Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ASMARA198
2008-04-04 08:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:
RARE INSIGHTS FROM PFDJ INSIDER
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000198
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ER
SUBJECT: RARE INSIGHTS FROM PFDJ INSIDER
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen for Reason 1.4 (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000198
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ER
SUBJECT: RARE INSIGHTS FROM PFDJ INSIDER
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen for Reason 1.4 (d)
1. (C) Summary: Hagos Ghebrehiwot gave subtle signals to
the ambassador that the Eritreans were ready to work with,
rather than against, the United States on bilateral and
regional interests. Considered to be strictly the bagman and
CEO of party-run enterprises, Hagos displayed surprising
political knowledge and adroitness, leaving the impression
that he is a driving force behind the Government of the State
of Eritrea's (GSE) overall political strategy. End Summary.
2. (C) In an April 2 meeting with the ambassador, Hagos
reiterated that all GSE/USG issues stem from the border
dispute with Ethiopia, stating he was "100% sure if the issue
is resolved most bilateral problems will disappear." He also
said GSE policies were not simply an excuse to keep the
Peoples' Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) in power
adding, "why would anyone choose to do things the way we do?"
and characterizing current policies as pragmatic, not
ideological.
3. (C) When repeating the standard party-line list of GSE
policy rationalizations and grievances against the United
States, Hagos' delivery seemed more puppet master than
puppet. The ambassador put Hagos on the spot by asking if he
knew the USG's position vis-a-vis the border, to which Hagos
promptly replied with a nearly verbatim restatement of the
policy. Hagos went on to highlight differences between the
USG's stated policy, i.e., the parties need to work between
themselves to implement an agreement, and what he
characterized as the USG's "actual" policy, which he claimed
is biased in favor of Ethiopia.
4. (C) Although Hagos referred to himself as a "hardliner"
in regards to GSE/USG relations, he noted most high officials
want bilateral relations improved. He cited
counter-terrorism as an area of common interest, mentioning
efforts to engage the USG in the 1990s and Eritrean support
for the United States after September 11, 2001. He also
listed a number of disagreements with USG policies in the
region in a frank but refreshingly diplomatic manner.
5. (C) Comment: The frank meeting with Hagos is a possible
step toward improved communication. Hagos' offer for a
meeting was sudden and surprising, given rebuffs to Emboffs'
requests for dialogue for over a year. The overture may be
linked to a letter dispatched from President Isaias to
President Bush on the border issue. End Comment.
MCMULLEN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ER
SUBJECT: RARE INSIGHTS FROM PFDJ INSIDER
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen for Reason 1.4 (d)
1. (C) Summary: Hagos Ghebrehiwot gave subtle signals to
the ambassador that the Eritreans were ready to work with,
rather than against, the United States on bilateral and
regional interests. Considered to be strictly the bagman and
CEO of party-run enterprises, Hagos displayed surprising
political knowledge and adroitness, leaving the impression
that he is a driving force behind the Government of the State
of Eritrea's (GSE) overall political strategy. End Summary.
2. (C) In an April 2 meeting with the ambassador, Hagos
reiterated that all GSE/USG issues stem from the border
dispute with Ethiopia, stating he was "100% sure if the issue
is resolved most bilateral problems will disappear." He also
said GSE policies were not simply an excuse to keep the
Peoples' Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) in power
adding, "why would anyone choose to do things the way we do?"
and characterizing current policies as pragmatic, not
ideological.
3. (C) When repeating the standard party-line list of GSE
policy rationalizations and grievances against the United
States, Hagos' delivery seemed more puppet master than
puppet. The ambassador put Hagos on the spot by asking if he
knew the USG's position vis-a-vis the border, to which Hagos
promptly replied with a nearly verbatim restatement of the
policy. Hagos went on to highlight differences between the
USG's stated policy, i.e., the parties need to work between
themselves to implement an agreement, and what he
characterized as the USG's "actual" policy, which he claimed
is biased in favor of Ethiopia.
4. (C) Although Hagos referred to himself as a "hardliner"
in regards to GSE/USG relations, he noted most high officials
want bilateral relations improved. He cited
counter-terrorism as an area of common interest, mentioning
efforts to engage the USG in the 1990s and Eritrean support
for the United States after September 11, 2001. He also
listed a number of disagreements with USG policies in the
region in a frank but refreshingly diplomatic manner.
5. (C) Comment: The frank meeting with Hagos is a possible
step toward improved communication. Hagos' offer for a
meeting was sudden and surprising, given rebuffs to Emboffs'
requests for dialogue for over a year. The overture may be
linked to a letter dispatched from President Isaias to
President Bush on the border issue. End Comment.
MCMULLEN