Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ATHENS313
2008-03-04 15:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

FM BAKOYANNIS ON MACEDONIA, KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN,

Tags:  PREL PGOV CMGT CVIS MK NATO AF GR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ9489
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #0313/01 0641508
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041508Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1351
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0295
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000313 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV CMGT CVIS MK NATO AF GR
SUBJECT: FM BAKOYANNIS ON MACEDONIA, KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN,
AND VISA WAIVER

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000313

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV CMGT CVIS MK NATO AF GR
SUBJECT: FM BAKOYANNIS ON MACEDONIA, KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN,
AND VISA WAIVER

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a March 3 meeting, FM Bakoyannis told Ambassador
Speckhard that she will tell NATO FMs March 6 that Greece is
not ready for a NATO invitation for Macedonia and expects
Alliance solidarity on this issue. Greece remains ready to
make a deal on a composite name -- using "upper" or "new"
Macedonia -- but will not go much further. Greece is ready
to negotiate on the basis of the Nimetz proposal, but
believes Skopje is unwilling to do so. Ambassador Speckhard
noted that this is not our understanding of Skopje's
position, emphasized the strategic importance of a NATO
invitation for Skopje for regional stability, and requested
that Greece show maximum flexibility in the Nimetz talks.


2. (C) On Kosovo, FM Bakoyannis made no commitments on
recognition, but said Greece is using its good offices to
keep Belgrade focused on its European future. Ambassador
Speckhard thanked her for recent public comments by the Greek
Ambassador in Belgrade. Ambassador Speckhard asked that
Greece provide greater support for ISAF -- specifically
requesting embedded trainers (OMLTs),helicopters, and a
lifting of the caveat limiting deployments to Kabul.
Bakoyannis said Greece is providing an OMLT, but cannot lift
the caveat or provide helicopters at this time -- a point she
had also made to NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer
earlier in the day. Finally, the Ambassador pressed for
Greece to take advantage of the opportunity to move forward
on the visa waiver program (VWP) by concluding the proposed
MOU. Bakoyannis said Greece must consult with the EU, but
will not await a global U.S.-EU agreement in this area before
moving forward. End Summary.

--------------
Macedonia Name - NATO FM Meeting
--------------


3. (C) Bakoyannis said her recent meetings in Washington had

been a good chance to explain just how sensitive this issue
is in Greece; 82 percent of Greek citizens object to any name
with the term "Macedonia." Nonetheless, Greece is ready to
negotiate on the basis of the Nimetz proposal (it can "be the
beginning of a discussion"),although Greece believes that
some points should be changed. However, Greece needs a
partner, and Macedonian name negotiator Dimitrov said "no to
everything" in last weekend's New York meetings. Skopje is
saying that the issue is a "bilateral issue." This is not
correct. Ambassador Speckhard said our understanding of the
Macedonian position is different, and we believe that Skopje
remains ready to negotiate.


4. (C) Bakoyannis said she will tell NATO Foreign Ministers
at the March 6 informal ministerial that "Greece cannot
accept an invitation for Skopje as long as good neighborly
relations are not assured." She noted that Greece is an Ally
and Macedonia is an aspirant. Greece will ask all Allies to
"help us persuade them to go in the right direction," but
will also make clear that Greece "expects Alliance
solidarity" on this issue. Greece will support an invitation
to Croatia and Albania. As a footnote, Bakoyannis said that
when Greece was a NATO aspirant, its own entry was delayed
for two years.


5. (C) Bakoyannis reiterated that Greece cannot accept a
name that "describes the kind of democracy the country has,"
ruling out "constitutional," and "independent." The name
cannot "monopolize Macedonia." The name must show that it is
"part of Macedonia" but not the "Bulgarian or Greek
Macedonia." Greece could accept "upper" or "new." She added
"we need a clear solution that is erga omnes and final."
Bakoyannis said the Greece has "gone as far as it can,"
adding, "our government will not fall on this issue. Once
was enough."


6. (C) Bakoyannis said she believed that the U.S. is "trying
to do what it can," and noted that Skopje needs to "work out
its judgment for itself." PM Gruevski can choose to present
his people with "a positive package" of successful entry into
NATO and Greek support for EU accession. She added that
Greece "expects the U.S. to help us." Should Greece and
Macedonia agree on a new name, the question of how other
nations might use that name will be "crucial." It would be
"very important to know" if the U.S. would use the new name
in bilateral relations, as this would be a "big help."


7. (C) Ambassador Speckhard reiterated the importance of
negotiating in good faith and in demonstrating maximum

flexibility. He reiterated that the U.S. is impressing on
Skopje the importance of coming to closure with Greece on
this issue, but emphasized that the U.S. cannot force either
Macedonia or Greece to accept a particular plan. The FM
replied that she had more faith "than anyone in Greece in the
U.S. capability to deliver a solution." The Ambassador
encouraged Bakoyannis to think about how any veto of
Macedonian NATO membership would influence regional stability
and the prospects for a negotiated settlement to this issue.
Bakoyannis maintained that Skopje has more to lose than
Greece, adding that it would "not be a catastrophe if Skopje
is not in NATO," affirming that the NATO veto is Greece's
"real fallback" should negotiations not conclude with
satisfactory results. The Ambassador warned that Greece had
as much to lose as Skopje if no solution is found.
Instability on its doorstep risks potentially much greater
consequences for Greece and the region if this issue is not
managed well.


