MCNS ON MARCH 30 REVIEWS BASRAH, BAGHDAD, NINEWA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001019

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2018
TAGS: MOPS MARR PGOV PREL PTER SY IZ
SUBJECT: MCNS ON MARCH 30 REVIEWS BASRAH, BAGHDAD, NINEWA
SECURITY OPERATIONS

REF: BAGHDAD 00880

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S REL AUS UK) SUMMARY: With PM Nouri al-Maliki still in
Basra, Deputy PM Barham Salih chaired the March 30
Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS)
foreshadowed by the sound of indirect fire (IDF) impacting in
the International Zone as participants arrived at the
meeting. The Committee, composed of deputies of most
ministries in attendance, discussed the recently released
statement of Moqtada al-Sadr and GOI response, security
situation and operations in Basra and Baghdad, and economic
and political steps to take once the fighting subsides. End
Summary.

Sadr's Statement
--------------

2. (S REL AUS UK) Deputy PM Barham Salih opened the MCNS
meeting with comments on the statement released that day from
Moqtada al-Sadr that called on his supporters to end all
armed appearances in Basra and other provinces. Salih
reported that PM Maliki had instructed government spokesman
Ali Dabbagh to issue a statement welcoming Sadr's statement
and re-stating the GOI's intention to pursue operations only
against criminal gangs, and not against any political party
or movement. Ambassador noted that Sadr's statement
presented an opportunity that should not be lost.


3. (S REL AUS UK) National Security Advisor (NSA) Muwaffaq
Rubaie reported on his conversation earlier that day with PM
Maliki. The PM ascribed Sadr's statement to the success of
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the crisis situation that
the enemy had found itself in. The PM reportedly considered
the forces opposing the government to lack coordination,
suffer from low morale, be in crisis, and preparing to face
defeat. Rubaie added that the PM would stay in Basra for an
additional two to three days. He also noted that the ISF
would pursue operations in Basra to regain control of some
police stations and the port, presumably the Port of Basra
but he did not specify. The D/PM indicated that the
statement, and its implementation, had to be studied
carefully before ISF stood down. Rubaie noted that ISF
operations would continue.

Military update
--------------


4. (S REL AUS UK) GEN Babakir Zebari, the Chief of Staff of
the Iraqi Armed Forces, and GEN Abud, the commander of the
Baghdad Operations Center, provided an update on the current
situation in Basra, other southern provinces, and Baghdad.
--Babil: 8th Division has control of the center of the
province, many IEDs have been placed, ISF is responding
vigorously when attacked or confronted, citizens are
cooperating with ISF, 65 criminals have been arrested;
--Karbala city and province are quiet and under the control
of the ISF, some small incidents, tribes are assisting the
ISF throughout the province;
--Al Kut in Wasit province is very tense, but calm, the ISF
having liberated the center of the city from armed men;
--Al Amarah in Maysan province is under cautious control, but
clashes over the previous nine hours with armed groups have
left dead on both sides, including one ISF commander;
--As Sumawah is calm, no clashes;
--An Nasariyah in Dhi Qar province has been tense due to
armed groups firing on ISF, air support is needed but tribes
remain supportive of ISF.


5. (S REL AUS UK) Babakir noted that because Basra operations
are under the PM's direct command, he did not have full
details of operations there. However, he could report that
the Karbala emergency battalion had returned to Karbala. He
praised the support of Coalition Forces (CF),in particular
four Apaches and several F-16s, for their crucial assistance.
He noted that there was good coordination with the
Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) and that the Iraqi Army
(IA) was reinforcing its men on the ground. Logistics
support was functioning; supplies to the troops were flowing.
He closed these remarks by noting the death of one battalion
commander in combat and that the tribes in Basra were working
closely with the ISF.


