Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD1042
2008-04-05 14:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

NSA RUBAIE ON PCNS, SOFA/SFA, BASRAH AFTERMATH

Tags:  PGOV IR IZ PINS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4306
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1042/01 0961435
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051435Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6654
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001042 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ PINS
SUBJECT: NSA RUBAIE ON PCNS, SOFA/SFA, BASRAH AFTERMATH

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001042

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ PINS
SUBJECT: NSA RUBAIE ON PCNS, SOFA/SFA, BASRAH AFTERMATH

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: In an April 4 meeting with Senior Director
for Iraq and Afghanistan Brett McGurk and Polmilcouns, Iraqi
National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubaie agreed on the
need to capitalize on the positive political atmosphere by
releasing a strong, unified statement during the April 5
PCNS. He was relatively optimistic about SOFA/SFA
negotiations and emphasized that JAM represented a criminal
problem and needed to be dealt with using law enforcement
measures. End summary.


2. (C) Rubaie said he expected two major issues to be
discussed during tomorrow's PCNS: 1) the situation
post-Basrah, or as he put, "after Muqtada's temper tantrum;"
2) SFA negotiations and the need to form an Iraqi negotiation
team. McGurk suggested that the PCNS issue a strong
statement, similar to the August 26 communiqu, that
emphasizes GOI unity against criminals, the need for economic
and political programs to follow military operations
(including immediate investment of Iraq's budget surplus),
and the importance of a long-term agreement with the U.S.
Rubaie agreed on the need for a statement. Rubaie said it
was "probable" that Tawafuq would rejoin the government,
albeit without the IIP. He predicted that members of Sahwa
would fill the IIP posts.


3. (C) On SOFA/SFA, Rubaie said the negotiations needed to
be "marketed in a proper way." He explained that they should
be linked to the formal end of the occupation and Chapter VII
authority. McGurk emphasized the importance of the July
deadline for the SFA. Rubaie said that, with the PM's
blessing, the SOFA negotiations should "not be difficult" and
predicted the Iraqis would want to discuss only "three to
four technical points." Rubaie was intrigued by the notion
that a SOFA provided the rules of the road for U.S. forces to
operate on foreign soil - and did not automatically lock-in a
permanent U.S. military presence. He asked for examples of
countries that have a SOFA with the U.S. but do not have a
permanent U.S. troop presence. McGurk asked about the likely
composition of the Iraqi negotiation team for the SFA,

suggesting that the 3 2 (Maliki, Talabani, Hashimi, Adil
Mahdi, and Barzani) deputies would be well-suited to the
task. Rubaie agreed, and noted again the importance of
briefing Muqtada al-Sadr regularly on what the SOFA is all
about - to correct misperceptions, even though Sadr will
likely remain opposed.


4. (C) Rubaie said Maliki's April 4 statement announcing an
end to raids against militants was delayed by one day to
avoid being seen as a capitulation to Sadr's escalating
threats. Rubaie stated that the U.S. needed to "radically"
revise its strategy against JAM and emphasized that JAM was a
criminal problem, not an insurgency, and needed to be dealt
with using law-enforcement rather than military means. He
explained that in the long-term the Sunni insurgency,
especially AQI, remained the real threat to the Iraqi
government. Rubaie divided the special groups into three
categories: 1) JAM members who are loyal to Sadr; 2) Groups
under the direct control of Iran; 3) Rogue groups operating
independently. He added that two competing special groups
had tried to trap him in Baghdad's Shula mosque and that one
group was hoping to take him hostage while the other was
trying to kill him. Rubaie recommended that the U.S. and GOI
take advantage of Sadr's denial that JAM possesses heavy
weapons to target individuals carrying such weapons, although
he admitted he did not know if the GOI and Sadr shared the
same definition of "heavy weapons." In response to McGurk's
comment that it's hard to conduct arrest operations when the
arresting party meets EFP ambushes and RPG barrages, Rubaie
clarified that any violent response to police operations
needed to be met with military force. He said the GOI should
publicize the names of the most-wanted JAM leaders, and
predicted that in response "nine out of ten" of the suspects
would immediately flee to Iran. Afterwards, he suggested,
the GOI could work with Sadrists, possibly through a
committee or liaison office, to prosecute remaining criminals
and "bring Sadr into our tent."


5. (C) Rubaie added that he was a writing a political and
military "lessons learned" from the Basrah experience. He
said it was clear that the ISF was incapable of operating
without coalition logistics support, and quoted a military
colleague who said that, without coalition support, the
"Iraqis would have been forced out of Basrah the same way
they were forced out of Kuwait."


6. (C) Rubaie agreed that the GOI should not "let Iran get
away" with its interference in Iraqi affairs and suggested
using the media to expose Iran's role in the recent violence.
He said that during the shelling ISCI leader Abdel Aziz
al-Hakim warned the Iranians that they were "playing with

BAGHDAD 00001042 002 OF 002


fire" by shelling the IZ and asked them to imagine the
consequences if the rockets killed any senior U.S.
leadership. McGurk agreed that escalation by Iran cannot go
unchallenged.
BUTENIS