SCENE SETTER FOR ATHENS GREECE (U)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001023

SIPDIS

EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2033
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS NATO TU MK GR
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR ATHENS GREECE (U)


1. (SBU) Welcome back to Athens, we look forward to your
important visit which comes at an important time in the
U.S.-Greece bilateral relationship. Since your visit last
July, ADM Fitzgerald (2-3 April),Lt Gen McFann (2 July),and
LTG Eikenberry (3 July) visited Athens and met with key Greek
military officers and defense officials. Although the
discussions were frank, all three visis were cordial
resulting in agreement to continue cooperative dialogue. You
will have offie calls with the Minister of National Defense,
Evangelos Meimarakis, and the Chief of the Hllenic National
Defense General Staff, Genera Dimitrios Grapsas. Mr.
Meimarakis is close to PM Karamanlis and calculates decisions
in terms of political consequences; he has therefore been
skeptical about requests for additional support in Iraq and
Afghanistan, as these missions are widely unpopular in
Greece. The Afghanistan caveats limiting Greek soldiers from
operating outside of Kabul and its environs are MOD imposed.
General Grapsas, a career Army armor officer, has been in
office since August 07 and is viewed as a pragmatic and
relatively apolitical leader. Unlike his immediate
predecessors, he has not used the press to advance Greek
positions on such issues as Aegean exercises or to object to
U.S. requests for more military assistance in ISAF and
Afghanistan. His lower-key approach has been beneficial, and
he should be privately thanked.


2. (C) Three key factors shape the Greek political-military
dynamic and its relationship to the United States. First,
the center-right New Democracy government of Prime Minister
Kostas Karamanlis ) re-elected by a slim majority in
September 2007 elections ) seeks to maintain good relations
with the U.S., though the U.S.-Greece partnership is complex
and, at times, tumultuous and the Greeks have accelerated a
long-term project of developing closer ties to the Russians.
Second, although Greeks have a deep respect and affection for
American culture and Americans in general dating to the
Marshall Plan and earlier, this is offset by Greek skepticism
about the American agenda and projection of U.S. power. Some
of this bleeds over into NATO; Greece probably has the lowest
levels of popular support for NATO in the Alliance, and as a
result, Greece,s participation in NATO operations is
politically sensitive. Notwithstanding these facts,
U.S.-Greek military-to-military cooperation is good (probably
the best aspect of our overall bilateral relationship),
particularly at the U.S. Navy base at Souda Bay on Crete,
which plays a key role in supporting U.S. military operations
in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, including Iraq.
Greece is also among the largest purchasers of U.S. military
equipment.


3. (SBU) You are likely to find the Greeks to be warm and
hospitable hosts but also staunch defenders of their
interests, particularly on issues touching on national
identity and territory. Some of the Embassy,s priority
goals include: 1) promoting stability in the Balkans in light
of Kosovo,s declaration of independence and Greece,s veto
of the Republic of Macedonia,s bid to join NATO at the April
2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest; 2) further cooperation in
combating Greek domestic and international terrorist threats
and in strengthening Greek borders against transiting
terrorists; 3) increasing Greek-Turkish cooperation and
stability in the Aegean and on Cyprus; and 4) expanding
trade with the U.S. and encouraging Greece to contribute to
European energy diversity as in develops as an energy transit
hub. Since your visit last year, there have been several key
political events that will undoubtedly influence your
discussions with Greek officials and others.

MACEDONIA
--------------


4. (SBU) Greeks consider the unmodified use of "Macedonia" a
usurpation of their heritage and warn that it could encourage
irredentism towards Greece's northern province of the same
name. We have repeatedly urged both sides to lower the
rhetoric and engage in negotiations led by Matthew Nimetz
under the auspices of the United Nations and have stated that
the U.S. would accept whatever solution Athens and Skopje
agreed upon through the negotiations. In the aftermath of
Greece vetoing Macedonia,s NATO invitation at the NATO 2008
NATO summit in Bucharest, we continue to urge both countries
to work for a mutually agreeable solution through the
UN/Nimetz process. However, the veto, and the popular
perception in Greece that Macedonia has been &intransigent8
in the negotiations as a direct result of &unquestioned U.S.
support8 has resulted in disappointment from both sides that
has clouded our relationship with Greece. The government of
Greece, however, is signaling its desire and intent to move
swiftly in finding a solution to the name issue, albeit on
its terms. Even those who know that this is not your issue
are likely to raise it with you; they just can,t help it.

KOSOVO
--------------


5. (SBU) Kosovo declared its independence on February 17,
2008, shortly after Serbia,s January 2008 elections. Kosovo
has been formally recognized by 43 United Nations Member
States, including 20 individual EU member-states, though a
number, including Greece, have not. Despite this, Greece
maintains substantial military forces in NATO,s Kosovo force
and is providing personnel and support to the EU,s &Rule of
Law Mission8 in Kosovo, to the International Civilian
Office, and to the OSCE Mission. The United States has
encouraged Greece to recognize Kosovo in the interest of
supporting regional stability, but we see little indication
Greece will recognize Kosovo in the near future. Greece is
playing a constructive role in urging Serbia to take a
forward-looking approach to its future in the European and
Euro Atlantic community.


