PRT WASIT: 3ID DEP CG DISCUSSES WASIT SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001029

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV MOPS IZ IR
SUBJECT: PRT WASIT: 3ID DEP CG DISCUSSES WASIT SECURITY
WITH ISF AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS

REF: BAGHDAD 367

Classified By: PRT Team Leader Wade Weems for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Wasit reporting cable.


2. (S//REL USA, ACGU) Summary. On 29 March, 3ID Deputy
Commanding General-Support (DCG-S),BG Edward Cardon, met
with Wasit civilian and military leaders at the Wasit
Governance Center (GC),site of the ISF HQ during the recent
fighting against non-compliant Jaysh Al Mahdi (JAM) and
criminal elements. The Governor, Provincial Council (PC)
Chairman, CG 8th IA, and Provincial Director of Police (PDOP)
appealed for additional CF support for ISF operations;
described a recent inflow of fighters from outside Wasit; and
reported that most neighborhoods of central Kut are under
government control but militia elements continue to employ
hit and run tactics against ISF. In a subsequent separate
meeting, PC Chair Jabir told PRT TL and IPAO of his
frustration in dealing with Sadrist politicians. He
explained that although the majority of the al Kut populace
does not support JAM the militia's position is strong in Kut,
making negotiation right now unlikely. Sadrist political
leaders do not appear to be involved in the recent violence
in Al Kut. End summary.


3. (S//REL USA, ACGU) Accompanying BG Cardon were CDRs 214
Fires BDE, 8TH IA MiTT, ODA 5121, 3ID POLAD, and PRT TL and
IPAO. IA and IP officers and Iraqi government officials, all
appearing drawn and tired, filled the Governor,s cavernous
office. Governor Abd al Latif Hamad Turfa's welcoming
remarks were punctuated by volleys of small arms, machine-gun
and RPG fire around the GC. Turfa stressed that "criminal
elements are treated as outlaws, not as groups belonging to a
party, we have not targeted parties, we target killers."
Turfa said that it was time to "put an end to these people"
and restore Kut to "what it was before." The Governor
alleged that the fighting was fueled by an inflow of fighters
from other provinces, especially Maysan. PC Chairman Mohamed
Hassan Jabir, expressed disappointment in CF support to the
ISF thus far, claiming that other provinces had received
more, despite facing less violence. He assured the gathering
that he had "exhausted all political efforts to restore calm"
including calls to Sadrist officials in Najaf, Baghad and
Wasit.


4. (S//REL USA, ACGU) ISF leaders, echoed the requests from
the political leaders for additional CF support. MG Othman
Ali Farhoud Mishided Al-Ganimi, CG 8th IA, said his single
battalion in al Kut had limited supplies, and that insurgents
were effectively using snipers and hit-and-run tactics. He
asked BG Cardon for air support and for the deployment of the
1st Georgian BDE (1GB) at select checkpoints to block enemy
re-supply and reinforcement from Maysan in particular. PDOP,
MG Abd Al Haneen Hamud Faysal Al Amir, also expressed
dissatisfaction with CF support, emphasizing his need for air
support, but said coordination between the IP and IA was good
and morale high in IP units.


5. (S//REL USA, ACGU) BG Cardon noted that IA and IP units
had performed well against militia activity but added, to
general agreement from the Iraqi officials, that the ISF
problem is holding the ground gained from the militants. "We
need to generate more actionable intelligence through tips
and informants," he said, "while conducting a public
information campaign to inform the local population of ISF
operations and solicit their support- information operations
are essential." BG Cardon emphasized that CF had already
provided substantial support and said he would discuss the
additional requests for support in detail with MGs Othman and
Haneen. He noted that Coalition assets were also supporting
ISF operations in Baghdad and Basra, and therefore Wasit's
needs had to be kept in perspective. Finally, he noted that
CF support requires specific targeting information to be
effective."


6. (S//REL USA, ACGU) PRT TL and IPAO met separately with PC
Chair Jabir (Note. Jabir is a regular and reliable PRT
contact. End note.) Jabir expressed frustration that
agreements between provincial governments and Sadrists had
been reached in "Najaf, Samawah, and Hillah, but not in Kut."
Jabir said he made many attempts to initiate dialogue with
Sadrist political leaders, including CoR member Iman Jalal
al-Din and Wasit Sadrist office deputy Ra,ad Abdul Hussein,
who was recently appointed by the CoR as the interlocutor
between the Wasit government and Sadrists, but said his
efforts had been fruitless, as the Sadrist politicians
appeared to have "no rules" guiding them at the provincial
level. He attributed this to the fact that Wasit Sadrists
would not act without direction from Najaf, and thus far,
nothing coherent had been issued. He also described dual
Sadrist political and militant channels reaching up to Najaf,

BAGHDAD 00001029 002 OF 002


and that directions regarding militia action came through the
militant channel, bypassing the political. When asked
whether Sadrist politicians in Wasit could control or limit
the violence even if they issued decisive statements, Jabir
said they could not. And he said negotiation with militants
seemed unlikely because "they are too strong" and must suffer
some losses before they will seek negotiations here. When
asked whether all the fighters on the street were JAM, he
said that their ranks, which he guessed to number in the
"hundreds," also included some Fadilah and Jaysh al-Sarkhi
fighters as well as large numbers of unaffiliated criminals.
He noted a recently arrested fighter, Hussein Chuni, had
spent most of his adult life in prison for criminal activity
and belonged to no group.


7. (S//REL USA, ACGU) Jabir said that the Wasit town of
Aziziyah is "settled" because the citizens (possibly tribal
leaders) forced an ISF-JAM agreement, but he said Numaniyah
and Al Hayy were trouble spots that might spread to al Kut.
(Note. As we spoke, Jabir received a report of eight vehicles
arriving with fighters from al Hayy. End Note) He also said
that a high percentage of fighters were coming from outside
Wasit, naming Amarah as a source. Jabir said the citizens
generally support the ISF,s recent operations and that he
personally receives numerous text-messaged tips on militant
activities. Militants shut down markets, igniting looting
and reducing access to fuel, food and other essentials. They
also seized key facilities, including Wasit University.
These actions fuel popular opposition to militant actions,
Jabir said.


8. (S//REL USA, ACGU) Comment: Jabir,s description of
fractured and disoriented Sadrist political leadership
matches PRT views, supported by reports of differences
between Sadrist CoR members, the Wasit Sadrist office,
Sadrist provincial council representatives, and Najaf
political leadership. In Wasit, Najaf seems to work directly
through the military chain of command either because the
Sadrist political leaders are too disorganized to affect
tactical events on the ground or they are unable to face down
militants emboldened by the outbreak of violence across the
south. In either case, Sadrist political leaders do not
appear to be involved in the recent violence in Al Kut. End
Comment.


9. (U) This cable has been cleared by BG Cardon.
CROCKER