Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD1005
2008-04-01 15:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

ANATOMY OF A BAGHDAD RECONCILIATION EFFORT:

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER KDEM PINR PHUM IR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0230
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1005/01 0921521
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011521Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6590
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001005 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM PINR PHUM IR IZ
SUBJECT: ANATOMY OF A BAGHDAD RECONCILIATION EFFORT:
MAHMOUDIYA QADA

REF: A. 2007 BAGHDAD 2847

B. 2007 BAGHDAD 3840

Classified By: Deputy Polcouns Greg D'Elia for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001005

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM PINR PHUM IR IZ
SUBJECT: ANATOMY OF A BAGHDAD RECONCILIATION EFFORT:
MAHMOUDIYA QADA

REF: A. 2007 BAGHDAD 2847

B. 2007 BAGHDAD 3840

Classified By: Deputy Polcouns Greg D'Elia for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT reporting cable.


2. (SBU) Introduction: Reconciliation movements in Baghdad
quickly spread through the province following the surge of
Coalition Forces and the success of the "Anbar Awakening."
Unlike other areas in Iraq with more homogeneous populations,
reconciliation in Baghdad must take root amidst a combustive
admixture of competing rural, urban, tribal, militia, and
political interests. To capitalize on local efforts toward
reconciliation, Coalition Forces and embedded Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs) had to quickly and carefully
broker local agreements designed to maintain security gains,
while working to sustain peace through the provision of
essential services, bolstering local governance, and creating
economic opportunities -- all the while encouraging the
Government of Iraq (GOI) to get into the mix. This cable is
the first in a series that examines the evolution of
reconciliation in Baghdad Province, offering a case study of
its development in Mahmoudiya Qada (county). Subsequent
installments will cover Tarmiya, Arab Jabour, and Sadr City,
among other areas. End introduction.


3. (C) Summary: A delicate reconciliation movement is
advancing in Baghdad Province's Mahmoudiya Qada -- once a
notorious part of the "Triangle of Death." In October 2007,
Mahmoudiya sheikhs -- 18 Sunni and 13 Shia -- met in the
spirit of reconciliation to determine ways to restore
stability. The sheikhs focused on security, governance,
economic issues, rule of law, and "social well-being" in a
conference hosted by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP),in
close coordination with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the
10th Mountain Division (2-10 BCT) and its embedded Provincial
Reconstruction Team (ePRT-4). The conference was the
culmination of a four-month initiative undertaken by USIP at

the request of those Mahmoudiya local government, tribal, and
civil society leaders tired of the havoc wrought by AQI,
militias, and criminal gangs. Shortly after the conference
2-10 BCT was replaced by 3/101 BCT, who continued to work
closely with the ePRT and Iraqi counterparts to improve
security and bring stability and normalcy back to Mahmoudiya.


4. (C) Summary cont'd: The respite from violence, however,
is a fragile one: tribal power struggles, political
rivalries, under-manned Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),poor
essential services, insufficient economic opportunities, and
weak provincial and local governments continually threaten to
undermine progress. On March 9, Provincial Council (PC)
Rural Services Committee (RSC) Chairman Sobhe Mashhedani
(reftel) traveled to Mahmoudiya to further reconciliation and
strengthen the tie between the provincial and local
governments. Even as the local and provincial governments
slowly address locals' needs and follow up on conference
promises, spoilers continue to pose challenges almost one
year after Mahmoudiya reconciliation efforts began. End
summary.

--------------
Mahmoudiya and the "Triangle of Death"
--------------


5. (SBU) Approximately 475,000 people from roughly 50 Shia
and Sunni tribes live in Mahmoudiya, which lies 20 miles
south of central Baghdad. Bordered by the Tigris and
Euphrates Rivers, Mahmoudiya was renowned before the war for
its rich agriculture, busy wholesale produce markets, and
convenient transportation links to Baghdad City. Before
2003, the area was largely tribal and Sunni. Saddam Hussein
stood up arms factories and rewarded loyal cadres with land
and villas in the area in an attempt to gird Baghdad against
the Shia-dominated south. Following the regime's collapse,
violence increased and massive population displacement
ensued, which undermined civil and tribal authority
structures and destroyed Mahmoudiya's social fabric and
infrastructure. Sunni insurgents and AQI made Mahmoudiya a
stronghold, attacking Coalition Forces, ISF, and the local
population. Today large numbers of Shia have moved to live
along Mahmoudiya's arterial lines leading into Baghdad, while
the Sunni remain primarily in the countryside.

