Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ATHENS627
2008-05-08 13:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

GREECE/MACEDONIA - FOSTERING PROGRESS FROM ATHENS

Tags:  PREL PGOV NATO MK GR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8559
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DE RUEHTH #0627/01 1291309
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081309Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1753
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000627 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: GREECE/MACEDONIA - FOSTERING PROGRESS FROM ATHENS

REF: A. ATHENS 596


B. ATHENS 92

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000627

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: GREECE/MACEDONIA - FOSTERING PROGRESS FROM ATHENS

REF: A. ATHENS 596


B. ATHENS 92

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Foreign Minister Bakoyannis and Prime Minister
Karamanlis continue the public line that Greece supports
Macedonian integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, but
only after the name issue is resolved. They continue to
profess that the next move must be Macedonia's to agree to a
name acceptable to Greece with a broad scope of use (they do
not view Macedonia's acceptance of the latest Nimetz proposal
on the eve of the Bucharest Summit as a significant
expression of flexibility). The Greeks also continue to
maintain that an acceptable solution must be comprehensive -
"erga omnes" - and make clear that the "Republic of
Macedonia" comprises only part of a larger/historic
Macedonia. Karamanlis and Bakoyannis have termed Skopje
"intransigent," and various Greek officials appear to be
backgrounding the Greek press that Greece sees little reason
for further negotiations under Nimetz' auspices until Skopje
"shows readiness to compromise." The Greeks also term
Macedonian PM Gruevski's call for a public referendum on any
solution as evidence of Macedonia's lack of desire to reach
an agreement. Finally, we are hearing from all our Greek
contacts that they see no possibility of further compromise
from Skopje until after the June Parliamentary elections and
the formation of a new government in Macedonia.


2. (C) Although we continue to press at all levels for
active engagement, flexibility, and creativity, we believe it
unlikely that the Greeks will be more energized until after
the Macedonian elections. We also assess that the Greeks may
be laying out a public maximalist line and that further
compromise from Athens may be possible should the Greeks
perceive concomitant movement from the Macedonians. In
particular, the Greeks may be led to revise their position on
an "erga omnes" solution in favor of Nimetz' most recent
formulation of a "domestic name," and an "international
name." Furthermore, the Greeks may also be persuaded to deal

with the sensitive issues of Macedonian identity and language
tacitly rather than explicitly in any document, if the
Macedonians could agree to the same. The Greeks, however,
will wait for what they deem as "credible" indications from
Skopje that it is prepared after the elections to move beyond
Nimetz' most recent proposal and accept some sort of name in
which the term "Macedonia" is modified by a descriptive
adjective before showing any additional flexibility. We
should continue to urge the Greeks to come up with several
names they can live with, and which the Macedonians have not
rejected, and provide those to Nimetz, rather than only
reacting to Nimetz' ideas. As we seek levers that will sway
the Greeks on this issue, we continue to make clear to them
our determination to reach a compromise soon so that
Macedonia can join NATO on the same timetable as Croatia and
Albania. End Summary.

--------------
The Greek Line
-------------- Qlthough recent public debQanpteadfastly maintained sue, and hint
that the next step is Macedonia's, and not Greece's, to take.
MFA Balkans Director Angelopoulos told us that Greece will
"gladly respond" to any indication from Skopje that it is
ready to consider names beyond the most recent Nimetz
proposal "Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)," which Greece has
rejected. It seems clear, however, that in spite of our
constant badgering, the Greeks are in no mood to offer
further compromises at this time, and they are awaiting
signals from Skopje.


4. (C) Post-Bucharest, Karamanlis and Bakoyannis have both
made statements that any solution must be comprehensive -
"erga omnes" ) and that the name that make clear that
"Macedonia" comprises only part of a larger/historic
Macedonia. And, the Greeks are not limiting their comments
to the Greek media; FM Bakoyannis made these points in an
April 29 Op-Ed in the Washington Times.


5. (C) The Greeks appear skeptical that they will receive

ATHENS 00000627 002 OF 003


the signals they profess to seek from Skopje, at least in the
short term. The Greek press is widely reporting various
"unnamed government sources" opining that there is little
reason to engage further with Skopje under Nimetz' auspices
until Skopje shows it is "ready to compromise." Furthermore,
in spite of our constant pressuring, virtually all of our
Greek contacts at all levels have told us that they assess
that Skopje will make no positive signals to Greece in the
run-up to the June Parliamentary elections. The Greeks
appear to expect little from Macedonia until after a new
government is formed in there. Our contacts point to PM
Gruevski's widely reported remarks about the need for a
public referendum on any name solution as an indication of
how dealing with this issue in Macedonia's heated political
climate could torpedo any prospects for further progress.

