IRAQI OFFICIALS ON MALIKI'S BASRAH CAMPAIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001044

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018
TAGS: EWWT MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI OFFICIALS ON MALIKI'S BASRAH CAMPAIGN

Classified By: POL-MIL MINISTER-COUNSELOR MARCIE B. RIES, REASONS 1.4(B
) AND (D)


1. (C) In a series of March 30 conversations with Iraqi
officials including Ali Merza, Director of the National
Security Advisor's Joint Planning Committee (JPC),Saiid
Jaber from the Crisis Action Cell (CAC) secretariat, and
A'amer Al- Musawi, chief of staff to the National Security
Advisor (protect all),each related to PolMilOff his
understanding of the genesis of Prime Minister Maliki's
aggressive military intervention in Basrah. Each of these
long-time embassy contacts is a technocrat responsible for
interagency operations and planning within the GOI.


2. (C) These officials, in separate conversations, explained
that the current large-scale operations in Basrah developed
out of long-term efforts to redevelop the port of Umm Qasr.
The Prime Minister was seeking to jump-start investment and
development in Basrah and the Iraqi economy as a whole by
focusing on the port, a key hub for trade and a source of
jobs. A GOI delegation led by DPM Barham Salih visited Umm
Qasr on February 26 to assess its potential and necessary
improvements. Some members of the delegation, including NSA
Rubaie, were unsettled by the extent of criminal militias
(under the Sadrist banner if not his influence) at Umm Qasr.


3. (C) This led to a plan for the PM to personally intervene
in Basrah in order to rid it of the corruption and end the
hold of criminal groups in control of Umm Qasr port. Once
Umm Qasr was stabilized, the Ministry of the Interior was to
take responsibility for the port,s security and the Ministry
of Transportation was to be in charge of the port's
operations.


4. (C) The second part of the plan was to exploit the media
in order to win support for the central government. Heavy
coverage of PM visits to the port, surrounding neighborhoods,
and residential areas would have shown the PM disbursing jobs
and economic development to the people as a gift from the
government.


5. (C) Based on advice from the Prime Minister,s advisors
(the officials mentioned Minister of State for National
Security Affairs Shirwan al-Waili and Yasin Majid, the PM's
Media Advisor),who provided him with a list of 500 targets
to purge the province of, the plan was altered from a limited
security operation focused on the port of Umm Qasr to a major
security operation throughout the city of Basrah. In the
opinion of the officials who spoke with us, this led to the
intensive military campaign.


6. (C) COMMENT: The significance of Maliki's campaign in
Basrah and the violence it ignited is still a matter of
debate throughout political circles in Baghdad. The dust has
not settled yet and it is quite possible that the views of
these and other officials regarding the wisdom of Maliki's
course of action may shift significantly in coming days,
weeks, and months.


7. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Plans for provincial elections by
October as well as the impending possibility that provinces
can apply for permission to become 'regions' beginning in
April may have been factors in the PM's decision to focus
attention on Basrah when he did. It is also possible that
security conditions had deteriorated in the months since
security control had been relinquished by Coalition Forces in
December 2007. In any case, Maliki's long-running feud with
Basrah Governor al-Waili (Fadhila) was a contributing factor
in how events played out, leading Maliki in the direction of
forceful action undertaken without provincial government
coordination, an action which in hindsight was foreshadowend
by the fact that security responsibility in Basrah was
transferred from the Coalition to the central, not
provincial, government. END COMMENT.
BUTENIS