-------------- --------------
The Surge Brings Security, Concerned Local Citizens,
and Hope for Reconciliation
-------------- --------------


6. (C) In May 2007, Mahmoudiya tribal leaders approached
Multinational Division-Baghdad (MND-B) to announce that they
were forming an alliance to fight AQI, Shia extremist groups,

BAGHDAD 00001005 002 OF 004


and Iranian influence. They also requested Coalition help.
MND-B reported that Mahmoudiya tribal leaders clearly viewed
this as a fight for their homes, families, villages, cities,
and country, and would take up the fight with or without
Coalition support. Multinational Division-Central (MND-C)
assumed the task to help build an outer security belt to
Baghdad's southern and western approaches, and military
operations by 2-10 BCT in the spring and summer of 2007
helped produce dramatic improvement in the overall security
situation in Mahmoudiya. Coalition and Iraqi Army (IA)
forces succeeded in capturing or killing large numbers of AQI
and other insurgents. As tribal leaders' predicted, AQI
extremism and brutality led many locals to turn on AQI
elements, beginning in West Zaidon in the Youssifeya area of
western Mahmoudiya. Reconciliation gestures, patterned after
the success of the Anbar Awakening, prompted further talks
between Mahmoudiya tribal leaders and Coalition Forces.
Initial security arrangements turned into a formal Concerned
Local Citizen (CLC) movement, which BCT commanders credit for
much of the improved security. (Note: CLC groups -- now
called Sons of Iraq -- later helped to clear areas stretching
from Abu Ghraib Qada down to Youssefiya in Mahmoudiya Qada.
End note.)


7. (C) Anxious to take advantage of the fragile improvement
in security, local government and tribal leaders worked with
the ePRT, Brigade, and USIP to develop a reconciliation
strategy. The first step was getting Mahmoudiya's fractious
tribes to agree on a set of broad social, economic, and
security goals. Getting buy-in from Sunni sheikhs in
Mahmoudiya and abroad was essential. (Note: Many of these
sheikhs are former Baathists that fled to Jordan after war
broke out in 2003. End note.) Sunni sheikhs -- embittered
over the loss of their positions and property and the
detention of tribal members -- also feared the rise of Shia
militias in Mahmoudiya. Consequently, many were actively
supporting Sunni insurgencies in Iraq.


8. (C) Then, in August 2007, Mahmoudiya Qaim Makam (Mayor)
Muayid formed a mixed Sunni-Shia delegation of local
government and military leaders, tribal sheikhs, and civil
society representatives to travel to Amman, Jordan to bring
the Sunni sheikhs onboard. (Note: PC RSC Chairman Sobhe
Mashhedani also traveled to Amman to participate in the
talks. End note.) The Mahmoudiya sheikhs based in Amman
initially received the Mahmoudiya delegation with suspicion
and some hostility, but the delegation successfully convinced
several key leaders to use their influence to support
reconciliation initiatives, commencing with the creation of a
tribal council in Mahmoudiya. (Note: These councils later
grew in number in Mahmoudiya under several names, such as
"support" and "awakening" councils. End note.)

--------------
Reconciliation Formalizes, Stumbles,
Then Breaks New Ground
--------------


9. (SBU) In September 2007, more than 200 Mahmoudiya tribal
leaders met at an Iraqi Army base in Mahmoudiya to form a
tribal council patterned after their Anbar neighbors. The
council initially focused on assisting Coalition and ISF to
identify terrorists and vet emerging Sons of Iraq (SOI)
groups. Though inclusive of nearly all of Mahmoudiya's Sunni
and Shia tribes, the meeting evolved into a venue for the
airing of local grievances. (Note: The event was held
largely at the behest of the Ministry of Reconciliation and
Dialogue and dominated by the local Iraqi Army (IA)
commander, General Ali -- exactly the kind of showcase
meeting co-opted by GOI entities that the Amman sheikhs
wanted to avoid. End note.)


