FOREIGN MINISTER: IRAN WILL ESCALATE CONFRONTATION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001039

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018
TAGS: IR IZ PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER: IRAN WILL ESCALATE CONFRONTATION
WITH US IN IRAQ

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (S) SUMMARY. During a March 31 meeting, Iraqi Foreign
Minister Hoshyar Zebari - just off the plane from the Arab
League Summit in Damascus - told Ambassador Crocker, MNF-I CG
GEN David Petraeus, NSC Senior Director McGurk and PolMil
Minister Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries that Iran had
settled on a policy of increased confrontation with the
United States in Iraq. Zebari added that Iran was expanding
support for the Sadr trend because it was unhappy with ISCI's
acquiescence of the SFA/SOFA process. Zebari agreed that a
united GOI had to condemn Iranian involvement in the violence
that is currently engulfing the capital and southern parts of
Iraq, and promised to press senior leadership to sign a
statement to that effect. According to Zebari, the Damascus
Arab League Summit went reasonably well for the hosts, but,
in the absence of a Lebanese delegation, did not raise that
country's problems once. END SUMMARY.

IRAN LEADERSHIP DECIDES TO ESCALATE CONFRONTATION WITH U.S.
IN IRAQ


2. (S) Zebari reported that after his March 2-3 visit to
Iraq, Iranian President Ahmadinejad lobbied Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamani for complete control of the Iraq portfolio,
arguing that he had successfully guided Iran's nuclear
confrontation with the United States - crowned by the
December 2007 NIE - and that he could duplicate the feat in
Iraq. Zebari said Coalition kinetic activities were having a
substantial effect on Iranian activities but Iran remained
determined to increase its influence by getting IRGC-QF
members into Iraq, under diplomatic cover or by other means,
and by using militias to intensify proxy confrontations with
the United States. The trilateral round was, according to
Zebari, a tactical move to keep the United States off-balance.


3. (S) Zebari mentioned that because Iran is unhappy with
ISCI's acquiescence in the SFA/SOFA process, it was
increasing support to the Sadr trend and training 1500
mid-level Jaysh Al Madhi officers in Iran. Zebari said that
CoR Dawa Bloc leader Ali al Adib and CoR Defense Committee
Chairman and Badr strongman Hadi al Amri, both recently
returned from Qum, reported that Iran was involved in
brokering a 9-point deal with Moqtada al Sadr, but whether he
exercised effective control over the Sadr trend remained an
open question. The Awakening movements preoccupy Tehran,
which intended to quash them should they appear in the South,
attack those already established in Sunni areas of mid-Iraq,
and support those in the North to the extent they stoke
Sunni/Kurdish tensions and provide Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
additional recruiting grounds. GEN Petraeus seized on this
and warned Zebari that Kurdish encroachment, particularly in
areas west of Mosul that are non-contiguous to the KRG, was
forcing local Sunni populations into AQI's orbit and was one
of MNF-I's chief concerns in Ninevah province.


4. (S) Zebari assessed the GOI had begun Southern
operations without adequate intelligence and logistical
preparation and that the move had backfired across southern
Iraq. Iran would manipulate the crisis to "Lebanize"
southern Iraq. GEN Petraeus noted that Prime Minister Maliki
had a less then well-developed plan for his Basrah operation
and had not been well served by some of his advisors. Citing
Adib and Amri's trip to Qom, President Talabani's KRG
meetings with IRGC-QF Chief Suleimani, and Vice President
Abdel Mehdi's upcoming meetings in Iran, the CG said the USG
was puzzled by the range of GOI contacts with Tehran since
the beginning of Basrah hostilities. Too many high-level GOI
officials were speaking to Iran without having spoken to each
other. Ambassador Crocker noted that far from speaking with
one voice to Tehran, the GOI appeared unable even to agree on
a meeting place where senior GOI leadership could discuss the
current crisis. Zebari agreed to push senior GOI leadership
to produce a signed common statement condemning Iranian
interference in Iraq before April 8-9 Congressional testimony
to Congress.

DAMASCUS SUMMIT


5. (S) Zebari assessed the July 29-30 Arab League Summit
had been "successful" for Syria, with Lebanon the only absent
member and respectable (11 of 22) Head of State-level
turnout, particularly from North Africa. In Lebanon's
absence, the Summit had not raised the issue at all. There
had been some tense moments nonetheless. In the final
communique, the Syrians modified the Summit's supportive Iraq
resolution and would not amend it after the Iraqi delegation
complained. Libyan President Qadaffi's statements about
Saddam Hussein strained discussions between the two
delegations. The Syrians chided the Iraqis for not doing
more for refugees and in a closed session, Arab League

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president Amr Moussa predicted the United States would invade
Iran.
BUTENIS