ISF GENERAL ON SECURITY SITUATION IN BAGHDAD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001010

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR IZ
SUBJECT: ISF GENERAL ON SECURITY SITUATION IN BAGHDAD

Classified By: Political Counselor Matthew H. Tueller for reasons 1.4 (
b,d).


1. (S) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: During a March 26 conversation,
amid a crescendo of unrest in Baghdad, Major General Abdul
Ameer, the Western Baghdad deputy commander and commanding
general of the Iraqi Army Sixth Division, painted a bleak
picture of the security situation. Abdul Ameer told several
USG callers, including Baghdad ePRT 6 Leader John Bennett,
that clashes in Basra had directly precipitated the
deteriorating security environment in Baghdad. He implied
that the Prime Minister had forced the start of military
operations in Basra before the military was ready for them.
With respect to northwestern Baghdad, EPRT team leader notes
that Iraqi Army leaders appear to lack the capacity to
respond effectively -- except with backing from Coalition
Forces -- should Jaysh Al-Mahdi and its breakaway Special
Group Criminals launch a concerted offensive, because the
Iraqi Army's focus on manning check points has diminished the
number of soldiers positioned to carry out military
operations. Moreover, many of its soldiers remain loyal to
militias, according to Abdul Ameer. We concur. END SUMMARY
AND COMMENT.

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BASRA OPERATIONS SURPRISE BAGHDAD IA COMMANDER
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2. (S) "We were surprised at the initiation of (military)
operations in Basra," Abdul Ameer said. "It came before we
expected it." (COMMENT: Abdul Ameer clearly implied that the
Prime Minister had forced the start of military operations in
Basra before the military was ready or possibly believed the
actions necessary. END COMMENT.) Noting that violence has
spread to northwest Baghdad -- which includes Karkh, Mansour,
and Kadhamiya districts -- Abdul Ameer expressed appreciation
for the support that his Iraqi Army (IA) forces have received
from Coalition Force (CF) units throughout the 2/101 BCT area
of operations.

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JAM, JAM, JAM -- AND NOT JUST SPECIAL GROUPS
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3. (S) Approaching one of the wall maps in his office,
Abdul Ameer pointed to all major areas of Baghdad and said,
"Jaysh al-Mahdi, Jaysh al-Mahdi, Jaysh al-Mahdi," as he
stabbed his forefinger on Sadr City, Kadhamiya, Shulla, and
other neighborhoods, adding the same to the areas leading
north and south from the capital. He stated that he believes
security incidents in Baghdad, including military attacks
March 25 - 26 against IA checkpoints and Coalition Forces,
involved more than Special Group Criminals (SGCs): "They are
main JAM as well." (NOTE: EPRT Leader does not fully share
this opinion, although there are likely crossovers between
some "regular" JAM and SGCs. END NOTE.) Worse, the general
added, within the IA as well as the National Police and Iraqi
Police, "The ranks are filled with JAM and Badr militia
members, some who even turn on us during battles to change to
the side of their militia."

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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ABOUT ABDUL AMEER
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4. (S) EPRT team leader notes that MG Abdul Ameer is one of
the most energetic and highly articulate generals with whom
2/101 BCT and its ePRT have had contact. At 43, he is also
one of the youngest generals, and reportedly a protege of
Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) Commanding General Abud.
Though Shia, he is adamant that sectarianism should play no
role in the military -- and he has even challenged the
civilian government on sectarianism. He said that his
division is 96 percent Shia in an audible aside at a recent
meeting co-chaired by General Abud and Implentation and
Follow-up Committee on National Reconciliation (IFCNR)
luminary Dr. Bassima Al-Jadri. This comment indirectly
challenged )- if she chose to hear -) Dr. Bassima's waxing
on the need to keep "balance" in the numbers of the Sons of
Iraq (formerly known as Concerned Local Citizens) being taken
into the Iraqi Police. Without disputing the percentage,
General Abud -) whom we believe views Abdul Ameer as a
protg )- cut Abdul Ameer off by saying that IA numbers
were not under discussion.


5. (S) While highly anti-militia, from our reading of Abdul
Ameer, he appears to worry that the Basra foray against the
Sadrists is a largely political decision of the Prime
Minister taken before the military was ready, and indeed
perhaps before non-military options had been exhausting. In
general, Abdul Ameer maintains that the IA is "significantly
infiltrated" by both JAM and Badr militias.


BAGHDAD 00001010 002 OF 002


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COMMENT: THE IA HAS LIMITED CAPACITY FOR
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN BAGHDAD
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6. (S) Abdul Ameer has been attempting to wean the IA off
its focus on the check points that abound in northwest
Baghdad's Karkh, Mansour and Kadhamiya districts. The EPRT
team leader has observed Ameer chairing joint security
meetings among IA, IP, NP, and CF, where he has consistently
pushed for a reduction in the number of traffic check points.
Indeed, the IA in northwest Baghdad is largely a
"check-point army" with little additional force for maneuver
operations. The 2/101 BCT estimates that the IA in northwest
Baghdad contains approximately 8,000 soldiers. At any given
time, the BCT assesses that only about 4,000 soldiers are
available; of that 4,000, some 3,000 are tied down in
check-point operations. Subtracting those who fill
headquarters and personal security details, only about 500
soldiers remain available for maneuver operations, including
patrols or task forces that could be used against a concerted
SGC/JAM take-down of check-points, particularly simultaneous
multiple attacks such as the capital is currently
experiencing. Thus, the small numbers of soldiers -- and the
soldiers' commitments to militias -- do not leave much room
for IA leadership at the division level and below to launch a
counter-offensive should there be a concerted JAM or SGC
offensive in northwest Baghdad, except with concerted backing
from Coalition Forces.
CROCKER