SADRIST SEEKS USG HELP IN "CLIPPING SATAN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000103

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: SADRIST SEEKS USG HELP IN "CLIPPING SATAN'S
TOENAILS"

REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 3375 (BADR-SADR ACCORD)

B. 07 BAGHDAD 3821 (IRAN IS EVERYWHERE)

C. 07 BAGHDAD 4048 (GOD AND SADR)

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Jawad al-Hasnawi, a senior Sadrist Trend
official and Deputy Governor of Karbala province, told us
January 10 that he and a growing number of other Sadrists
have come to the conclusion that Iran, not the United States,
is Iraq's greatest nemesis, and he proposed that the USG work
together with him and like-minded colleagues to "clip the
toenails of Satan" by ridding Iraq of what he characterized
as rampant Iranian penetration at all levels. Relating a
convoluted tale of his violent expulsion from Karbala by
alleged Iranian confederates within the GOI and ISF, he
complained that Sadrist arch-enemy ISCI/Badr and the Hakim
family "manage" Iraq on behalf of their Iranian masters while
duplicitously passing themselves off as democratic friends to
an all-too-gullible USG. The intense and bearded
30-something Hasnawi readily acknowledged that Iran has also
infiltrated the Sadrist Trend, particularly the Jaysh
al-Mahdi (JAM),and said Moqtada al-Sadr's six-month "freeze"
order is an attempt by the fiercely nationalistic and
virulently anti-Iranian Sadr to flush out elements who are
paid by Iran - often through ISCI/Badr - to discredit the
movement and attack Coalition Forces. He claimed Sadr has
already decided to extend the freeze beyond its scheduled
late-February expiration, and is keen to change the
movement's focus from "legitimate resistance" to delivery of
public services. Hasnawi grew visibly tense and replied in
the negative when asked whether Sadr was aware of our
meeting, but claimed that, as a member of Sadr's Political
Committee and a future senior leader of the movement, he is
in a position to establish an indirect line for us to Sadr by
introducing views to Moqtada that are often compatible with
USG perspectives and thus gradually change Sadr's fiery
worldview. We intend to arrange future meetings with Hasnawi
in order to glean further insight into the Sadrist movement.
End Summary.

America is Bad But the Persians are Worse
--------------


2. (C) Hasnawi, an intense and bearded man in his mid-30s who
introduced himself as the Deputy Governor of Karbala and a
member of the Political Committee of the Office of the Martyr
Sadr (OMS),was accompanied by the even more intense and dour
Ghalib al-Dami, who introduced himself as a Sadrist member of
the Karbala Provincial Council. They were joined halfway
through the meeting by Ibrahim al-Sumaydaei, a chain-smoking
Sunni lawyer who is often interviewed on Arab satellite
television news programs for his glib "Baghdad ground truth"
commentary. Sumaydaei, who confided that he once worked in
Saddam's intelligence service, brokered the meeting out of a
claimed nationalistic desire to foster understanding between
"moderate" Sadrists and the USG (we thought it imprudent to
ask the Sadrist interlocutors whether Sumaydaei had divulged
to them his shadowy Baathist past).


3. (C) Hasnawi's dominant and recurring message during the
90-minute meeting was that Iran - not the United States - is
the real occupying power in Iraq, and the Iranians and their
Iraqi confederates are well on their way to controlling
Iraq's political, economic, and Shia religious life at the
national level and throughout the southern and central
Shia-majority provinces. Acting on age-old ambitions to
dominate Iraq, he claimed, Iran is using Iranian citizens,
Iraqi sympathizers (some with family ties to Iran),and paid
agents to penetrate the Iraqi government, intelligence, and
security forces at all levels and do Tehran's bidding. In
addition, he claimed that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (an
Iranian national) and the rest of the senior Shia religious
establishment are beholden to Iran. Characterizing Karbala
as the center of gravity for Iran's comprehensive and
concerted infiltration campaign, he claimed the town is awash
with long-term Iranian residents (not merely religious
pilgrims) and that Persian is heard more often than Arabic on
Karbala streets.


4. (C) Hasnawi said he naively attempted several months ago
to alert Karbala government officials such as the provincial
governor (a member of the Dawa party) and police chief (a
Badr official) of the extent and scope of Iranian activity.
Rather than acting on his tip, however, Hasnawi claimed the
officials alerted their fellow Iranian confederates of his
discovery and orchestrated acts of harassment against him
that included the assassination of Hasnawi's bodyguards, an
arson attack on his house, the arrest of his brother, and the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest that was rescinded only
after Moqtada al-Sadr's top lieutenants weighed in with

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"Arab" GOI senior officials. He claimed the harassment
happened to coincide with a larger anti-Sadrist offensive
launched by the ISF in the wake of the late-August 2007
Shabbaniyah violence at Karbala's holy shrines: Hasnawi
insisted that the violence was a staged set-up by Sistani
gunsels and ISCI/Badr intent on killing Sadrists, but he
conceded with evident sorrow that Sadr's enemies have
succeeded in convincing the Shia street that Sadr and JAM
bear full responsibility for the "desecration" and that the
Sadrist public image has plunged as a result. Hasnawi and
Dami said they are unable to return to Karbala for fear of
violence and are thus unable to fulfill their duties as
provincial government officials.