6. (S REL AUS UK) The commander of the Baghdad Operations
Center, GEN Abud, gave an overview of events in Baghdad since
March 24. He reported that while the ISF had not foreseen the
violence by militias armed groups, the ISF had responded
well. He stated that ISF procedures had worked, in part
because they had prepared for the worst and had found that
containing the armed groups had not been as difficult as

BAGHDAD 00001019 002 OF 004


planned for. He noted that attacks were declining and that
ISF were conducting night raids as of March 28. Over the
course of 5 days, 190 armed men had been arrested. Also, 192
weapons had been turned in on March 30. Most positive, he
said there were no indicators of coordinated attacks by the
armed groups.


7. (S REL AUS UK) Abud insisted that the situation in
Baghdad was improving, and called for a full, not one-half,
resolution of the problem lest it happen again. Most
important for the future of his country, Abud noted, was that
weapons must be taken from the hands of the people on the
streets of Iraq. Responding to the D/PM, Abud said that
conducting operations in Baghdad was like fighting in 15
provinces, but progress was being made, he insisted. Sadr
City and Shu'la were being surrounded to shut down their
malign actions -- the loss of one or two checkpoints was not
significant. He reported that about 18 ISF had been killed,
many more wounded, and possibly as many as 400 militia
fighters had died.

Iraqi Police
--------------


8. (S REL AUS UK) The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) Director
reported that the police in Baghdad had, in the main,
responded well. Few had abandoned their post and there had
been good coordination with the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in their
neighborhoods. There had been some cases, particularly in
the Shu'la district of Baghdad, of police surrendering
quickly to militia fighters, but this was rare. In Basra,
the picture was less sanguine. IPS admitted that over 400
policemen had been fired for dereliction of duty, and he
estimated that ten percent of the National Police in Basra
were bad and the police at their posts were scared and
intimidated. The Ministry of Interior had sent 15 police
commanders to Basra to stiffen discipline there.

AQI Infiltration
--------------


9. (S REL AUS UK) The Deputy Minister of State for National
Security reported that AQI might be sending 30 fighters into
Basra to inflame the situation there. He also reported that
85 militants had turned themselves in.

JAM and JAM-SG Split Healed
--------------


10. (S REL AUS UK) Deputy National Security Advisor Safa'a
lamented that this fighting had brought Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)
and JAM Special Groups (JAM-SG) together, though not the same
in all parts of the country, noting that in Najaf the
distinction was most pronounced. Re-establishing this wedge
would be important. The government must now consider
non-military steps to be taken for long-term success against
the militants, he added. Abud insisted that the criminality
must be stopped and weapons taken from the militants.
Babakir stressed the importance of dealing with terrorist
elements first then moving on to tackle the criminal militias
regardless of their political or ethnic affiliation.

CG's Views
--------------


11. (S REL AUS UK) MNF-I Commanding General GEN Petraeus
emphasized Babakir,s point that they should not lose sight
of focus on AQI, Ansar al Sunna, and their Sunni affiliates.
He asked the group to recall how AQI had set off
ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad and warned the committee
that there was intelligence evidence of Sunni regarding
female suicide vest bombers. He also endorsed Safa'a's
comments about the latest action having brought together JAM
and SGs when all had worked to separate JAM from the SGs over
the past year. GEN Petraeus observed that SGs had used JAM
as their defensive perimeter.


12. (S REL AUS UK) GEN Petraeus urged serious analysis of the
performance of all of the security forces. He stated that it
was essential to determine where there were weaknesses and
which leaders had not performed well. He noted that military
commanders of fighting units cannot be selected on political
considerations.


13. (S REL AUS UK) GEN Petraeus noted Basra was quieter but
questioned whether that could be a function of the ISF not
pushing as hard as the previous day. He also noted the value
of close air support and air weapons teams against IDF cells.
He also urged the group to be realistic about the reasons
behind the JAM statement and why JAM was pulling back. In

BAGHDAD 00001019 003 OF 004


addition to the JAM announcement, GEN Petraeus also cited
Coalition success against rocket sites and shortages of
ammunition among JAM groups. He noted that below-the-surface
political negotiations were already going on, to include with
neighboring Iran.


