MANAGING GREECE ON KOSOVO AND MACEDONIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000092

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS NATO MK KI SR GR
SUBJECT: MANAGING GREECE ON KOSOVO AND MACEDONIA

REF: A. SKOPJE 0032


B. SKOPJE 0017

C. ATHENS 0021

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b, d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Managing Greece over the next few months is likely to
be difficult on the key Balkan issues of Macedonia and
Kosovo. To leverage Greek behavior we should:

-- Engage the Greeks on Kosovo and Serbia, including through
extending an invitation to them to participate in
international structures for dealing with Kosovo and asking
then to lead some efforts to support Serbia,s transition;

-- Develop a coordinated message from partners -- ideally the
Quint -- and from high-level U.S. officials that highlights
the consequences of Greek behavior for regional stability;

-- take steps with Skopje to encourage progress in the Nimetz
process; and

-- Avoid linkages between Greek behavior on Kosovo and
Macedonia with unrelated Greek desiderata that could prove
counterproductive. End Summary

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High Stakes
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2. (C) U.S./Greek relations are never frictionless or
serene, but the coming months have the potential to be
especially difficult. Our paths on two critical related
issues -- Macedonia and Kosovo -- diverge; we need to
influence Greece to play a more constructive role on both
issues. This cable lays out Embassy Athens' thinking on how
to do that, particularly during FM Bakoyannis, mid-February
visit to Washington.


3. (C) Bringing economic and political stability to the
Balkans is one of our highest policy priorities in Europe.
Greece has been an uneven partner in this endeavor,
responding positively in some areas -- such as providing
troops for NATO's Kosovo Force and the EU Force in Bosnia,
and in promoting trade and investment in the region -- but
not on our terms in others. On the two large Balkan issues
pending this Spring, we diverge.

-- Kosovo: The Greeks are disquieted by the prospect of
Kosovo's independence over Serbia's objections. Greek
antipathy largely stems from a knee-jerk affinity for the
Serbian position (based, among other things, on Orthodox
solidarity),but also from concerns of a possible negative
precedent for Cyprus and a possible reactionary response in
Serbia that could destabilize the region. We lay out the
counterarguments every chance we get, but have not been able
to sway the opinions of the public or policy makers. That
said, the current Greek stance can probably best be described
as a discomfited lack of resistance. The Greeks are not
taking steps to stymie EU decision making on a Rule of Law
Mission, they have pledged substantial personnel to the EU
Rule of Law Mission, they have pledged to maintain their
force levels in KFOR, they have provided staff for the
International Civilian Office (ICO),and they have also told
us that they will not block decisions on Kosovo in any of the
relevant international fora (OSCE, UN, EU). They aren't
enthusiastic, but they will not be spoilers. However, a
post-UDI Kosovo will require friends in the region who are
committed to its success, political stability, and economic
growth. And Greece can play a helpful role in mitigating
further self-inflicted wounds in Serbia and help them on the
path to integration.

-- Macedonia: Even more troubling is Greece's expressed (and
sincere) intent to block a NATO invitation to Macedonia,
absent an agreed solution on the name. Although this would
be contrary to Greece's obligations under the 1995
U.S.-brokered Interim Accord, the Greeks have made abundantly
clear that this decision is firm. We share Embassy Skpje's
ref A assessment that a Greek veto woul be highly negative
for Macedonia, for regional stability, and also for Greece,s
hope of eventually reaching an agreement on the issue.

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Influencing the Greeks
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ATHENS 00000092 002 OF 003




4. (C) In the near term, we need to exercise our influence
on the Greeks to get them in a better place on both issues.
We recommend the following:

-- Coordinated Messages from Partners: Although the U.S. and
UK have engaged with the Greeks on these issues, we do not
see indications that our other partners have. We believe it
important that the Greeks hear from Allies beyond the U.S.
and the UK of the consequences of Greece's policies for
regional stability. Such messages would have the most impact
if delivered jointly -- a Quint approach to the Greeks on
Kosovo and Macedonia would be optimal.

