JAM IN BAGHDAD -- HOW STRONG IS IT?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001036

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR IZ
SUBJECT: JAM IN BAGHDAD -- HOW STRONG IS IT?

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (U) This is a joint Embassy political-Baghdad PRT cable.


2. (S) SUMMARY: Jaysh Al-Mahdi's (JAM) show of force in
Baghdad since March 23 has demonstrated its potential to
bring Iraq's capital to a standstill for a limited period,
but not without alienating large segments of the local
population and losing many fighters. The JAM offensive left
many of Baghdad's residents angry and somewhat shaken, and
has also offered a rare glimpse of the extent and the
limitations of JAM's political and strategic power in
Baghdad. CF presence standing side by side with ISF
neutralized JAM's military action to a series of random
terror acts. Cautiously hoping that a tenuous ceasefire
would hold, Baghdad residents began on April 1 to settle back
into the lives they led before eight days of conflict locked
most of them in their homes. END SUMMARY.

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BAGHDAD BEGINS RETURNING TO "NORMAL"
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3. (C) AFter eight days JAM's influence subsided. Baghdad
residents began leaving their homes April 1 to travel to
markets, work, and school throughout most of the city, while
Sadr City and some neighboring areas began to also stabilize.
Locals reported that Iraqi Police (IP) and Iraqi Army (IA)
units were manning checkpoints. Markets and households began
to replenish food supplies, though food and fuel prices
generally remained significantly higher than they were before
March 23. Many Amanat workers returned to work and began to
deplete the massive piles of trash that had accumulated over
the previous eight days throughout Baghdad's nine central
districts. Access to regular hospital services remained
limited in areas such as Sadr City, but emergency cases
reportedly received treatment. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
and Coalition Forces only confronted JAM in a limited number
of Baghdad's neighborhoods, and much of the city's population
felt the deprivations of war after several days of conflict,
indicating that a pitched battle between Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) and JAM could precipitate a localized
humanitarian crisis in parts of Baghdad.

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JAM'S SUCCESSES: QUICK AND DIRTY -- AND RELIANT ON FORCE
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4. (C) The speed and the extent to which JAM members
prevented movement and spread fear through large swathes of
Baghdad was breathtaking. 48 hours after their first
protests and manifestations of "civil disobedience" on March
23, we saw the first spike in JAM initiated violence, causing
the IA to implement a vehicle ban which, along with
apprehensions of JAM mortar and rocket attacks, led to the
closure of streets, schools, businesses, and markets
throughout Baghdad's central districts. In the Shia-majority
areas that they controlled, they sent out snipers, implanted
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosively formed
penetrators (EFPs),and started launching mortars and rockets
at Coalition Forward Operating Bases, Joint Security
Stations, and the International Zone. They limited movement
through Sadr City and parts of several surrounding districts,
to include Kadhamiya, 9 Nissan, northern Adhamiya, and
western Rashid.


5. (C) JAM also intimidated many members of the ISF and
several key provincial leaders into defection, compliance, or
silence. In the midst of the crisis, several elected
representatives and government employees made the instinctive
calculations. Policemen in the vicinity of Sadr City
reportedly abandoned their posts rather than confront JAM
members; some of these deserters may have either joined JAM
or facilitated its actions. Iraqi Army soldiers in
Shia-dominated areas reacted similarly, though to a much
lesser extent. IP required CF support to stay at checkpoints
in hot areas in eastern Baghdad, according to numerous local
reports and media accounts. IA performed adequately in
western Baghdad with CF support, according to Baghdad EPRTs.
Provincial Council (PC) Chairman Mueen al-Khademy (ISCI)
released a bold PC statement March 27 asking citizens of
Baghdad not to side with the "criminals and outlaws" seeking
to destabilize the city. Mayor Saber al Essawi (ISCI) made a
radio announcement that the Amanat is continuing to provide
its services to all areas of Baghdad, asking for patience as
Amanat staff were also "suffering" from the curfew. But
Governor Hussein Tahan (ISCI) remained conspicuously silent
during a time of crisis in his province. Shatha Al-Obeidi,
Governor Tahan's media advisor, told PRToff that the governor
seemed to want to avoid discussing the conflict raging in
Baghdad for fear that taking a position could hurt him or PC
members in upcoming elections.