10. (SBU) Anxious to revitalize the effort and raise its
level of visibility, the Mahmoudiya tribal leaders pressed
for a conference in Baghdad's International Zone. More than
30 Iraqi media outlets and international press covered the
event. The 2-10 BCT and ePRT-4 provided funding, security,
and transportation for the event and USIP worked with tribal
leaders to craft an agenda and participants list. USIP's
conference design emphasized developing solutions to current
problems vice airing historic grievances. Conference
participants worked in five topical groups -- security,
governance, rule of law, economic issues, and social well
being -- to identify three goals for each topic over a
three-year planning horizon. On the final day of the
conference, GOI representatives from the Prime Minister's
Office, Implementation and Follow-Up Committee on National
Reconciliation (IFCNR),Baghdad PC, and Mahmoudiya local
government participated. (Note: PC RSC Chairman Mashhedani
was the only provincial official that attended. Other
notable absences were sheikhs from the West Zaidon area,
which had led the rise against AQI earlier in the year. End

BAGHDAD 00001005 003 OF 004


note.) The conference concluded with the announcement of 37
shared goals that the Mahmoudiya sheikhs committed to
achieving over the next three years. GOI officials in
attendance applauded the announcement and in turn committed
to carefully considering areas for possible implementation.

--------------
Political Machinations, Tribal Rivalries,
and Weak Government Slow Down Progress
--------------


11. (C) In spite of initial success, political rivalries,
tribal power struggles, and weak local and provincial
governments stymied further progress. In November 2007, the
Baghdad PC voted to replace the Mahmoudiya Qaim Makam (a
Communist who had actively supported the reconciliation
initiatives) with the previous Qaim Makam from the more
politically influential (and Badr organization, ISCI
party-affiliated) Kilaby tribe. (Note: Coalition forces
detained the previous Qaim Makam, Abu Karrar Jabir al Kilaby,
who was later released by the GOI. Abu Karrar, a former
Iraqi Army Warrant Officer, is close to senior ISCI/Badr
members and was not successful in his previous tenure as
mayor of Mahmoudiya. Reports of an increase in local
tensions followed the announcement. End note.) In addition,
weak Mahmoudiya local councils did not follow up locally the
shared goals agreed upon by the sheikhs at the October
conference, neglecting to raise them in official meetings.
Scant interaction between the Mahmoudiya local councils and
the provincial government diminished further any possibility
for action on the sheikhs' goals.


12. (C) By December 2007 belief in the sustainability of
Mahmoudiya reconciliation appeared to be waning among all
parties. Coalition Forces and USIP reported more complaints
from Mahmoudiya sheikhs about the lack of follow up from the
GOI. Frustrated with the lack of local and provincial
government action, ranking Mahmoudiya sheikhs called on the
Prime Minister's office to follow up on the GOI commitment
made during the conference to consider their shared goals.
(Note: PC members reported that while Prime Minister Maliki
appeared "surprised" by the lack of GOI follow up, he did not
order further action in support of the initiative. End
note.) Reconciliation efforts began to lose further momentum
in early 2008, although security remained intact under
improving cooperation between 3/101 BCT, local ISF and
growing numbers of SOIs. 3/101 BCT and ePRT-4 effectively
utilized Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and
USG civilian agency funding to begin local reconstruction
projects and micro grants programs to spur local economic
activity. However, sectarian tensions simmered as some Sunni
sheikhs began to publicly criticize the Shia-dominated qada
government of consistently failing to provide services to
Sunni areas.

-------------- -
Rebuilding the Momentum....Reconciliation Redux
-------------- -


