Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD105
2008-01-14 16:44:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

REACTION TO THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE LAW AND

Tags:  PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1627
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0105/01 0141644
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141644Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5218
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000105 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: REACTION TO THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE LAW AND
ASSESSING THE IMPACT

REF: BAGHDAD 85

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000105

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: REACTION TO THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE LAW AND
ASSESSING THE IMPACT

REF: BAGHDAD 85

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Sunni reaction to the January 12 passage of
the Accountability and Justice Law, an early indicator of the
ultimate political impact, has been somewhat tepid. The
Sunni Tawafuq Front issued a statement January 13 calling the
law "mediocre" but acknowledging it contains some positive
elements. This lukewarm reception stems in part from Vice
President Hashimi's belief that CoR Speaker Mashadani
violated a promise not to bring the law to a vote until
Monday, January 14. As a result, Sunni leaders feel they
were deprived of an opportunity to push back against several
amendments that they found problematic, but which were
endorsed in the January 12 voting. In a January 13 meeting
with Hashimi, S/I Satterfield addressed Hashimi's concerns
and strongly urged him not to veto the law. IIP bloc leader
Dr. Ayyad al-Sammaraie told us on January 14 day that he
would advise Hashimi not to veto the law unless he could
convince President Talabani and Vice President Abdel Mehdi to
join him in doing so; Dr. Ayyad suggested that Mashadani
might be able to effect one improvement to the text by
deleting a reference to the Iraqi intelligence service before
transmitting the law to the Presidency Council. Our
assessment of the law's impact on reconciliation is that if
implemented in a non-sectarian, non-partisan spirit, Sunni
distrust of the Maliki government will be eased and the Iraqi
people and neighbors will come to see this as a significant
step along the path to national reconciliation. End summary.

Tawafuq: Law is "Mediocre"
--------------


2. (C) Sunni reaction to the January 12 passage of the
Accountability and Justice Law (i.e., the "de-Ba'ath Law")
has been somewhat tepid. On January 13, the Tawafuq Front
issued a statement calling the bill a "mediocre" law that
contains "lots of holes." Nonetheless, Tawafuq acknowledged
that the law contained positive elements and would "alleviate
the injustice and inequality of a large segment of Iraqi
citizens who were discriminated against without any
justification." In conclusion, Tawafuq vowed to try to
revisit and remedy the law in order to make it consistent

with its original purpose. From the statement, it is not
clear whether Sunni efforts to address perceived flaws would
include a veto by Vice President Hashimi.

Hashimi Undecided
--------------


3. (S) As reported septel, Vice President (and leader of the
Iraqi Islamic Party) Tariq al-Hashimi told S/I Satterfield on
January 13 that IIP had been caught off guard by the previous
day's vote, because CoR Speaker Mashadani had pledged not to
bring the law to a vote until Monday, January 14. (Asked why
Mashadani held the vote earlier than expected, one IIP leader
assessed that Mashadani probably acted without thinking).
Consequently, IIP found itself unexpectedly deprived of the
opportunity to push back against several of the amendments
introduced by the CoR's Sadrist-led de-Ba'athification
Committee. (In point of fact, IIP delivered a non-paper in
Arabic to the Embassy outlining its specific concerns about
the amendments only an hour before the voting got underway in
the CoR.) Hashimi said he was particularly concerned by an
amendment to Section 4, Article 12 of the law that deprives
the Presidency Council of the right to approve exemptions to
the de-Ba'athification law, and instead requires that any
exemptions be approved by the CoR, inevitably raising the
barrier to waivers. In addition, Hashimi worried that some
Sunnis formerly granted exemptions and now serving in Iraq's
security and intelligence services would be removed from
their posts. S/I Satterfield assured Hashimi that the USG
would use all of its influence to prevent sectarian abuse
during the law's implementation and to ensure protection of
shared interests in safeguarding a continued role for loyal
Iraqis in the security and intelligence services. He
stressed, however, that the Sunnis had won significant
concessions and that while the law might not be perfect from
a Sunni perspective, vetoing the finished legislation would
be a grave strategic error. Hashimi, however, remained
non-committal as to whether he would sign the bill into law
once it reaches the Presidency Council.