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JAM'S WEAKNESSES: LIMITED APPEAL BEYOND CORE STRONGHOLDS
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6. (C) JAM achieved an impressive show of force in Baghdad
through brute intimidation. Muqtada Al-Sadr's (MAS) calls
for broad civil action across the city brought JAM members
and loyalists into the streets in a number of areas,
including 9 Nissan district, northern Adhamiya, the Shula
neighborhood of northern Mansour, and parts of Kadhimiya and
west Rashid. But it did not inspire broad popular support in
Baghdad. Quite the contrary - - a noticeable gap emerged
between the substance of Sadr's demands (widespread sit-ins
and demonstrations) and the actions of the majority of
residents in Baghdad (sitting it out at home).


7. (C) One local PRT contact described it as "the Iraqis in
the middle" -- those Baghdad residents who do not sympathize
with JAM, but also do not represent or work for the
government. These Iraqis caught in the middle -- Shia and
Sunni -- experienced insecurity, threats, food shortages, the
firing of rockets in front of their homes, the emplacement of
explosives in their streets, house arrest, isolation, and a
rapid deterioration in their purchasing power. As one
resident disgusted with JAM told PRToff, "Maliki is weak.
Here everyone is loyal to either their sect, JAM or money.
We need a powerful, secular leader."

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JAM'S "FOES": BADR- AND SUNNI-CONTROLLED
AREAS RESIST THE TIDE, REMAIN CALM
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8. (C) Sunni areas stayed calm and seemed comparatively
unaffected. Most residents in West Baghdad touted the
security provided by "Abna al Iraq," the local Sons of Iraq.
Though limited security incidents occurred in mixed areas,
these "fault line" areas remained more calm and returned to
normalcy more quickly than the Shia-dominated areas. Badr
areas like Atifiya in Kadhamiya and along the Karada
peninsula remained calmer than Sadr-controlled areas. One
local contact told poloff that he now avoids Shia areas and
travels through Sunni areas instead, "where nine months ago
they were slaughtering people." There were reports of
migrations away from restive JAM-associated Shia
neighborhoods into calmer disticts, e.g. Shia leaving the
JAM-dominated Shula neighborhood moving to stay with family
in other Shia or mixed areas like Karada. Sadists and
Badrists were said to be assassinating each other in at least
one area -- the rural Zafaraniya neighborhood of Karada
district.

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Some Empathy for Sadr City, but JAM-Powerbase Limited in
Baghdad
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9. (C) JAM is very much in Baghdad an urban mass movement
with weak appeal in rural areas. Surrounding qadas all held
steady - - because tribal and Sunni residents know who the
JAM members are. Over the past week, numerous reports shed
light on different Baghdadi perceptions of Sadr City. Many
feel sorry for Sadr City residents and believe that viable
employment opportunities would have prevented this kind of
unrest from ever occurring. Though blamed for senseless
killings, local JAM were also described on occasion as "our
sons" who must be "helped." There were frequent reminders
that JAM is not the only "troublemaker" in Baghdad. Several
people pointed out that Iraqis in general - but security
forces in particular - located in or around Sadr City
hesitate to kill local JAM for fear of tribal reprisals.
(Comment: Allegedly, tribal law only goes one way-it does not
apply to those who pledge loyalty to the government via
service in the ISF. Killing ISF does not "count." End
Comment.) For many Baghdad residents, blame for the violence
was directed not just at JAM but at the GOI for failing to
provide essential services.

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VERDICT: JAM CAN SHUT DOWN BAGHDAD, BUT THEY PAY A PRICE
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10. (C) The protests that began Easter Sunday were not the
massive uprising that we could expect were MAS to call an
end to the freeze and urge all of his followers to rise up.
Such a scenario could involve significantly more violence and
last for a far longer period. Nonetheless, JAM's actions
showed that its leaders can very quickly call on large
numbers of loosely coordinated armed supporters. Despite
command and control issues and confusion in Baghdad within
and between mainline JAM and Special Groups, MAS turned the

BAGHDAD 00001036 003 OF 003


action off around Mar 30 and most of his followers listened;
he issued very clear instructions, which were distributed to
all OMS offices: "get weapons off the streets." He could, of
course, also turn the protests back on. The price for the
mayhem they cause: dead JAM members and substantial loss of
public support. Many locals fear that JAM will never
surrender their weapons. One locally employed staff member
at the Baghdad PRT warned of the many IP uniforms, vehicles,
and weapons left in the hands of militia that will likely be
used for kidnappings, extortion, or other terror-related
activities. The sense of insecurity is compounded by the
increased volume of IEDs and EFPs set up since March 23.
BUTENIS