ENERGY ISSUES
--------------


6. (SBU) Greece is seeking to play a prominent new role as an
energy pipeline hub to western Europe. We see the most
significant development as the Turkey-Greece-Italy
Interconnector (TGI),which is the first pipeline to carry
Caspian gas to Europe without going through Russia or through
Russian-controlled pipelines. It is an important step in
realizing our Southern Corridor strategy of increasing energy
diverQhave actively encouragQr gas from Azerbaijan. @reece; whereas currently
natural gas supplies coQGI becomes
fully opeQendence could be reduceQ


7. (SBU) Greek cooperation on energy with Russia has
increased significantly over the past two years. On April
29, PM Karamanlis and outgoing Russian President Putin signed
an agreement on cooperation on the South Stream gas pipeline.
While some view this pipeline as a competitor to TGI, TGI is
far more advanced in design and development and likely will
not be impacted. Meanwhile, Greece, Bulgaria, and Russia
have agreed to support the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Bosporus
Oil Bypass Pipeline (BAP) and share ownership. We support
this initiative insofar as it is commercially feasible. The
Embassy and Washington agencies have been actively promoting
with Greece the need for increased European energy security
and diversification. While normally discussed in the
economic circles, the energy diversity issue has enormous
national security implications for Greece and Europe.

GREECE-TURKEY
--------------


8. (C) Although Greece and Turkey still differ on issues
such as Aegean air/seaspace demarcation and Greece often
complains of alleged Turkish air incursions in the Aegean,
rapprochement remains a foundation for their bilateral
relations. Against the sway of public opinion, the GOG
remains supportive of Turkey's EU accession hopes and
understands that a Turkey in the EU is in Greece's long-term
strategic interest. The Greeks are quite nervous about the
potential &closure8 of the ruling AKP party and what that
might mean for democracy in Turkey and for Turkey,s
relations with the EU and Greece. The Karamanlis government,
in general, believes that their bilateral relations are
better off with the Erdogan govenment than any military
supported consevative alternative. Similarly, while there
now exists political will on Cyprus to resolve that island,s
status, the Greek view is that the current constitutional
crisis in Turkey is also likely to prevent significant
progress.


9. (C) As you know, the Greeks were deeply disappointed by
the NATO decision not to support NOBLE ARCHER 2008. You can
anticipate that all of your interlocutors will want to
discuss with you how they might craft an exercise in the
future that would overfly Agios Efstrations with NATO
support. You can also anticipate that your Greek
interlocutors will press you on the decision-making process
leading up to NATO's decision not to provide support to NOBLE
ARCHER 2008.


10. (SBU) On 1 July, Lt Gen McFann met with Gen Grapsas
Chief, HNDGS and others and discussed NATO air issues. The
inclusion or exclusion of Aegean islands in NATO supported
exercises and NATO-led exercises dominated the discussion.
Lt Gen McFann reiterated the NATO policy of remaining neutral
in these disputes and Gen Grapsas replied that NATO
neutrality always favors Turkish interests an$ tha4 They
cg5,d see no justification for noT inclUding the island of
Agios Efstratios in an exeraise. Lt Gen McFann stated that
this is a political and not a military question and
encour!eed the Gr%eks to raise this issue with NATO political
authorities and to seek written guidance frkm 4(e NATO
Secretary General.


GWOT CONTRIBUTIONS
--------------


11. (C) At every opportunity, and at every level, we
encourage the Greeks to contribute more to the war efforts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Although Greek contributions in Iraq
and Afghanistan are limited, Greek contributions to other
important GWOT initiatives are substantial and should not be
overlooked. Greece allows over 24,000 over-flights a year
and participates in OAE/OEF, KFOR, and UNIFIL. The U.S. Navy
and U.S. Air Force rely heavily on Souda Bay as a support hub
for sea and air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and
Southwest Asia. Although it is fine to thank them privately
during meetings, Greek public sentiment is strongly anti-war,
so the help Greece gives us at Souda Bay and with frequent
transshipments of ammunition are subjects they would like to
keep private, avoiding any public acknowledgments.

CONCLUSION
--------------

12. (C) Although it sounds cliche, your visit comes at an
important moment. In spite of the mutual disappointment
surrounding the name issue, U.S. and Greece share significant
common strategic interests. While we should not expect a
dramatic improvement in the short run of Greek attitudes
towards U.S. foreign policy or NATO, we both stand a lot to
lose if the relationship were to significantly deteriorate.
Fortunately, following the Secretary,s generally positive
meeting with the Foreign Minister last month in Berlin, the
relationship has stabilized and we are once again focusing on
areas where we can have productive cooperation. Your visit
will remind them that they are an important NATO ally, and in
spite of the veto at Bucharest, there is a lot of work to be
done together in support of our shared values and common
objectives.
SPECKHARD