PRT MUTHANNA: POST-BASRAH ATMOSPHERICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001048

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018
TAGS: PINS PGOV IR
SUBJECT: PRT MUTHANNA: POST-BASRAH ATMOSPHERICS

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Greg D'Elia for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Muthanna reporting cable.


2. (C) The new OMS leader in Muthanna is known as Muhannad
Abdulhussein al-Karbala'i (although there is suspicion that
this is a pseudonym). He cooperated closely with Gov.
Marzook during the outbreak of violence in late March,
including reaching an agreement that, in exchange for
preventing JAM violence, entailed the provincial government
1) allowing the Sadrists to re-open two closed OMS offices in
Rumaytha; 2) promising to release the 50 detainees arrested
by the Criminal Investigations Unit (CIU) on 23 and 24 March,
as well as JAM members held by the CIU without sufficient
evidence to bring to trial. Sadrists in Muthanna had sought
government agreement to these terms for over a year.


3. (C) The curfews imposed by security services across the
south during the recent fighting generated local anger
against provincial governments. Rather than blaming the
militias, citizens are criticizing the government for curfews
that brought no increase in security and aggravated daily
life by restricting movement and leading to fuel shortages
and inflated prices of goods. In Muthanna, residents ask why
they endured these hardships even though the province
remained peaceful and view the restrictions as further
evidence of the GOI's incompetence.


4. (C) Current public perception of the Sadrist movement in
Muthanna is that it is a violent organization without a
competent and credible political dimension. The Sadrists
face the challenge of proving their political abilities and
fielding a convincing slate of candidates when provincial
elections take place. They are likely to reach out to
respected, educated individuals who can put a respectable
face on the relatively uneducated and unrefined masses
associated with the Sadrist movement. Provincial elections
will also put pressure on the Sadrists to reach out to tribes
for support and talk to "foreigners." This last should help
us in our PRT engagement efforts.


5. (C) Maliki,s ad hoc "Sahwa" start-up in Basra has
attracted 800 tribesmen from Muthanna to sign up for the
Iraqi Army. The tribesmen had to be "cleared" through the
local Da,wa Party office and then went through what was
jokingly called "the one hour IA training camp" before
shipping south. Our local contacts predict that tribal
demands for what are seen as "free jobs" in the IA will swell
in Muthanna and the other southern provinces, as Shia tribes
demand the same recognition and employment opportunities
given to their Sunni counterparts through the "Sahwa"
movement.
BUTENIS