5. (C) While Hasnawi rattled off a list of senior GOI
officials alleged to be Iranian moles (he listed, for
example, former PM al-Jaffari and Dawa CoR leader Ali
al-Adeeb and son),he reserved his strongest invective for
the "Persian" Hakim family and their ISCI/Badr organization.
He insisted that the Hakims and ISCI/Badr "manage" Iraq on
behalf of their Iranian masters while duplicitously fobbing
themselves off as democratic friends to the USG which, to
Hasnawi's claimed "amazement," appears "blind" to the Hakims'
pro-Iran allegiance. For example, Hasnawi intoned, ISCI/Badr
routinely teams with Iranian intelligence to run the
following scam on the USG using JAM members as bait: Iranian
agents recruit JAM elements to attack Coalition Forces or the
ISF and then give the "case files" to ISCI/Badr, which passes
such information to the Coalition. As a result, Hasnawi
continued with clear bitterness, JAM members are killed or
arrested, "innocent" JAM are attacked in the process, the
Sadrist image is further tarnished in USG eyes, and ISCI/Badr
and the Hakims appear as "white doves of peace" to the
Americans. He claimed ISCI/Badr sought a non-aggression
truce with Sadr in late 2007 (ref A) out of weakness and
desperation, but then quickly abrogated the agreement. He
said the agreement is "dead" and has no practical effect.
"When anything bad happens in Iraq," Hasnawi maintained,
"Sadrists will always think the Hakims are behind it."



6. (C) Hasnawi claimed that anti-Iran sentiments have long
been held throughout the Sadrist movement (ref B and C),and
he paraphrased what he characterized as a favorite saying by
Moqtada's late father Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr that, but for
the Sadr family, "Iran would crush Iraq with an iron foot."
In keeping with foot imagery, Hasnawi employed what we
understand to be an earthy Iraqi peasant proverb by inviting
the USG to work together with him and like-minded Sadrist
colleagues to "clip the toenails of Satan" and rid Iraq of
Iranian domination. He said that he was in a position to
provide significant and detailed information of Iranian
agents to the USG and he made no quid pro quo request. We
note that Hasnawi's anti-Iran rhetoric and proffered
intelligence regarding the identity of alleged Iranian agents
are similar in tone and scope to the rumblings of a group
claiming to be Sadrists from the Karbala, Najaf, and
Diwaniyah areas that calls itself the "Mid-Euphrates
Awakening" with whom MNF-I has had several engagements (ref
C).

Insights Into the Sadrist Trend
--------------


7. (C) Hasnawi denied press reports that Moqtada spends much
of his time in Iran, insisting that in the past year Moqtada
has visited Iran only twice - once on an "official visit" and
once when he believed his life to be in danger - and both
times he stayed only a short time. He stated with apparent
conviction that Moqtada "hates and distrusts" Iran, but
Hasnawi readily acknowledged that Iran has successfully
penetrated the Sadrist Trend, particularly JAM. For this
reason, he claimed that Moqtada ordered a six-month "freeze"
on JAM military activity in order to expose pro-Iranian
elements within the ranks. Hasnawi said that loyal Sadrists
will report such elements to trusted "Arab" GOI authorities
for arrest and prosecution, but he appeared flustered when we
asked how the Sadrists could trust a government they claim to
be under the complete sway of Tehran. He said that top Sadr
lieutenant Salah al-Obaydi had already announced Moqtada's
decision to extend the freeze order beyond its scheduled
late-February expiration. Hasnawi said past Sadrist
opposition to the USG presence in Iraq was thoroughly
justified, claiming that international law permits the people
of any nation to engage in "legitimate resistance" against
armed foreign troops on their soil, but noted that attitudes
toward the USG are beginning to soften to a limited degree as
an increasing number of Sadrists start to believe that
American troops will depart Iraq on their own accord but that
Iranian agents will never depart unless driven out by force.


8. (C) He said Moqtada wants to transition the focus of his

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movement away from "legitimate resistance" to delivery of
public services, and that this consumes much of the efforts
of the OMS Political Committee on which Hasnawi sits. He
claimed the Sadrists can operate within a democracy and
desire to work with any group, party, or individual (Sunnis
and Kurds included) that supports Iraqi nationalism and
unity. Hasnawi further claimed that the Sadrists welcome a
civilian - not military - USG presence in Iraq and can have
cordial relations with official American civilians. Hasnawi
grew visibly tense and replied in the negative when asked
whether Moqtada was aware of our meeting, but claimed that,
as a member of the Political Committee and a future senior
leader of the movement, he is in a position to establish an
indirect line for us to Sadr by introducing views to Moqtada
that are often compatible with USG perspectives and thus
gradually change Sadr's thinking.
CROCKER