Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD1007
2008-04-01 16:11:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

HELPING THE NEGIHBORS MAKE SENSE OF BASRAH

Tags:  PGOV PREL IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0290
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1007 0921611
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011611Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6596
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 001007 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: HELPING THE NEGIHBORS MAKE SENSE OF BASRAH

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


S E C R E T BAGHDAD 001007

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: HELPING THE NEGIHBORS MAKE SENSE OF BASRAH

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (S) Observers trying to make sense of this week's fighting
in Basrah face a somewhat baffling array of narratives. For
PM Maliki, the Basrah operation was about asserting central
government authority over a city that had long been dominated
by criminals and extremists, and which was slipping ever
faster into anarchy. In contrast, the Sadrists and their
sympathizers saw the operation as a politically motivated
campaign by ISCI and Da'wa to suppress the Sadrist Trend in
advance of provincial elections later this year. The
Pan-Arab media saw the struggle as one of Iraqi nationalists
against the occupation and its local agents. Others viewed
the fighting as evidence that Iraqi institutions, including
the security services, remain largely ineffective and lack
public support. Still others saw the contest as a proxy
struggle between the U.S. and Iran, with the Iranians
determined to foment chaos in Iraq to advance Iranian
interests.


2. (S) What has been missing from most of these competing
narratives is adequate appreciation of the strategic import
of Maliki's decision. Yes, the decision to launch the Basrah
operation was impulsive. Yes, the planning and execution of
the operation left much to be desired. Yes, Maliki probably
bit off more than he could chew -- particularly at a moment
when the Iraqi Security Forces already had their hands full
fighting Al-Qaeda in and around Mosul. None of that,
however, detracts from the import of Maliki's decision that
the JAM Special Groups (and other JAM elements disregarding
Muqtada al-Sadr's ceasefire instructions) had crossed a red
line in terms of their defiance of central government
authority, and that it was time for the Iraqi state to
reassert its sovereignty over Basrah. Put in other terms,
Iraq's Shi'a Prime Minister demonstrated that he was willing
to put national interests before sectarian interests -- even
at the risk of provoking Iranian ire.


3. (S) This is a point that, from our perspective in Baghdad,
Iraq's Arab neighbors in particular have been slow to grasp.
It may be worth pointing out in Arab capitals that the Basrah
operation, though far from perfect, contained some
encouraging signs: This was a national operation, involving
Iraqi Army units that deployed as a national force and that,
by and large, stood their ground in a conflict where the
opposing force was on its home turf.


4. (S) It may also be worth noting that Maliki took a huge
political gamble by ordering the ISF into Basrah, and the
outcome of that gamble still hangs in the balance. The Arab
neighbors can help determine whether Maliki or the JAM
Special Groups (and, by extension, Iran) emerges as the
victor. There will never be a better time for the Arab
League and its members to demonstrate support for Maliki.
If, instead, the Arab world continues to shun Maliki, then
what incentive will his successor have for standing up to
Iran and its proxies? For those who believe that history is
made by individuals rather than by amorphous forces, there is
still an opportunity here to shape the outcome of this week's
events in Basrah. The Arabs should seize it.
CROCKER