Sammaraie: No Individual Veto
--------------


4. (S) In a meeting the next morning (January 14) with IIP
party bloc leader Dr. Ayyad al-Sammaraie, Dr. Ayyad said that
IIP had still not reached a decision on whether to call for a
Presidency Council veto of the law. However, he emphasized
that his personal recommendation to Hashimi would be that he

BAGHDAD 00000105 002 OF 003


must not veto the bill alone (and thus bear the blame alone);
he should only veto if he gets the concurrence of President
Talabani and Vice President Adil Abdel Mehdi, in which case
the Presidency Council could jointly reject the amended law
on the grounds that it violates the spirit of the August 26th
leaders' agreement. Poloffs pushed back, stressing the need
to avoid a veto and pointing out that there was no guarantee
that the Shi'a and Kurdish blocs would agree to "fix" the law
in the event of a veto.


5. (S) Sammaraie, who was joined by Rashid al-Azzawi (a Sunni
CoR member who sits on the De-Ba'athification Committee)
expressed concern that unless revised, the law would lead to
the collapse of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service
(INIS). According to Sammaraie, most Sunnis employed by INIS
were never granted formal exemptions to de-Ba'athification
policy, and so would still be vulnerable even if the GOI
interpreted the new law as not revoking any formal exemptions
previously granted. These employees have been panicking over
the past 48 hours, convinced that this is a deliberate Shi'a
effort to purge the INIS of Sunnis. Sammaraie emphasized
that pursuing formal exemptions for these employees was
problematic, since such exemptions would have to be approved
by the CoR and the names of those involved would inevitably
leak to the public -- thereby putting the Sunni employees and
their families at risk.

Clever Solution?
--------------


6. (S) Sammaraie and al-Azzawi proposed a potentially clever
fix: they suggested that Speaker Mashadani exercise his right
(under the CoR's bylaws) to make minor tweaks to laws and
delete the words "Intelligence Agency" from the definition of
security agencies found in Section 1, Article 1, point ten of
the law. Mashadani could then transmit the law to the
Presidency Council for signature, thereby avoiding the need
to re-open the law on the floor of the CoR. Ayyad did not
specifically promise that Hashimi would sign the law into
effect if this change were made, but seemed confident that
this would suffice to address Hashimi's concerns (and the
concerns of the Sunni employees at the INIS).

Additional Sunni Reaction
--------------


7. (C) Sammaraie then summed up his opinion of the law,
saying: "It represents a midpoint between those who are still
seeking revenge against the former regime, and those who are
seeking amnesty." That balanced assessment tracks with the
Tawafuq statement noted above, and with most other statements
by Sunni leaders. In Salah al-Din, for example, Governor
Hamood Shekti told the PRT that dissent to the law would
eventually subside and, overall, the law would make his job
easier. Even firebrand CoR Member Adnan Dulaymi conceded
that the legislation included points (such as allowing former
Ba'athists to collect pensions) that were "good and
acceptable" and represented an improvement over the current
system. On the other hand, Salih Mutlaq, who led a walkout
during the January 12 voting to hold a press conference
absolving himself of any responsibility for the law's
passage, blasted the bill as a "law of accountability without
justice."

Assessing the Impact
--------------


8. (C) On the surface, the reform law will extend eligibility
for most government positions for up to 36,000 former Ba'ath
party members at the "firqa" level. Essentially, only those
at the top three ranks of the former Ba'ath heirarchy will be
subject to the fullest restrictions of the law. Those at the
four lower ranks, with some exceptions, are not subject to
de-Ba'athification. The law affirms the legislators'
specific intent, already expressed in the recent pension law,
to restore pension rights to former civil servants without
regard to party affiliation. There are areas of legal
ambiguity, for example with respect to continuity of
previously granted exemptions, but on the plus side the
reform law provides for a process of legal appeal denied to
those subjected to de-Ba'athification in the past.


9. (C) In terms of the core USG objective of using this
legislative step to foster conditions for broad political
reconciliation, the spirit whereby the law is implemented
will have a greater impact than the form and letter of the
law. We must continue to press the Maliki government to
change the manner in which it has chosen to govern. Sunnis
fear that even with achievement of this benchmark on the path
to reconciliation, a sectarian government can and will still
use de-Ba'athification as a devastating partisan tool.
Distrust of the Maliki government will not diminish as a

BAGHDAD 00000105 003 OF 003


result of passage of the de-Ba'ath reform law unless
implementation is seen as taking place in accordance with the
spirit of the law.
CROCKER