13. (SBU) In February 2008, 3/101 BCT, ePRT-4, and USIP
launched plans to restart reconciliation momentum. PRT
Baghdad joined the effort with a plan to link sustained
reconciliation and security to improved GOI services
provision through more effective provincial and local
government interaction. (Note: This initiative is part of
PRT Baghdad's surge exploitation strategy. End note.) PC
RSC Chairman Sobhe Mashhedani -- the only Sunni member of the
PC -- agreed to champion the provincial government effort.
As chair of the USG-GOI Joint Rural Planning Committee
(JRPC),Mashhedani agreed that a provincial delegation to
Mahmoudiya would follow up on essential services issues
raised during the JRPC meeting on Mahmoudiya and streamline
the PC's interaction with the local government. He also felt
strongly that he needed to tell Mahmoudiya residents
personally that any further progress on services depends on
continued security, which makes reigniting reconciliation
efforts critical. Mashhedani committed to delivering this
message publicly and privately to Mahmoudiya government and
tribal leadership. In order to reintroduce the outcomes of
the October conference, USIP finalized a five-month "Media
and Dialogue" project for Mahmoudiya to spread awareness of
the sheikhs' goals and build grassroots momentum for pushing
GOI action on them.


14. (SBU) On March 9, Mashhedani and other PC members
traveled to the Mahmoudiya capital to launch the new USIP
initiative and announce approved GOI projects alongside local
government leadership. A smaller number of tribal leaders
and local press gathered at the same IA compound used for the
first reconciliation meeting in September 2007. After
welcoming all, local IA Commander General Ali briefly
commented on continued security in the area, then graciously

BAGHDAD 00001005 004 OF 004


deferred to provincial and local government officials.
(Note: General Ali's previous overbearing approach at the
September 2007 meeting had changed -- a direct result of
3/101's efforts to mentor the influential IA commander on a
more appropriate role for the army in local government and
community affairs. End note.) Mashhedani evoked the October
2007 conference, claiming: "Now that security is here, you
need all of us (the provincial and local government) to act
and we will, but you must continue reconciliation here."
Provincial and local officials announced key 2008-funded
projects to improve services -- primarily potable and
irrigation water -- in Mahmoudiya. (Note: Tribal leaders
applauded these projects. Mahmoudiya experienced critical
shortages of both last summer. End note.) They touted the
importance of overcoming sectarian differences to continue
security and facilitate better service provision and the
return of internally-displaced persons. The new Qaim Makam
passionately proclaimed: "We are Iraqis all -- we must
remember this." Provincial representatives emphasized to the
tribal leaders the importance of working with their local
government to ensure that they are providing the best
guidance to the provincial government regarding where to
focus service provision and reconstruction projects.


15. (U) In a significant gesture of non-sectarianism,
provincial and local government officials then traveled to
the Sunni areas of Youssifeya in western Mahmoudiya. On the
site of a Soviet-built electricity plant, hundreds of Sunni
and Shia sheikhs and other residents gathered to listen. The
optic of provincial representatives alongside local officials
in the Sunni western areas of Mahmoudiya sent a powerful
message. (Note: This was the first visit of the
Shia-dominated local government of Mahmoudiya to Youssifeya.
End note.) Mashhedani began the address: "This is a day of
transformation and peace. We represent the GOI and are here
to showcase improved security, listen to your needs directly,
and ask how we can help." Carrying Mashhedani's message
forward, GOI officials each spoke about continuing
reconciliation and the bravery of the SOIs. They credited
their ability to execute new projects to improve services in
the area to Youssifeya's security. In front of local and
international media, GOI officials voiced their strong
commitment to improving the lives of all the citizens of
Mahmoudiya.

--------------
Comment
--------------


16. (C) The failure of the GOI to underpin reconciliation
efforts in Mahmoudiya with visible improvements in basic
services, infrastructure, and agriculture may precipitate a
strong turnout during provincial and local elections, with
many voting against the leading local political parties (Dawa
and ISCI/Badr). This result could alter the political make
up of Mahmoudiya by introducing the possibility of a Sadrist
majority in the capital of the qada, challenged by
marginalized Sunni tribesmen and their rural backing. A
complete failure by the GoI could even lead to a resurgence
in violence, although MNC-I and the BCT believe this scenario
is very unlikely. The March 9 Mashhedani visit helped foster
the belief that there are tangible benefits to aligning with
the local and provincial government. Now local and
provincial leaders need to follow through. To help the GOI
maintain positive momentum, the BCT, ePRT-4, and the Baghdad
PRT continue working to bolster local government, spur
provincial government action, and strengthen the link between
the two. Whether this link can grow and improve without the
assistance of the USG is the most important measure of the
sustainability of recent progress in security and
reconciliation in Mahmoudiya. End comment.
CROCKER