14. (S REL AUS UK) In Baghdad, IDF continued to come from
Sadr City and its periphery, but Rashid had remained quiet, a
credit to the efforts of the Implementation and Follow-up
Committee for National Reconciliation. MNF-I was not
conducting ground raids into Sadr City, but was working to
shut down and deny rocket and mortar launching points in and
around Sadr City. He added that the committee still needed
to clean up the Facility Protection Service.


15. (S REL AUS UK) GEN Petraeus also noted that attack levels
in the North were down 11 percent but that ISF and Coalition
were still busy in Mosul.

Looking Beyond the Battles
--------------


16. (S REL AUS UK) NSA Rubaie observed that political and
economic measures must be taken after the military effort.
He agreed with Safa'a and GEN Petraeus that the wedge between
JAM and SGs must be re-established. Rubaie cited the
progress made in Najaf and Karbala and observed that neither
city had seen the outbreaks of violence as other cities in
the southern provinces had. He also noted that the Sadrist
movement was not as cohesive as it had been since Sadr
announced his "retirement" from politics to pursue
theological studies. Most important, we could not lose sight
of the long-term vision for a military subordinate to
civilian control.


17. (S REL AUS UK) Ambassador noted that Iraq has surplus
funds in its budget that could be used to create jobs in the
short-term and develop the economy in the mid-term. The PM
should talk about this. The D/PM agreed, suggesting a growth
fund was needed but job creation now to draw potential
supporters away from the militants. He called on the United
States and the UK to support Iraqi efforts in this regard
with the International Monetary Fund(IMF). Minister of
Finance Bayan Jabr opined that capital projects were better
than giving money away, and that the IMF Stand-by Agreement
(SBA) required funds be used for development projects -- it
would take three months to get things going. D/PM Salih said
that was too long, funds for projects to create jobs were
needed now. He and Jabr must discuss with the PM, he
concluded. Spokesman Ali Dabbagh interjected that GOI
efforts for economic recovery and development must be
announced to show the people their government was working on
their behalf.

Humanitarian Situation
--------------


18. (S REL AUS UK) The D/PM expressed concerns about the
suffering of the people in both Basra and Baghdad. For the
former, the United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and his
office were coordinating the airlift of needed supplies. For
Baghdad, he advocated the lifting of the curfew during the
day if the security situation would allow it. (Note: The GOI
lifted the curfew in Baghdad March 31, at 0500 local. End
note.) UK Ambassador Prentice and Ambassador expressed their
support for UNAMI's efforts; Ambassador noted that the UNAMI
deputy Special Representative David Shearer would travel to
Basra to help coordinate assistance. Ambassador emphasized
that the GOI should lead and the international community
would assist in providing humanitarian assistance. GEN
Petraeus noted that Dr. Chalabi offered to go to Sadr City
and meet with the Sadr City Council as the preliminary step
in providing humanitarian assistance and essential services.
GEN Petraeus stated that it would be a very good idea if
someone from the Prime Minister,s office accompanied
Chalabi, adding that Dr. Safa'a constituted a fine choice.

Post Mortem Needed
--------------


19. (S REL AUS UK) The Iraqi National Intelligence Service
(INIS) deputy director reminded the committee of the need to
do an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy,
how well it did in battle, and what can be done to improve
security. D/PM Salih agreed that there must be an
examination of lessons learned, but later.

Next Steps
--------------


BAGHDAD 00001019 004 OF 004



20. (S REL AUS UK) After NSA Rubaie listed three goals for
Baghdad security (rid Baghdad of AQI, rid Baghdad of SGs,
remove all heavy weapons from Baghdad),D/PM Salhi wrapped up
the meeting with calls for closer coordination with MNF-I.
He added that when the Prime Minister returned, the
government needed to have a mechanism for assessing how it
did in meeting its own goals. He also reminded ISF
commanders present that lawlessness by the ISF, such as an
alleged raid for supplies on the Ministry of Health, was
unacceptable.
CROCKER