Battle for Basrah
--------------


3. (S) The Ambassador began by congratulating Maliki on what
appeared to be successful security operations in Basrah, Um
Qasr, Zubeir and Abu Floos. A triumphant Maliki declared
that, notwithstanding what al-Arabiyya TV and other media
sources claimed, Muqtada al-Sadr's ceasefire statement had
little impact on the outcome. To the contrary, said Maliki,
Sadr's statement betrayed his weakness and was issued just a
few hours after Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),backed by tribal
volunteers, had taken to Basrah's streets. Moreover, Maliki
implied that he had humiliated Sadr by refusing to speak with
him or to negotiate any agreement with him. In addition,
Maliki credited a change in plan with shifting the focus of
the ISF from trying to clear neighborhoods ("that would have
been bad") to instead focusing their efforts on conducting
raids against criminals. "Despite the difficulties, I wasn't
pessimistic. I was optimistic, even though when things were
bad I thought I was going to have to remain there personally
for two months to get things under control," said the PM.


4. (S) "Frankly, it was the Special Forces and the close air
support that saved the day," Maliki continued. He expressed
some disappointment that air support was not available
earlier (a result of the GOI's failure to fully involve the
Coalition in the operation's planning, as General Petraeus
pointed out). Maliki noted that Iraqi air force planes were
not yet capable of providing close air support, and asked
whether the U.S. could sell combat helicopters to Iraq
quickly. Maliki said he particularly needed helicopters to
provide support to the Iraqi Special Operations Forces
(ISOF),as well as to assist in patrolling the Iraqi-Iranian
border. General Petraeus cautioned that helicopters were not
a quick fix to the ISF's needs because of the long lead time
required in terms of training pilots and maintenance crews.
Maliki, undaunted, said he wanted to get the ball rolling.
General Petraeus pledged to work it.

Next Steps
--------------


5. (S) "What happened in Basrah was good . . . it gave the
people and the tribes more courage to stand up against the
militias. We need to build on that politically . . . They
(JAM) were dealt a blow militarily, and they lost popular
support," the PM summarized. Security operations in Basrah
would continue, as ISF took control of major intersections
and strategic buildings in order to make it more difficult
for JAM to retake the streets should fighting resume. He
then outlined next steps: 1) Maliki has dedicated $100
million dollars to reconstruction/services in Basrah; 2) he
will dispatch a Reconstruction Committee to Basrah; 3) using
the GOI's Tribal Support Councils, he has hired thousands of
southern tribesmen on three month contracts, who will undergo
further screening by a new intelligence committee and then be
inducted into the ISF at the end of the three months. In
addition, Maliki said he wanted to further develop the ISOF
and to stand up a Quick Reaction Force to go after
gangs/militias. He indicated that Thar Allah was his next
target. With some prompting from the Ambassador, Maliki said
he would meet with President Talabani on Saturday, April 5,
after which he would attend a meeting of the Political

BAGHDAD 00001052 002 OF 002


Council for National Security. The Executive Council would
meet the following day.


6. (S) Maliki conceded that he had learned some lessons in
Basrah. He noted that while some Iraqi Police (IP) units
stood and fought, and some policemen gave their lives, many
fled because they were either intimidated or loyal to the
militias. He acknowledged the need for house cleaning,
particularly amongst border police units on the Iraqi-Iranian
frontier. As for the ports, they were once again operational
after the civilian work force had returned to the job (Maliki
said work had stopped for two hours because the Iraqi Army
had been "tough" in disarming the Facilities Protection
Service guards at the port). The next step, he added, was to
weed out the JAM and Fadhilah militia members who had
infiltrated the workforce. The Ambassador promised to send
Maliki some ideas about how to develop the Um Qasr port, and
Maliki suggested expanding the new security contract for BIAP
to encompass the port as well. (NB - This prompted Maliki to
digress on the subject of airport security badges, which he
said would all soon be replaced; General Petraeus offered to
arrange a briefing for the PM on what steps have already been
taken over the past 4-6 months to tighten up security at the
airport and clean out the militia influence.)

Iran
--------------


7. (S) General Petraeus noted that the past week's fighting
had revealed Iran's hand in Iraq, and the Ambassador stressed
the need to send a strong message to Iran that its
interference was unacceptable. "By God, we were very clear
with them," said Maliki, who added the Iranians were
initially unhelpful but ultimately became more supportive in
dealing with Muqtada al-Sadr. Maliki acknowledged the need
for Iraq's disparate political parties to speak with one
voice to the Iranians. He then turned the conversation to
the Arab neighbors, complaining of Kuwaiti ("when I say
Kuwait, I actually mean a member of the Kuwaiti royal
family"),Emirati, and Saudi support for militia fighters in
the south, while the Syrians were training militants from
Najaf. When the Ambassador pointed out that Maliki would
have an excellent opportunity to deliver his message at the
upcoming Neighbors' Conference in Kuwait, Maliki quipped that
Neighbors' Conferences "were becoming as useless as Arab
League summits" and said he could send a better message
through a televised broadcast than by attending the
Neighbors' Conference. Steering the conversation back to
Iran, the Ambassador suggested that Maliki consider closing
the Iranian Consulate in Basrah. Maliki agreed the Consulate
was a problem (adding that he had to restrain his generals in
the Basrah Operations Center from launching an attack on the
Consulate since it was a diplomatic facility, even though it
was serving as a weapons distribution center) and said that
the Consulate was temporarily closed because its Iranian
staff had fled to Iran with their families.

Sadr City
--------------


8. (S) General Petraeus informed the PM that Coalition Forces
would continue to control parts of Sadr City in order to
prevent rocket and mortar teams from launching attacks from
those areas. Maliki approved, adding that residents of Sadr
City needed to learn that if they allowed militants to launch
rockets from their neighborhoods, that they would pay a price
-- even if it meant incurring civilian casualties. General
Petraeus responded that MND-B had been launching precision
strikes against rocket and mortar teams, either with guided
missiles or direct fire.
BUTENIS