--------------
Fostering Progress
--------------


6. (C) Although we press all of our contacts at all levels
for active engagement, creativity, and flexibility, we assess
that the Greeks are unlikely to move off of their public
positions until after they know who their Macedonian
negotiating partners will be, and they see some indications
that those partners will be prepared to entertain changes to
the Nimetz March proposal. The Greeks will respond to
invitations from Nimetz for discussions, but they are
unlikely to take any steps to narrow further the differences
between the sides until this has occurred.


7. (C) Few levers are likely to influence Greek behavior on
this point. Although the Greeks value their bilateral
relationship with us, there is nothing on the U.S./Greece
bilateral agenda that assumes the political and public
importance in Greece of the name issue. Linkages between
Greek behavior on Macedonia with Greek desiderata on
unrelated issues is likely to remain counterproductive.
Explicit linkage of the name issue with Greece's desire to
participate in the visa waiver program (VWP) is likely to
have the reverse effect and make it more difficult for the
political leadership in the face of what the press will label
"blackmail" to sell out their cultural heritage. Likewise,
we need to avoid actions that could initiate a "tit-for-tat"
response that could jeopardize other strategic interests with
Greece, such as our ongoing unrestricted use of the deep
water port and air field at Souda Bay -- our key military
logistics hub in the Eastern Mediterranean -- and the Port
of Thessaloniki as a key route for transit of goods to Kosovo
and the Balkans.

-------------- --
Greek Flexibility ) Not Necessarily An Oxymoron
-------------- --


8. (C) We do assess, however, that the Greeks are laying out
a maximalist position that could be subject to further
revision under the right conditions. Should the Greeks deem
that the Macedonians are prepared to move beyond the most
recent Nimetz proposal towards a name that is more acceptable
to Greece, we could envision a concomitant change in the
Greek position in the following areas for example:

-- Scope of Application: Although the Greeks insist on "erga
omnes," we assess that they may be led to revise this
position in favor of Nimetz' most recent suggestion of a
"domestic name" and an "international name" as laid out in
the March proposal. We can also expect the Greeks to
continue to seek assurances that the "international name"
will be used for bilateral relations, including by the U.S.
(in spite of our having given no hope on the latter).

-- Macedonian Identity and Language: We assess that there
may also be greater flexibility on how best to handle the
sensitive issue of Macedonian identity and language (e.g.
what understandings exist for use of the adjective
"Macedonian"). Greek negotiators have emphasized to us that
an explicit affirmation of a Macedonian people and Macedonian
language in the document (as PM Gruevski seems to insist on)
would impose an insurmountable barrier for ratification of
the agreement in the Greek Parliament. They acknowledge
that, if the agreement is silent on "the adjective," the
Macedonians will likely get what they need from everyone in
the world (except Greece) through everyday usage. To make it
into a public issue, however, will make negotiations far more
complex than they already are.

--------------
Ready for A Deal ) But On Their Terms
--------------


ATHENS 00000627 003 OF 003



9. (C) In short, the Greeks want to get this behind them,
but are unwilling to make many concessions in their positions
to do so. They see Macedonia as the demander; they
accordingly expect Skopje to make further concessions to
achieve a deal. The difficulty of negotiation is overlaid
with the ubiquitous condescension with which Greeks speak to
and about Macedonians. GOG spokesmen swear to us that they
are doing their best to speak with respect for the
"Skopjeans," but their success is limited, and the Greek
press makes no such effort.


10. (C) Limited additional Greek flexibility is possible,
but in spite of our best efforts to push Greece to show
initiative in the negotiations, the Greeks are likely to
continue to wait until after the Macedonian elections and a
move by Skopje to show further flexibility on the name in
line with the geographic or other adjective that is in front
of "Macedonia" and gives connotation that it is only a part
of the broader Macedonia. Our stance, hardball or softball,
is unlikely to affect their political calculations in the
near term. In spite of this, the Embassy will continue to
use every opportunity to press them to recognize their
responsibility and interest to follow up on their commitment
to work expeditiously to find a solution to this longstanding
problem.
SPECKHARD