Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD1045
2008-04-05 17:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

VP ADEL ON SECURITY CRACKDOWN, "CONFUSED"

Tags:  PGOV PREL IZ IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4329
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1045/01 0961747
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051747Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6659
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001045 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: VP ADEL ON SECURITY CRACKDOWN, "CONFUSED"
SADRISTS, AND SFA

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001045

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: VP ADEL ON SECURITY CRACKDOWN, "CONFUSED"
SADRISTS, AND SFA

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d).



1. (C) Summary: In an April 5 meeting, Vice President Adel
Abdel Mehdi told us that the time is ripe for harsh and
decisive GOI action against the "cancer" of armed outlaw
groups, a measure supported by the Iraqi political class and
public and even by Iranian General Qasim Sulaimani. He said
the overwhelming majority of Iraqis - even those who live in
Sadrist strongholds - have turned against Sadrist extortion,
shakedowns, and intimidation and are eager for the GOI to
impose order and stability. He portrayed the Sadrists as
confused and quickly losing influence on the Shia street.
End Summary.

Broad Support for GOI Removal of "Cancer" of Armed Outlaws
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Adel told NSC Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan
McGurk, Amb. Marcie Ries, and Polcouns that, in the aftermath
of the GOI crackdown in Basrah, there is broad political
momentum and public support for the elimination of armed
criminal groups in defense of the principle that only GOI
security personnel should have a right to bear weapons. He
praised the Basrah operation led by Prime Minister Maliki as
a "good direction" that proved that a Shia government can
deal harshly with Shia militias, but the GOI must follow-up
and "settle" once and for all the "cancer" of JAM and armed
criminal groups. He lauded GOI security force handling of
the Basrah operation (he cited a report that showed only 3
percent of forces had deserted or misbehaved during battle)
and for containing JAM violence in south-central Iraq, much
of which is under provincial government control. Adel
appeared genuinely unaware of Maliki's April 4 statement
temporarily halting raids and arrests of militia members.


3. (C) Adel predicted a crackdown on JAM will vastly improve
the security situation since JAM provides cover for the
criminal acts of many groups, just as the GOI crackdown on
AQI exposed and ended the criminality of other groups. Adel
claimed that Iranian Quds Force Gen. Qasim Sulaimani had
agreed with him (referencing a meeting between Adil,
Talabani, and Sulaimani) recently that JAM needed to be

dissolved, not just frozen. When asked how the GOI would
achieve this result, Adel stated that the GOI should hit hard
at key Sadrist strongholds like Sadr City on the theory that
"once you take the capital the rest falls quickly into
place." Warning that JAM would quickly adapt to "small GOI
measures" and claiming that "we know these people and we know
how to fight," Adel predicted that, as had happened with
Kurdish rebels in 1975, the military wing the Sadrist Trend
would give up the battle if the GOI struck hard and also
followed a political track.


4. (C) Adel said the Political Council for National Security
would likely devote much of its scheduled April 5 meeting to
discuss this issue, and that the Presidency Council would
convene prior to the meeting. McGurk urged the group to take
advantage of the political climate to issue a statement
affirming national unity based on the principles of the
August 2007 Leaders' Communique, and also to address the
issue of spending and investing the GOI's budget surplus.
Adel confided that Maliki agreed before leaving for Basrah to
hold an Executive Council meeting, but a meeting date had not
yet been scheduled.

Sadrists Confused, Popularity Dwindling
--------------


5. (C) When asked about the current direction and thinking of
Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sadrist Trend, Adel quipped that
reading Sadr's moves is like predicting the odd bounces of an
oblong American football rather than the predictable bounces
of a round soccer ball: "the Sadrists are confused and
Muqtada himself is confused." He said the Basrah operation
defused the Sadrist's favorite rallying line that their fight
is against ISCI/Badr since it is now a fight between a
popularly-supported GOI and armed outlaws who carry guns
against the government. Adel affirmed the right of the
Sadrist Trend to operate as a political or cultural
organization within the established political framework but
could not operate as a "para-military group or a state within
a state." He said the overwhelming majority of residents in
Sadr City are against Sadr and all Iraqis are tired of JAM
extortion, shakedowns, and intimidation. Regarding Sadr's
Shia street influence, Adel said "when Sadr said the Eid
should start on Thursday and Sistani said it should start on
Friday, people followed Sistani." Adel complained that
recent media coverage of the Basrah operation, particularly
by USG-funded "al-Hurra" was negative toward the GOI and
factually incorrect in many instances, possibly as the result
of Sadrist intimidation of journalists.

BAGHDAD 00001045 002 OF 002



Moving Ahead on the SFA
--------------


6. (C) NSC McGurk briefed on the results of the first round
of SOFA talks among technical experts, asking that Adel weigh
in with Maliki on the need for a parallel political-level
discussion of the broader strategic framework agreement that
sets forth our bilateral relationship in political, economic,
cultural and other areas. Adel assured us he would discuss
the matter with Maliki and National Security Advisor Rubaie,
opining that it would be "very difficult" to meet our joint
target of completing all related talks by the end of June -
so as to permit CoR approval before the end of its summer
session on July 31.
BUTENIS