8. (C) Immediately after the meeting with the FM, DCM
discussed the name issue with the PM,s deputy diplomatic
advisor, Constantinos Bitsios. For the first time in many
discussions of the issue, Bitsios expressed a personal
opinion that a bilateral agreement with Skopje would come
only after the Bucharest summit. He said that the GoG would
do its utmost to preserve as positive a climate as possible
to make that achievable, particularly in the statements of
government officials. He noted that he had spent the last
few days acting as a "pharmacist, handing out tranquilizers"
to media sources and MPs who had ratcheted up speculation
about "U.S. pressure." DCM noted PM Karamanlis' recent
statements of inflexibility in the Parliament and advised
Bitsios to keep in mind that statements that seem moderate in
the domestic context can still seem provocative in the other
capital.

--------------
Kosovo
--------------


9. (C) Ambassador Speckhard expressed our appreciation for
recent statements by the Greek Ambassador in Belgrade urging
the Serbian Government to be responsible and condemning
violence. The Ambassador encouraged Bakoyannis to continue
to use Greece's good offices in turning Belgrade to its
future as part of Europe and away from violence.


10. (C) Bakoyannis said that things will be "tense for a
while." Greece is particularly concerned about the North of
Kosovo, and she had asked NATO Secretary General de Hoop
Scheffer to pay particular attention to the region. She
highlighted in particular the need for special care to ensure
the protection of cultural/religious sites as she believed
the worst thing that could happen would be the destruction of
a church, monastery or other Serbian cultural site. She
affirmed that Greece forces will remain in KFOR and that
Greece will press for the ESDP mission to "go and stay and be
active." Bakoyannis said Greek officials are in frequent
contact with Serbian officials, noting that she would speak
with FM Jeremic March 4.

--------------
Afghanistan
--------------


11. (C) Ambassador Speckhard noted the critical need for all
allies to do more in Afghanistan and requested that Greece
provide helicopters, additional embedded trainers (OMLTs),
and lift its caveat limiting deployment to Kabul.


12. (C) Bakoyannis said that NATO Secretary General de Hoop
Schaeffer had raised the need for further contributions to
Afghanistan with her and other Greek officials earlier in the
day. She had discussed with Defense Minister Meimarakis how
Greece could best help and had decided to provide an OMLT.
She said Greek officials have been in contact with NATO
officials on the issue; although Greece had offered 8
officers, for now NATO only seeks 3. Greece also stands
ready to take over operations of the Kabul airport, and is
ready to redeploy a mobile hospital unit (that was withdrawn
last year). She had also discussed provision of helicopters
with Meimarakis, who reported that Greece could not spare any
helicopters at this time -- due to the need to have them
deployed in the Aegean. Meimarakis had told her that Greece
may be able to provide helicopters to ISAF next year, when
Greece will have concluded a purchase of additional
helicopters. Bakoyannis said Greece is donating 15 Leopard
Tanks to the Afghan National Army. On caveats, she said that
Greece is "among 22 countries" that have caveats in
Afghanistan, and that is unlikely to change.

--------------
Visa Waiver
--------------


13. (C) Ambassador Speckhard said that we had made
substantial progress in the past six months in our ongoing
effort to obtain visa waiver status for Greece. However,
this progress could stall should Greece await EU action
before negotiating and signing the proposed bilateral MOU.
Bakoyannis affirmed Greece's strong interest in participating
in the visa waiver program, noting that Greece has taken
major steps to qualify. However, Greece is also in the EU
and in Schengen, and if Greece is asked "to do more" than
other countries it would be "difficult." She noted that she
had told DHS A/S Barth in Washington that Greece wants "the
same status and requirements" as the other EU states, but
does not want "extra" or "special measures." Her bottom line
was that Greece cannot be "in a more difficult position than
France or Germany." And, whatever Greece does on this issue
must be "coordinated" with the EU.


14. (C) However, Bakoyannis agreed with the Ambassador that
Greece could not await a comprehensive EU-U.S. agreement
before moving forward on VWP. Greece is reviewing the MOU
signed by the Czech Republic. At the end of the day, the
Ministry of Interior needs to confirm that the MOU is
"acceptable." Ambassador Speckhard noted that EU members
already within VWP may not share Greece's interest in a rapid
and flexible resolution of the MOU issue. He affirmed that
the U.S. is "ready to engage as quickly as possible" on the
issue, and awaits the GOG response to our draft MOU.
SPECKHARD