Our messages should include the following points on Macedonia:

o Support for the Interim Accord and expectation that Greece
will comply with its obligations and evaluate Macedonia on
NATO's performance based standards and not block an
invitation as "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"
should it meet those standards;

o Statement that we are encouraging Skopje and Athens to
engage seriously now in the Nimetz process;

o Encouragement for Greece to carefully weigh the costs and
benefits of blocking Macedonia's entry into NATO, including
thinking through how a post-veto scenario would bring this
long standing issue closer to resolution; and

o Assurances that the Quint will not accept a "wear them
down" strategy from Skopje, but will continue to press for a
mutually acceptable resolution for as long as it takes.

The last point is particularly important as senior Greek
officials are convinced that GOM leaders are not interested
in accepting a composite name for international organizations
and would use an invitation to NATO membership without a
final resolution as a way to further kick the ball down the
road while they chip away at any remaining resistance to
their constitutional name.

-- Balkans and Regional Role: The Greeks consider themselves
a key player in the Balkans. They want to be part of any/all
multilateral structures working in the region. We should
consider inviting them to participate in the steering board
for the International Civilian Office in Kosovo, even absent
rapid recognition of an independent Kosovo. We should also
find other ways to involve the Greeks in broader
considerations of stability in the Balkans and other regions.


-- Serbia Handlers: Although PM Karamanlis is not generally
motivated by additional responsibilities, we believe he and
FM Bakoyannis would be receptive to U.S. and European
requests to engage with Belgrade on behalf of the
international community, in the lead up to and the aftermath
of Kosovo independence. The Greeks are proud of their
"special relationship" with Serbia. Although the Greeks will
likely not be objective in dealing with Serbia, we do believe
they would faithfully convey concerns from the international
community to Belgrade and vice versa and could play a
important and useful role in leading a "friends of"-like
effort in the aftermath of a UDI to emphasize the
international community's interest in Serbia's future. This
would provide the PM and FM with some cover with the public
in the face of the difficult and unpopular political
decisions they will need to take with respect to Macedonia
and Kosovo.

-- High-Level Encounters: We note Embassy Skopje's ref B
recommendation for a White House meeting in March by
Macedonian PM Gruevski. In the zero-sum calculations of the
region, we should consider a concomitant gesture to the
Greeks. We note that the President has traditionally
received a senior Greek official in Washington for the March
25 Greek Independence Day, and we should extend an invitation
to PM Karamanlis to be that official this year. Such a visit
should not be limited to the Macedonian issue, but cover the
range of "strategic partnership" issues the President and
Prime Minister covered in their last meeting in March 2005.

-- Nimetz Process: The continued public drumbeat vis-a-vis
Macedonia's name/NATO prospects has led many Greeks to see
much of their broader relationship with the West through this
prism. Therefore, any progress that could be achieved would
not only pay large benefits related to Macedonia, but would
also spill over into other areas. We therefore support
Embassy Skopje's (ref A) suggestion to press Skopje to
propose a formula that goes beyond Skopje's current "dual

ATHENS 00000092 003 OF 003


5. (C) We recommend we avoid establishing linkages between
Greek behavior on Macedonia or Kosovo with Greek desiderata
on unrelated issues on the grounds that it is likely to be
counterproductive. A U.S. effort to link Greece's desire to
participate in the visa waiver program with Greek behavior on
Macedonia (or Kosovo) is likely to reinforce Greek
determination to veto Macedonian entry into NATO. The Greek
leadership would see this as an unacceptable threat from the
West, and PM Karamanlis could only take the position of
standing up against "unacceptable" U.S. pressure to maintain
Greece's position of principle. The Greeks may be able to be
talked quietly down from their tree, but they won't be
threatened or ordered down.

6. (C) Likewise we will need to reflect carefully on the
consequences we establish for Greece should it fulfill its
threats. We will need to bear in mind that the manner in
which we react can and will influence follow-on developments.
It is important our response not further complicate the
continuing need for Greece,s cooperation in supporting
stability in the Balkans and the possibility of the two sides
eventually reaching a compromise on the name issue, no matter
how remote that might seem at the time. We still have many
strategic interests in Greece that we need to keep in mind,
including the use of the deep water port and air field at
Souda Bay -- our key military logistics hub in the Eastern
Mediterranean -- and the Port of Thessaloniki as a key route
for transit of goods to Kosovo and the Balkans.
SPECKHARD